Military Handbooks And Standards Plus NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents Pertaining To Reliability And Life Cycle Cost
Military Handbooks and Standards
along with NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents pertaining to
reliability issues are here for quick search and download as PDF files. Brief
summaries of each document are provided.
You can also see a terse
list of the files for download.
Military Standards (MIL-STD) are generally imposed requirements and give details on what to do.
Military Handbooks (MIL-HDBK) are generally how to do documents intended to standardize and educate.
Military/Government (AD) are archive direction numbers for technical documents which can (theoretically) be retrieved from the National Technical Information Service NTIS. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents have these designators:
NUREG-(nnn) publications by NRC staff
NUREG/BR-(nnn) brochures by NRC staff
NUREG/CP-(nnn) conference proceedings by NRC staff
NUREG/CR-(nnn) publications by NRC contractors
NUREG/IA-(nnn) publications resulting from International Agreements
Easy access to important reliability documents is a service to the reliability community by Barringer & Associates, Inc. If you have other reliability and life cycle cost documents you feel should be included, send an Email notice with their URL’s to Paul Barringer. Additional MIL-HDBK, MIL-STD, and Defense/Federal specification documents are available from ASSIST Quick Search. Need a free PDF reader?
Redundancy Notebook, December 1997. 68 Pages.
The objective of the report is to present in a coherent fashion the information and tools necessary for the evaluation of most types of redundancy design configurations with which a reliability engineer is faced. The report contains a number of alternative evaluation approaches, both classical and unique. Closed form results and algorithms are derived for the evaluation of the reliability of various types of redundant configurations.
AD-A053406 Storage Reliability Of
Missile Material Program, February 1978. 66 Pages. Also identified as LC-78-2
This report summarizes analyses on the non-operating reliability of missile ordnance devices. The objective of the program is the development of non-operating (storage) reliability prediction and assurance techniques for missile materiel. Included are analyses of solid propellant rocket motors, gas generators, igniters, safe and arm devices, and other explosive devices. Reliability models are developed for each component type.
December 1978. 520
Pages. 25 Meg file.
This is also known as the F. Stanley Nowlan and Howard F. Heap RCM report, or just the Nowlan & Heap report.
This book explains basic concepts, principles, definitions, and applications of a logical discipline for development of efficient schedule (preventive) maintenance programs for complex equipment, and the on-going management of such programs. Such programs are called reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) programs because they are centered on achieving the inherent safety and reliability capabilities of equipment at a minimum costs. A U.S. Department of Defense objective in sponsoring preparation of this document was that it serves as a guide for application to a wide range of different types of military equipment.
There are essentially only four types of tasks in a scheduled maintenance program. Mechanics can be asked to:
1. Inspect an item to detect a potential failure mode.
2. Rework an item before a maximum permissible age is exceeded.
3. Discard an item before a maximum permissible age is exceeded.
4. Inspect an item to find failures that have already occurred but were not evident to the equipment operating crew
central problem addressed in this book is how to determine which types of
scheduled maintenance tasks, if any, should be applied to an item and how
frequently assigned tasks should be accomplished. The use of a decision diagram as an aid in
this analysis is illustrated. The net
result is a structured, systematic blend of experience, judgment, and
operational data/information to identify and analyze which type of maintenance
task is both applicable and effective for each significant item as it relates
to a particular type of equipment. A
concluding chapter emphasizes the key importance of having a mutually
supportive partnership between the personnel responsible for equipment design
and the personnel responsible for equipment maintenance if maximum RCM results
are to be achieved.
Appendices are included as follows:
1. Procedures for auditing the development and implementation of an RCM program.
2. A historical review of equipment maintenance evolution.
3. Techniques of performing actuarial analyses.
4. An annotated bibliography.
Nowlan & Heap report,
slightly modified, is available as bound paperback from the book shop from MRO-Zone
AMSAA Design For Reliability Handbook, Date circa 2009, Pages 50
This guide is written as an overview for both the manager and the analyst. It extends coverage of the design for reliability (DFR) process topics identified in ANSI/GEIA-STD-0009 [Reliability Program Standard for Systems Design, Development, and Manufacturing was adopted on 20 August 2009 for use by the department of Defense(DoD), and the document is available for US$100 from as ANSI. This document consists of the following four objectives:
1. Understand Customer/User Requirements and Constraints;
2. Design and Redesign for Reliability;
3. Produce Reliable Systems/Products; and
4. Monitor and Assess user Reliability].
The Design For Reliability Handbook expands upon the mathematical and engineering process steps required to ensure robust design.
While this manual is intended to provide a general understanding of the concepts and principles required, and serve as an outline to robust design, it is not meant to be employed without project specific tailoring. When used in conjunction with project specifications, it should serve as a basis for identification and planning of the appropriate process steps that should be utilized during the design process thus improving the system reliability of fielded systems.
Reliability Growth Guide, September 2000, Pages 205
Reliability growth is the improvement in a reliability parameter over a period of time due to changes in product design or the manufacturing process. It occurs by surfacing failure modes and implementing effective corrective actions. Reliability growth management is the systematic planning for reliability achievement as a function of time and other resources, and controlling the ongoing rate of achievement by reallocation of these resources based on comparisons between planned and assessed reliability values. To help manage these reliability activities throughout the development life cycle, AMSAA has developed reliability growth methodology for all phases of the process, from planning to tracking to projection. The report presents this methodology and associated reliability growth concepts.
[The technique is also referenced in the literature as reliability growth plots, Crow-AMSAA plots, Crow AMSAA plots, CA plots, C-A plots, C/A plots, Duane Plots, etc. See the November 2002 Problem of the Month.]
Because of the file sizes, the report is downloadable in sections:
Cover pages through Section 1-Introduction: Pages Cover-24 (1.6 Meg)
Section 2-Reliabilty Growth Planning: Pages 18-47 (2.1 Meg)
Section 3-Reliability Growth Tracking: Pages 48-86 (2.2 Meg)
Section 4-Reliability Growth Projection: Pages 87-133 (2.5 Meg)
Appendix A-Background: Pages A1-A5 (0.3 Meg)
Appendix B-Tables For Section 2: Pages B1-B43 (3.2 Meg)
Appendix C-Derivations For Section 2: Pages C1-C8 (0.2 Meg)
Appendix D-Derivations For Section 4: Pages D1-D12 (0.4 Meg)
Appendix E-Distribution List: Pages E1-D3 (0.1 Meg)
AMSAA-TR-736 Development Of A Mathematical Tool For Implementation Of Prognostics Based On Life History, October 2003, 100 pages.
In order to increase mission reliability and reduce the logistics footprint, considerable interest is now being focused on the implementation of prognostics. One approach to prognostics is to track usage in terms of mile, hours or cycles, and generate replacement-before-failure rules for components subject to aging whenever the system is preparing to enter a period during which failures must be zealously avoided (e.g., deployments or combat pulses). This report documents the development and notional application of a new tool that implements this approach. The tool, which is an extension of Mathematica, generates graphs and tables for a variety of metrics that one could use in an interactive decision-making process. Mathematica is a leading commercial software package for performing mathematics. Key chapters in this report constitute a basic set of electronic templates for applying the new tool. The tool itself is provided in the appendices.
AMSAA-TR-2006-4 Development Of A Mathematical Tool For Implementation Of A Prognosistics Decision-Making Process Based On Component Life History, March 2006, 134 pages. The key benefit of prognostics is that it can be used to reduce failure risks during deployments and missions when failure is particularly disadvantageous and maintenance inconvenient due to the reduced logistics footprint. One approach to prognostics is to monitor usage in conjunction with an aging model thereby keeping track of remaining component lifetime. This enables one to track usage with on-board sensors and embed an algorithm in on-system logistics software that will automatically generate maintenance alerts and recommendations so that a covered component can likely be replaced before failure as its remaining lifetime decreases and failure risk increases. An additional benefit of usage-based prognostics is that it can also be used to identify an optimum replacement age that minimizes life cycle costs for components that age, provided the costs of in-service failure are greater than planned replacement which is often the case. This report documents the development and application of a collection of functions written in Mathematica that can be used to implement usage-based prognostics using life distributions for components that become less reliable with usage.
DoD Directive 50001.1 directs the acquisition details for Department of Defense Programs (which drives life cycle cost and RAM models). DoD Directive 5000.2 directs the management principles. DoD Directive 5025.1-M directs procedures for managing all acquisition programs. For other RAM details see below.
RAM Guide For Achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability, 3 August 2005, 266 pages, 4.17 MB
This Guide supports the DoD’s fundamental principles ond procedures as documented in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price. This guide supports that objective by focusing on the four key steps necessary for building systems with the required levels of RAM:
1. Understand and document user needs and constraints,
2. Design and redesign for RAM
3. Produce reliable and maintainable systems, and
4. Monitor field experience and sustain RAM performance
Chapter 1 introduces RAM, what it is, why it is important, current RAM problems in the DoD, and activities appropriate to achieving satisfactory levels. It concludes with a guide for senior management. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the four-step model for achieving RAM, Chapter 3 focuses on Step 1 including RAM metrics, Joint capabilities integration and development, and pre-acquisition activities. Chapter 4 focuses on Step 2 and scopes successful approaches for designing-in reliability and maintainability. Chapter 5 focuses on Step 3 and expands this discussion through the testing, production and fielding of capabilities. Chapter 6 focuses on Step 4 and addresses methods for sustaining RAM through the operational life and providing lessons learned for the following generation of capabilities. Throughout the document, the guide also highlights the integration of RAM activities with the defense acquisition management framework, the joint capabilities integration and development system, and the systems engineering technical reviews.
DOD3235.1H Test & Evaluation of System Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability—A Primer , March 1982. 287 Pages.
The purpose of this primer is to provide instruction in the analytical assessment of system reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) performance. This text presents concepts and techniques for designing test plans which can verify that previously established system suitability requirements have been achieved. Test resource availability may be adversely affected by cost, schedule and operational urgency constraints. In such cases, alternate test plans which represent the most meaningful, timely and cost effective approach, consistent with these constraints, must be develop. It is essential that all participants understand the critical issues being addressed and the acquisition risks inherent in conducting a limited test program. The design and execution of sound test programs is no accident. It requires numerous hours of research and planning and a thorough understanding of testing techniques, the test system and its operating scenario. Further, the test results must support the development of realistic performance estimates for the entire production run, after having tested relatively few systems. Herein lies the usefulness of the statistical concepts contained in this text. Topics addressed in this text will familiarize the reader with the statistical concepts relevant to test design and performance assessment. In short, these topics, when combined with common sense and technical expertise formulate the basis of all sound test programs.
DOD-HDBK-791 Maintainability Design Techniques, March 1988. 232 Pages
purpose of this handbook is to provide Army design engineers with guidelines to
assist them in incorporating maintainability into
Army materiel early in research and development. Information collected from maintenance records provides practical examples—good and bad—that illustrate the design principles that result in maximum maintainability. The designer can use these principles to build maintainability into materiel and thereby contribute substantially to solving the Army’s maintenance problem.
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the principle of maintainability, its importance, and methods of achieving it. The following 10 chapters refer to simplification, standardization and interchangeability, accessibility, modularization, identification and labeling, testability and diagnostics techniques, prevention maintenance, human factors, and environmental factors—describe in detail their role in achieving the maintainability principles.
Data includes ergonomic details.
DOE-NE-STD-1004-92 Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document, February 1992. 69 Pages.
DOE Order 5000.3A, “Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information,” requires the investigation and reporting of occurrences (including the performance of root cause analysis [RCA]) and the selection, implementation, and follow-up of corrective actions. The level of effort expended should be based on the significance attached to the occurrence. Most off-normal occurrences need only a scaled-down effort while most emergency occurrences should be investigated using one or more of the formal analytical models. A discussion of methodologies, instructions, and worksheets in this document guides the analysis of occurrences as specified by DOE Order 5000.3A.
DOD-STD-1686 concerning electrostatic discharge see DOD-HDBK-263, and MIL-STD-1686C which is described below.
DOD-STD-1701(NS) Hardware Diagnostic Test System Requirements, June 1985, Pages 11 (This is NOT an authentic copy)
This document establishes the general procedures, terms and conditions governing the preparation and completion of a hardware diagnostic test system (HDTS). The purpose of this Standard is to establish the development criteria for the preparation and completion of the hardware diagnostic test system for systems, subsystems, and equipments.
DOD-STD-2167A Defense System Software Development, February 1988, Pages 49
This standard establishes uniform requirements for software development that are applicable throughout the system life cycle. The requirements of this standard provide the basis for Government insight into a contractor’s software development, testing and evaluation efforts.
This standard is not intended to specify or discourage the use of any particular software development method. The contractor is responsible for selecting software development methods (for example, rapid prototyping) that best support the achievement of contract requirements.
This standard, together with the other DOD and military documents referenced in Section 2, provides the means for establishing, evaluating, and maintaining quality in software and associated documentation.
Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) applicable to this standard are listed in Section 6. These DIDs describe a set of documents for recording the information required by this standard. Production of deliverable data using automated techniques is encouraged.
Per DODD 5000.43, Acquisition Streamlining, this standard must be appropriately tailored by the program manager to ensur that only cost-effective requirements are cited in defense solicitations and contracts. Tailoring guidance can be found in DOD-HDBK-248, Guide for Applicable and Tailoring of Requirements for Defense Material Acquisitions.
Software Quality Program, 29 April 1988, 15
pages, supersedes MIL-S-52779.
This standard contains requirements for the development, documentation, and implementation of a software quality program. This program includes planning for and conducting evaluations of the quality of software, associated documentation, and related activities, and planning for and conducting the follow-up activities necessary to assure timely and effective resolution of problems.
DOD-SEFGuide, System Engineering Fundamentals, January 2001, 222 pages.
This book provides a basic, conceptual-level description of engineering management disciplines that relate to the development and life cycle management of a system. For the non-engineer it provides an overview of how a system is developed. For the engineer and project manager it provides a basic framework for planning and assessing system development. The book is divided into four parts: Introduction; Systems Engineering Process; Systems Analysis and Control; and Planning, Organizing, and Managing.
DOE-STD-113499 Review Guide For Criticality Safety Evaluations, September 1999. 23 Pages.
This Department of Energy Standard is approved for use by all DOE criticality safety personnel. It contains guidelines that should be followed when reviewing Criticality Safety Evaluations that were developed by DOE Contractors to demonstrate the safety of fissile materials handling at DOE Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities. Adherence to these guidelines will enhance consistency and uniformity of review of Criticality Safety Evaluations across the DOE complex and compliance with either DOE Order 5480.24 or DOW Order 420.1 requirements.
MIL-HDBK-5 Metallic Materials And Elements For Aerospace Vehicle Structures, Rev MIL-HDBK-5H, 1 December 1988. 1653 pages (37 Meg PDF file size!)
[Metallic Materials Properties Development and Standardization (MMPDS) prepared by Battelle makes MIL-HDBK-5 obsolete and MMPDS-03 is the current version available in 6 volumes for US$599 for hard copy or US$499 for downloads—please note MMPDS-03 is covered under US Copyright—see http://mmpds.org for further information.]
MIL-HDBK-5H is intended primarily as a source of design allowables, which are those strength properties of metallic materials and elements (primarily fasteners) that are widely used in the design of aerospace structures. These metallic materials include all systems potentially useful in aerospace and aircraft applications, including those involving reinforcing components. This document also contains information and data for other properties and characteristics, such as fracture toughness strength, fatigue strength, creep strength, rupture strength, fatigue-crack propagation rate, and resistance to stress corrosion cracking. The use of this type of information is not mandatory.
In addition to the properties of the materials and elements themselves, there are some of the more commonly used methods and formulas by which the strengths of various structural elements or components are calculated. In some cases, the methods presented are empirical and subject to further refinements.
MIL-HDBK-61 Configuration Management Guidance, Rev A, 7 February 2001. 221 pages (1.4 Meg PDF file size)
This handbook provides guidance to DoD managers assigned the responsibility for configuration management on how to ensure the application of product and data configuration management to defense materiel items, in each phase of their life cycle. Acquisition practices, including the manner in which CM is specified in a contract, and the process of monitoring contractor application are evolving as the result of two interacting transistions.
MIL-HDBK-103 Lists Of Standard Microcircuit Drawings, March 2008, 861 pages
The Standard Microcircuit Drawing Program (SMDP) is directly under the auspices of the DoD Parts Management Program (PMP). The PMP is implemented by MIL-HDBK-512, “Parts Management.”
MIL-HDBK-108 Sampling Procedures And Tables For Life And Reliability Testing (Base on Exponential Distribution), April 1960. 78 Pages (6 Meg PDF file size) Also referred to as H-108)
This handbook has been prepared to meet a growing need for the use of standard sampling procedures and tables for life and reliability testing in Government procurement, supply, and maintenance quality control operations as well as in research and development activities where applicable.
A characteristic feature of most life tests is that the observations are ordered in time to failure. If, for example, 20 radio tubes are placed on life test, an t1 denotes the time where the ith tube fails, the data occur in such a way that t1≤t2≤…≤ t20. The same kind of ordered observations will occur whether the problem under consideration deals with the life of electric bulbs, the life of electronic components, the life of all bearings, or the length of life of human beings after they are treated for a disease. The examples just given all involved ordering in time.
In destructive testing involving such situations as the current needed to blow a fuse, the voltage needed to break down a condenser, the force needed to rupture a physical material, the test can often be arranged in such a way that every item in the sample is subjected to precisely the same stimulus (current, voltage, stress). If this is done, then clearly the weakest item will be observed to fail first, the second weakest next, etc. While the random variable considered mostly in this handbook is time to failure, it should be emphasized, however, that the methodology provided herein can be adapted to the testing situations mentioned above where the random variable is current, voltage, stress, etc.
MIL-HDBK-109 Statistical Procedures For Determining Validity Of Suppliers’ Attributes Inspection, 6 May 1960. 42 pages. (2.8 meg PDF file size) Also referred to as H-109.
The purpose of this handbook is to provide appropriate statistical tests and tables of critical values to Department of Defense procurement inspection and quality control activities for use in determining the validity of suppliers’ inspection records when sampling inspection by attributes is specified. Such records serve to assure the consumer that only supplies conforming with technical requirements are being offered for acceptance.
Also see ANSI/ASQ Z1.4-2003: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes.
MIL-HDBK-189C Reliability Growth Management, 14 June 2011, 149 Pages, (2.4 Meg PDF file size)
This guide provides an understanding of the concepts and principles of reliability growth. Guidelines and procedures to be used in managing reliability growth are also presented. This guide is not intended to serve as a reliability growth plan to be applied to a program without any tailoring. When used in conjunction with knowledge of the system and its acquisition program, it will allow for the development of a reliability growth management plan that results in a final system that meets its requirements and lowers the life cycle costs of the fielded system.
[MIL-HDBK-189B Reliability Growth Management, 29 April 2010, Withdrawn because
approved prior to full document coordination. It is released as MIL-HDBK-189C.]
MIL-HDBK-189A Reliability Growth Management, 10 September 2009. 403 Pages. (5.6 Meg PDF file size—contains many different growth models)
This handbook provides procuring activities and development contractors with an understanding of the concepts and principles of reliability growth, advantages of managing reliability growth, and guidelines and procedures to be used in managing reliability growth. It should be noted that this handbook is not intended to serve as a reliability growth plan to be applied to a program without any tailoring. This handbook, when used in conjunction with knowledge of the system and its development program, will allow the development of a reliability growth management plan that will aid in developing a final system that meets its requirements and lowers the life cycle cost of the fielded systems. It should be pointed out that this handbook is not intended to cover software reliability growth testing and planning, rather the intent only is to include software failures or incidents coincident as they occur and apply to the failure definition/scoring criteria from testing applicable to addressing reliability growth tracking.
MIL-HDBK-189 Reliability Growth Management, 13 February 1981. 155 Pages. (5.2 Meg PDF file size)
This handbook provides procuring activities and development contractors with an understanding of the concepts and principles of reliability growth, advantages of managing reliability growth, and guidelines and procedures to be used in managing reliability growth. It should be noted that this handbook is not intended to serve as a reliability growth plan to be applied to a program without any tailoring. This handbook, when used in conjunction with knowledge of the system and its development program, will allow the development of a reliability growth management plan that will aid in developing a final system that meets its requirements and lowers the life cycle cost of the fielded systems. [This document describes the Duane method of reliability growth and becomes the Duane AMSAA methodology which today is described as the Crow-AMSAA reliability growth model.]
MIL-HDBK-217F Reliability Prediction Of
Electronic Equipment, January 1990. 205 Pages. (15.3 Meg PDF file size)
The purpose of this handbook is to establish and maintain consistent and uniform methods for estimating the inherent reliability (i.e., the reliability of a mature design) of military electronic equipment and systems. It provides a common basis for reliability predictions during acquisition programs for military electronic systems and equipment. It also establishes a common basis for comparing and evaluating reliability predictions of related or competitive designs. The handbook is intended to be used as a tool to increase the reliability of the equipment being designed.
The application of this handbook contains two methods of reliability prediction – “Part Stress Analysis” in Sections 5 through 23 and “Parts Count” in Appendix A. These methods vary in degree of information needed to apply them. The Part Stress Analysis Method requires a greater amount of detailed information and is applicable during the later design phase when actual hardware and circuits are being designed. The Parts Count Method requires less information, generally part quantities, quality level, and the application environment. This method is applicable during the early design phase and during proposal formulation. In general, the Parts Count Method will usually result in a more conservative estimate (i.e., higher failure rate) of system reliability than the Parts Stress Methods.
Rome Laboratory – ORACLE is a computer program developed to aid in applying the part stress analysis procedure of MIL-HDBK-217. Based on environmental use characteristics, piece part count, thermal and electrical stresses, subsystem repair rates and system configuration, the program calculates piece part, assembly and subassembly failure rates. It also flags overstressed parts, allows the user to perform tradeoff analyses and provides system mean-time-to failure and availability. The ORACLE computer program software (available in both VAX and IBM compatible PC versions) is available at replacement tape/disc cost to all DoD organizations, and to contractors for application on specific DoD contracts as government furnished property (GFP) A statement of terms and conditions may be obtained upon written request to: Rome Laboratory/ERSR, Griffiss AFB, NY 13441-5700. [see SRC’s PRISM software tool]
MIL-HBK-251 Reliability/Design Thermal Applications, January 1978, 697 Pages. (54 Meg file size!)
This handbook has been prepared specifically to guide engineers in the thermal design of electronic equipment with improved reliability. The primary purposes are: to permit engineers and designers, who are not heat transfer experts, to design electronic equipment with adequate thermal performance with a minimum of effort; to assist heat transfer experts, who are not electronic experts; to aid designers in better understanding the thermal selection of Department of Defense specification and standards for equipment; and to assist Navy personnel in evaluating thermal design during the various stages of equipment procurement and development.
This handbook recommends and presents electronic parts stress analysis methods which lead to the selection of maximum safe temperatures for parts so that the ensuing thermal design is consistent with the required equipment reliability. These maximum parts temperatures must be properly selected since they are the goals of the thermal design, a fact with is often overlooked. Many thermal designs are inadequate because improper maximum parts temperatures were selected as design goals. Consequently, the necessary parts stress analysis procedures have been emphasized.
MIL-HDBK-259 Life Cycle Cost In Navy Acquisitions, April 1983. 71 Pages. (3.4 Meg file size)
This handbook provides basic
information on life cycle cost analysis as a management tool for controlling
and reducing total costs. The emphasis
is on what the life cycle cost techniques are rather than on how to implement
them. The intent is to furnish an
overview of the points to address and the procedures to use when performing
life cycle cost analysis so that the analyst, wheatear government or
contractor, will be better able to conform to the acquisition manger’s
objectives. Without going into great
depth, those issues of most interest to the beginner are discussed, thus making
this handbook particularly used as an initial step in learning about and
understand life cycle cost in Navy acquisitions. These issues are:
a. what is life cycle cost
b. what are the objectives and requirements of life cycle cost
c. what costs are relevant and significant
d. what are the analysis procedures
e. what data sources and estimating techniques should be used
f. when and how to choose or develop a computerized model
Experience has show that these are the most pressing questions for those who are undertaking their first life cycle costing effort, and a document which addresses these questions can, in some measure, help to instill a cost management discipline which will result in more efficient cost reduction and cost control efforts in Navy acquisitions.
MIL-HDBK-263B Electrostatic Discharge Control Handbook For Protection Of Electrical And Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices), July 1994. 171 Pages. (15.1Meg PDF file size)
This handbook provides guidance, not mandatory requirements, for the establishment and implementation of an Electrostatic Discharge (EDS) Control Program in accordance with the requirements of MIL-STD-1686. This document is applicable to the protection of electrical and electronic parts, assemblies and equipment from damage due to ESD. It does not provide information for the protection of electrically initiated explosive devices.
Various segments of industry are aware of the damage static electricity can impose on metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) parts. The sensitivity of other parts to electrostatic discharge damage has also become evident through use, testing, and failure analysis. Trends in technology utilizing new materials, processes and design techniques, including increased packaging densities result in some parts being more susceptible to ESD.
Electrical and electronic parts which have been determined to be ESD sensitive (ESDS) include: microelectronic discrete and integrated semiconductor devices; thick and thin film resistors, chips and hybrid devices; and piezoelectric crystals. Subassemblies, assemblies and equipment containing these parts are also ESDS.
Materials which are prime generators of electrostatic voltages include, but are not limited to, common plastics such as polyethylene, vinyls, foam, polyurethane, synthetic textiles, fiberglass, glass, rubber, and other commonly used materials. Damaging electrostatic voltage levels are commonly generated by contact and subsequent separation of these materials by industrial processes and personnel movement.
MIL-HDBK-274 Electrical Grounding For Aircraft Safety, 1 November 1983 with change notices for 29 June 1990. 363 pages. (14.4 Meg PDF file size)
The purpose of this handbook is to provide aircraft maintenance personnel with the information required for electrical safety grounding of each type of operational aircraft in the U.S. Navy inventory. In addition, this handbook provides background information pertaining to the operational concerns for aircraft grounding, static electricity theory and how it affects aircraft, and techniques used for measurement of grounding points.
MIL-HDBK-276-1 Life Cycle Cost Model For Defense Materiel Systems Data Collection Workbook, February 1984. 407 Pages. (29.5 Meg PDF file size)
This handbook describes the elements to be considered in determining the life cycle cost of a materiel system. These cost elements and cost factors form the input and output structure of the Life Cycle Cost Model for Defense Materiel Systems. The handbook is meant to be a workbook for determining life cycle costs. Normally, a subset of the cost structure contained in this handbook and the Model will be prescribed for any given procurement. The emphasis is on what costs should be considered in developing life cycle cost estimates for controlling and reducing total costs. The handbook and the Model are specifically designed to give the analyst and the program manger complete control over the subset of the Model’s cost elements which is applicable to the system being costed and to select the most appropriate cost estimating methodology for each cost element.
MIL-HDBK-286 A Guide for DOD-STD-2168 Defense System Software Quality Program, December 1990. 66 pages.
This handbook describes the intent of DOD-STD-2168’s requirements, interprets those requirements, and provides recommendations for applying the standard on a software acquisition or support contract. See DOD-STD-2168 above and MIL-HDBK-287 below.
MIL-HDBK-287 A Tailoring Guide for DOD-STD-2167A, Defense System Software Development, August 1989, 210 Pages.
This handbook provides guidance to Government program managers and other program office staff responsible for tailoring DOD-STD-2167A for a software development or support contract. It explains key concepts of DOD-STD-2167A, presents tailoring considerations for DOD-STD-2167A, and describes how to tailor the standard and its associated Data Item Descriptions.
MIL-HDBK-338 Electronic Reliability Design Handbook, October 1998. 1042 Pages.
This Handbook provides procuring activities and development contractors with an understanding of the concepts, principles, and methodologies covering all aspects of electronic systems reliability engineering and cost analysis as they relate to the design, acquisition, and deployment of DoD equipment/systems. The sections include:
Reliability Specification, Allocation and
Reliability Data Collection and Analysis,
Systems Reliability Engineering
Production and Use (Deployment) R&M
R&M Management Considerations
Special details are described on pages:
· Pages 987-1042 Section 12: describes reliability management considerations
· Page 988 describes performance-based specifications for reliability
· Page 991 describes 10 reliability program management issues from customer and supplier perspectives
· Page 993 describes a template for reliability program elements
· Page 1003 describes a checklist for reliability program elements
· Page 1005 describes how reliability activities are phased into projects
· Page 1006 describes how reliability activities by life cycle cost phases
· Page 1012 describes the relationship between reliability and risk reduction with trade-off studies
· Page 1018 describes software reliability
· Page 1028 shows a graph with 70-95% of electronic equipment costs determined by the time equipment is specified on the bill of materials and accepted by the design review and a graph showing expenditures incurred during the life cycle.
· Page 1031 describes life cycle cost concepts and activities performed during the different phases of concept/definition/development/production
· Page 1032 describes types of product performance agreements
MIL-HDBK-344A Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) Of Electronic Equipment, August 1993 102 Pages.
This Handbook provides uniform procedures, methods and techniques for planning, monitoring and controlling the cost effectiveness of ESS programs for electronic equipment. It is intended to support the requirements of MIL-STD-785, Task 301, “Environmental Stress Screening” and/or MIL-STD-781, Task 401, “Environmental Stress Screening: and to implement Air Force R &M 2000 ESS recommendations and guidelines.
The Handbook is intended for use by procuring activities and contractors during development and production. It is not intended that the Handbook procedures and techniques be used in a cookbook fashion. Knowledge of the equipment and the manufacturing process is essential for a properly planned and tailored ESS program. The data base needed for a systematic approach to ESS application is not fully developed. Use of the Handbook by Government procuring agencies and equipment manufacturers will foster the development of an improved and broader data base.
A properly applied ESS program can significantly impact the quality and reliability of electronic products delivered to the Government. ESS is interrelated with the requirements set forth in MIL-Q-9858, MIL-STD-785, MIL-STD-781, and MIL-HDBK-781. Quality Control is a manufacturing function and Reliability Engineering is a design function. Although the Quality and Reliability disciplines are related, in practice, they are conducted as separate programs without common objectives. The Handbook uses the ESS program as a means for integrating Quality Control and Reliability Engineering tasks so as to assure achievement of reliability objectives during manufacture. Supporting software is available from Rome Laboratory that fully automates the details manual procedures contained herein.
MIL-HDBK-454 General Guidelines For Electronic Equipment, 15 April 2007. 208 Pages. This document was formerly MIL-STD-454.
This handbook is the technical baseline for the design and construction of electronic equipment for the Department of Defense. It captures in one document, under suitable subject heading, fundamental design guidelines for multiple general electronic specifications. The opportunity to focus on a single document, afforded to contractors, results in substantial savings to the Government.
This handbook provides guidance and lessons learned in the selection of documentation for the design of electronic equipment. This hand book is for guidance only. The handbook cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.
Also see MIL-HDBK-5400.
MIL-HDBK-470A Designing And Developing Maintainable Products And Systems, Volume 1 & Volume 2, August 1997. 716 Pages. This was previously known as MIL-STD-470.
This handbook is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD). It was developed by the DoD with the assistance of the military departments, federal agencies, and industry and replaces in their entirety MIL-HDBK-470 and MIL-HDBK-471 (both formerly military standards). The handbook provides guidance to maintainability managers and engineers in developing and implementing a sound maintainability program for all types of products.
This handbook is for guidance only. This handbook cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.
Maintainability is a discipline that has become more important over the past 30 years as military systems became more complex, support costs increased, and defense budgets decreased. It is also important in the commercial sector, where high levels of maintainability are increasingly becoming an important factor in gaining customer loyalty. In fact, American products that once were shunned in favor of foreign alternatives recently have made or are making a comeback. This shift in consumer preferences has been directly attributed to significant improvements in the quality of the American products, a quality that includes good maintainability.
MIL-HDBK-472 Maintainability Prediction, May 1966 + change notice 1 from 12 Jan 1984. 176 + 122 = 298 Pages.
The purpose of the Maintainability Prediction Handbook is to familiarize project managers and design engineers with current maintainability prediction procedures. To achieve this objective, particular care has been exercised in selecting and including only those procedures which are currently used in predicting the maintainability of equipment and systems. The highlights of each maintainability prediction procedure are presented in a clear, lucid and intelligible manner and include useful supplementary information applicable to specific procedures.
The prediction of the expected number of hours that a system or device will be in an inoperative or “down state” while it is undergoing maintenance is of vital importance to the user because of the adverse effect that excessive downtime has on mission success. Therefore, one the operational requirements of a system are fixed, it is imperative that a technique be utilized to predict its maintainability in quantitative terms as early as possible during the design phase. This prediction should be updated continuously as the design progresses to assure a high probability of compliance with specified requirements.
A significant advantage of using a maintainability prediction procedure is that it highlights for the designer, those areas of poor maintainability which justify product improvement, modification, or a change of design. Another useful feature of maintainability prediction is that it permits the user to make an early assessment of whether the predicted downtime, the quality, quantity of personnel, tools and test equipment are adequate and consistent with the needs of system operational requirements.
MIL-HDBK-502 Acquisition Logistics, May 1997. 139 Pages.
The Department of Defense is focusing on total cost of ownership throughout the life cycle. Achieving affordable support depends upon effective acquisition logistics management and planning.
This handbook offers guidance on acquisition logistics as an integral part of the systems engineering process. The information contained herein is applicable, in part or in whole, to all types of materiel and automated information systems and all acquisition strategies. However, this handbook does not present a “cookbook” approach to acquisition logistics—such an approach would not accommodate the vast, widely varying array of potential materiel acquisitions. It does offer examples and points to consider to help you shape your overall thought process. It addresses:
· How systems engineering fits into the acquisition process
· Supportability analyses as part of the systems engineering process
· How to develop supportability requirements
· The acquisition and generation of support data
· Logistics considerations for contracts.
· The logisticians role on integrated product teams.
MIL-HDBK-512 Parts Management, October 2000. 13 Pages.
This handbook provides guidance for implementing an effective Parts Management Program (PMP) on Department of Defense (DoD), industry and commercial acquisitions. The guidance in this document supports acquisition strategies and systems engineering practices of DoD 5000.2-R. This document provides performance-based parts management process guidance which is intended to be adapted to individual program needs and which provides appropriate latitude for innovative approaches and design solutions by the contractors. The objectives of a PMP are to reduce total cost of ownership and increase logistics readiness, and are achieved through:
· Promoting interoperability.
· Enhancing the interchangeability, reliability, and availability of parts
· Minimizing diminishing source impacts and parts obsolescence.
· Assisting in meeting end item performance.
· Assisting with parts selection and qualification procedures.
· Becoming compatible with the business environment and trends.
· Minimizing the proliferation of parts and drawings through standardization.
MIL-HDBK-515 Weapon System Integrity Guide, October 11, 2002
This document provides guidance on how to integrate the existing integrity processes within systems engineering, resulting in a more efficient and cohesive approach to engineering. In order to accomplish this, the Weapon System Integrity Guide (WSIG) contains three basic thrusts:
a. To integrate the efforts called out in the various
integrity processes, namely: the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP),
the Engine Structural Integrity Program (ENSIP), the Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program (MECSIP),
and the Avionics/Electronics Integrity Process (AVIP);
b. To synergistically integrate or coordinate specific
integrity process efforts/tasks with related efforts in various other systems
engineering disciplines; and
c. To place increased emphasis on the sustainment portion of the life cycle.
This handbook does not supersede the integrity process documents referenced. This handbook is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement.
Also includes FRACAS details.
MIL-HDBK-695 Rubber Products: Recommended Shelf Life, 23 May 2005, Rev. D, 45 Pages. (2 Meg PDF file size)
This handbook establishes guidelines for time periods for the expected life of elastomeric products during shelf storage. The use of the expected shelf storage lives listed herein is NOT MADE MANDATORY by this handbook. The decision as to whether or not a product will have a limit placed upon the time that it may remain in storage is a function of the agency responsible for the product’s ultimate use.
a. Products fabricated solely from rubber. These include solid rubber, cellular rubber and hard rubber (ebonite) items
b. Composites in which the rubber is present as a discrete phase. Examples are cables, fabric reinforced gaskets, non-aerospace hose, rubber coated fabrics, shock mounts and tires.
c. Kits, accessories and outfits. The shelf life for these items should be determined by the component with the earliest expiration date.
a. Rubber-base adhesives, coatings, sealers, and liquid rubber materials packaged in cans or tubes.
b. Rubber tapes.
c. Aerospace o-rings and other molded seals. Refer to SAE ARP5316 for recommended shelf lives.
d. Aerospace bulk hoses and hose assemblies. Consult SAE AS1933A for age control limits for acceptance of aerospace bulk hoses and hose assemblies.
e. Non-aerospace bulk hoses and hose assemblies (surface vehicle, industrial and marine application).
f. Unvulcanized rubber, such as tread repair stock and tank lining sheet stock.
g. Composites in which the rubber is in admixture with other ingredients, for example, rubber-asbestos packings and rubber-cork gaskets.
h. Subassemblies, assemblies and systems which contain elastomeric items as component parts, such as small arms, weapons, vehicles, aircraft, missiles and space vehicles.
i. Products fabricated from flexible materials that are not elastomeric, for example, some plastics.
The information contained in this handbook is intended as a guide for use by those agencies whose responsibility is to place control requirements on rubber products, as well as by those activities whose responsibility it is to control the age of products stocked in Government storage facilities. The handbook is not intended for use in controlling the age of rubber products prior to their acceptance by the Government or by Government contractors. The handbook does not make mandatory the disposition of rubber products that have been in storage longer than the periods recommended. The decision as to whether or not to dispose of “overage” products is a function of the storage, supply or using facilities. Responsible activities should make every attempt to limit the procurements of rubber products to the extent that large volumes of “overage” products should be tested to determine whether or not they meet the requirements of the applicable specifications. Procurement documents should require the mold marking of the cure date, such as the year and month on the rubber product (or on its package) and careful records kept of the cure date of all stored rubber products. When age limitations of the details specification listed herein conflict with the requirements herein, the requirements of the detail specification will govern.
MIL-HDBK-764 System Safety Engineering Design Guide For Army Materiel, January 1990, 346 Pages.
Most all of the disciplines involved in the design, engineering, production, and deployment of Army systems are concerned in some way with system safety. Accordingly, one of the primary functions of the system safety engineer is to integrate the safety-related planning done by various other disciplines. These other disciplines are responsible for specific categories of safety planning, but their primary responsibilities are for other services. For example, reliability engineers are concerned with the failure rates of all components in a piece of equipment, whether or not such failures are safety related.
System safety engineers have found that accidents are caused by adverse environmental effects and by errors in design, production, operations, maintenance, and disposal. Thus each technical discipline or management activity that can contribute to the elimination or minimization of these accident causes should be integrated into the system safety activities. Some of the principal technical activities that can affect the safety of a system are:
· Human Factors Engineering
· Reliability Engineering
· Maintainability Engineering
· Maintenance Engineering
· Test Engineering
· Quality Engineering And Control
· Industrial Hygiene
· System Safety Engineering And Management Activities
Data includes ergonomic details.
MIL-HDBK-781A Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for Engineering Development, Qualification, and Production, April 1996. 411 Pages.
This handbook contains test methods, test plans, and environmental profile data presented in a manner which facilitates their use with tailorable tasks when appropriate.
The testing of equipment procured for new military systems is an increasingly complex process. Test methods, test plans, and test environments must be selected which will ensure that contractually required reliability levels are attained in the field and early defect failures are removed prior to field deployment. MIL-HDBK-781 provides a menu of test plans, test methods, and environmental profiles. The most appropriate material may be selected for each program and incorporated into the tailored reliability test program.
The handbook sections on reliability test methods and test plans present methods for growth monitoring, environmental stress screening, mean-time-between-failure assurance testing, sequential tests, fixed-duration tests, and all-equipment tests, including a durability/economic Life Test. The sections on test environmental profiles provide typical test environments for fixed-ground equipment, mobile ground vehicle, shipboard, jet aircraft, turboprop and helicopter, and missiles and assembled external stores equipment. The references provided will expand the user’s knowledge and aid in the design and implementation of reliability test programs through more details data.
Environmental Criteria And Guidelines For Air-Launched Weapons, December 2007, 118 pages
This handbook is converted from MIL-STD-1670. As air-launched weapons become more complex, the definition of the service environment and the attainment of high operational reliability become more complex and more critical. High operational reliability is directly dependent on how well the operational environment is defined and properly provided for during the equipment design and test phases. The pas practice of qualifying weapons to arbitrary vibration levels and temperature extremes of standards and specifications without first investigating the weapon’s expected life cycle environment has resulted in weapons severely deficient in reliability when used in the operational environment. The document provides methods for defining the weapon’s expected total service environment early in the design phase and translating this environment into design criteria that is to e demonstrated prior to the weapon’s operational use.
This handbook establishes guidelines for the development of environmental engineering design and test requirements for air-launched weapons. It provides acquisition activities with guidelines for the implementation of the required “most realistic environmental test” in addition to MIL-STD-810.
MIL-HDBK-1798 (Superseding MIL-STD-1798) Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program, December 1997, 34 Pages.
This standard sets forth programmatic tasks for the development, acquisition maintenance, modification, and operation of mechanical equipment and mechanical elements of airborne, support and training subsystems to assure operation soundness, dependability and affordability throughout the life cycle of Air Force Systems. The Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program, MECSIP, consists of a series of disciplined time phased actions, procedures, analyses, tests, etc., which when developed and applied in accordance with this standard will ensure more reliable, affordable, and supportable equipment and subsystems, thus contributing to the enhancement of total systems mission effectiveness and operational suitability.
MIL-HDBK-1823 Nondestructive Evaluation System Reliability Assessment, April 1999. 112 Pages.
This handbook provides uniform guidance requirements for establishing NDE procedures used to inspect new or in-service hardware for which a measure of NDE reliability is required. They are, specifically, Eddy Current (EC), Fluorescent Penetrant (PT), Ultrasonic (UT), and Magnetic Particle (MT) Testing. This document may be used for other NDE procedures if they are similar in output to those listed herein, such as Radiographic testing, Holographic testing, Shearographic testing, etc.
NDE systems are classified into either of two categories: those which produce only qualitative information as to the presence or absence of a flaw, i.e., hit/miss data, and systems which also provide some quantitative measure of the size of the indicated flaw, i.e., â vs. a data .
MIL-HDBK-2036 Preparation Of Electronic Equipment Specifications, 1 November 1999, 157 pages.
This handbook provides guidance to specifiers and the acquisition community for the development of requirements for end-item specifications and commercial item descriptions. This handbook also provides guidance for the evaluation of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and nondevelopmental items (NDI) as to their suitability for use in military environments.
This document provides guidance for the tailoring of general and detailed requirements which must be addressed in the preparation of specifications for electronic equipment used in ships (including submarines), space, mobile (vehicular) and land applications. The document also includes a system classification details for establishing system priority to set the severity levels to be achieved along with probability of mission successes and confidence levels in design life validation which includes environmental conditions plus inclusion of a long list of military and commercial specifications.
MIL-HDBK-2084 Handbook For Maintainability Of Avionic And Electronic Systems And Equipment, July 1995, 34 pages.
This document was originally MIL-STD-2084 before designation as a handbook.
Maintainability is an attribute of design and is a measure of the ease, rapidity, and accuracy with which systems or equipment can be restored to operation status following failure or repair. A high degree of readiness and availability of avionic and electronic systems and equipment can be assured only when their design allows for positive and accurate identification of operational status, and when items are found defective, rapid and efficient fault isolation, removal, replacement, and subsequent repair.
The special features designed and built into systems which make them easy to maintain and efficient to support result when maintainability is clearly defined as a system requirement and the maintainability program is established as a functional area of design. The purpose of this standard [handbook] is not to subrogate the maintainability program requirements of MIL-STD-470, but merely to amplify the design criteria requirements of the maintainability program and to emphasize maintainability by design.
Under the concept of maintainability by design, emphasis is placed on those design areas which tend to have the greatest influence on ease of maintenance. This includes requirements for modularization, replacement at higher levels, and increased depth of localization. These physical and technical considerations of maintainability design are necessary if complex avionic and electronic systems and equipment are to be supported efficiently at all levels of maintenance.
MIL-HDBK-2155 Failure Reporting, Analysis And Corrective Action System, July 1985. 17 Pages.
This standard, MIL-STD-2155 , establishes uniform requirements and criteria for a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) to implement the FRACAS requirement of MIL-STD-785. FRACAS is intended to provide management visibility and control for reliability and maintainability improvement of hardware and associated software by timely and disciplined utilization of failure and maintenance data to generate and implement effective corrective actions to prevent failure recurrence and to simplify or reduce the maintenance tasks.
On 11 December 1995 the document was
converted from MIL-STD-2155 to MIL-HDBK-2155 with
“NOTE: MIL-STD-2155 has been redesigned as a Handbook and is to be used for guidance purposes only. For administrative expediency, the only physical change from MIL-STD-2155 is the cover page [designating the document as MIL-HDBK-2155]. However, this document is no longer to be cited as a requirement. If cited as a requirement, Contractors may disregard the requirement of this document and interpret its contents only as guidance.”
MIL-HDBK-2164A Environmental Stress Screening Process, June 1996. 45 Pages.
This handbook provides guidelines for Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) of electronic equipment, including environmental screening conditions, durations of exposure, procedures, equipment operation, actions taken upon detection of defects, and screening documentation. These guidelines provide for a uniform ESS process that may be utilized for effectively disclosing manufacturing defects in electronic equipment caused by poor workmanship and faulty or marginal parts. It will also identify design problems if the design is inherently fragile or if qualification and reliability growth tests were too benign or not accomplished. The most common stimuli used in ESS are temperature cycling and random vibration. A viable ESS program must be dynamic; the screening program must be actively managed, and tailored to the particular characteristics of the equipment being screened. It should be noted that there are no universal screens applicable to all equipment.
ESS is part of a viable engineering development, manufacturing corrective action and overhaul process rather than a test in the normal accept/reject sense. Guidance in developing a screen can be found in Figure 1. Those participating in the effort, including the contractor should never be led to believe that a “failure” is bad and would be held against them. ESS is intended to stimulate defects, not to simulate the operating environment, and therefore, factory failures are encouraged. The root causes of ESS failures need to be found and corrected before there is a complete process.
MIL-HDBK-5400 Electronic Equipment, Airborne General Guidelines For, 15 June 1992 and 30 November 1995, 91 Pages, (3.3 Meg PDF files)
This handbook contains general guidelines for electronic equipment for operation in piloted aircraft and helicopters, missiles, boosters and allied vehicles. Detail electrical and mechanical design, performance and test requirements should be as specified in the detail specification or contract.
This handbook provides guidance for implementing and tailoring guidelines and documents contained in MIL-HDBK-454 Standard General Guidelines For Electronic Equipment, which have applicability in the design and production of electronic equipment for airborne applications. Included in this handbook are references to the applicable requirements, and index of applicable documents, and a guide for tailoring and application of those requirements and documents in conjunction with the various equipment design, development and production phases.
This document supersedes MIL-E-5400 and MIL-STD-5400.
MIL-HDBK-46855 Human Engineering
Program Process And Procedures, 17
May 1999, 276 pages, supersedes DOD-HDBK-763 and MIL-H-46855.
This handbook provides human engineering (HE)
(a) program tasks
(b) procedures and preferred practices, and
(c) methods for application to system acquisition.
The program tasks outline the work to be accomplished by a contractor or subcontractor in conducting an HE effort integrated with the total system engineering and development effort. They serve as a basis for offerors to provide HE program information during the solicitation process.
An HE effort should be provided to
(a) develop or improve all human interfaces of the system
(b) achieve required effectiveness of human performance during system operation, maintenance, support, control, and transport, and
(c) make economical demands upon personnel resources, skills, training, and costs.
MIL-P-24534 Planned Maintenance System: Development Of Maintenance Requirement Cards, Maintenance Index Pages, And Associated Documentation, 26 April 1978 – 7 May 1985, Rev. A, 150 pages, (5.4 Meg PDF file)
This specification identifies the requirements and standards for the development and production of Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRCs), Maintenance Index Pages (MIPs), and other associated documentation used with the Navy Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Systems, Planned Maintenance System (PMS), OPNAVINST 4790.4, Volume I. This specification implements Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) (see 6.3.33) methodology for the determination of maintenance requirements (see 6.5) and applies to all levels of system or equipment grouping, and to all scheduled maintenance, whether equipment is in use, ready for use, or in standby or lay up condition. This specification addresses the total scheduled maintenance program for a ship, irrespective of the maintenance echelon possessing the capability to perform the maintenance; that is organizational, intermediate, and depot level scheduled maintenance tasks are considered. This specification provides procedures for development of unscheduled maintenance within the PMS program. Planned maintenance system documentation shall be developed in accordance with this specification. This specification is intended for use by PMS development activities and by activities which manage, monitor, or coordinate that development.
MIL-PRF-19500L Performance Specification Semiconductor Devices, General Specification For, October 1998. 119 Pages.
This specification established the general performance requirements for semiconductor devices. Detail requirements and characteristics are specified in the performance specification sheet. Revisions to this and performance specification sheets are structured to assure the interchangeability of devices of the same part type regardless of manufacturing date coed or conformance inspection (CI) completion date. Five quality levels for encapsulated devices are provided for in this specification, differentiated by the prefixes JAN, JANTX, JANTXV, JANJ, and JANS. Seven radiation hardness assurance (RHA) levels are provided for the JANTXV and JANS quality levels. These are designated by the letters M, D, L, R, F, G, and H following the quality levels portion of the prefix. Two quality levels for unencapsulated devices are provided for in this specification differentiated by the prefixes JANHX and JANKC.
MIL-PRF-38534D Performance Specification Hybrid Microcircuits, General Specification For, January 1999. 82 Pages.
This specification establishes the general performance requirements for hybrid microcircuits, Multi-Chip Modules (MCM) and similar devices and the verification requirements for insuring that these devices meet the applicable performance requirements. Verification is accomplished through the use of one of two quality programs (Appendix A). The main body of this specification describes the performance requirements and the requirements for obtaining a Qualified Manufacturers List (QML) listing. The appendices of this specification are intended for guidance to aid a manufacture in developing their verification program. Detail requirements, specification characteristics, and other provisions which are sensitive to the particular intended use should be specified in the applicable device acquisition specification. This document supersedes MIL-STD-1772.
MIL-PRF-38535E Performance Specification Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) Manufacturing, General Specification For, December 1997. 127 Pages.
This specification establishes the general performance requirements for integrated circuits or microcircuits and the quality and reliability assurance requirements which must be met for their acquisition. The intent of this specification is to allow the device manufacturer the flexibility to implement best commercial practices to the maximum extent possible while still providing product which meets the military performance needs. Details requirements, specific characteristics of microcircuits, and other provisions which are sensitive to the particular use intended will be specified in the device specification. Quality assurance requirements outlined herein are for all microcircuits built on a manufacturing line which is controlled through a manufacturer’s Quality Management (QM) program and has been certified and qualified in accordance with requirements herein. Several levels of product assurance including Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) are provided for in this specification. The certification and qualification sections found herein outline the requirements to be met by a manufacturer to be listed on a Qualified Manufacturer Listing (QML). After listing of a technology flow on a QML, the manufacturer must continually meet or improve the established baseline of certified and qualified procedures, the QM program, the manufacturer’s review system, the status reporting and quality and reliability assurance requirements for al QML products. The manufacturer may present alternative methods of addressing the requirements contained in this document. This specification requires a manufacturer to establish a process flow baseline. If sufficient quality and reliability data is available, the manufacture, through the QM program and the manufacture’s review system, may modify substitute or delete tests.
MIL-PRF-49506 Performance Specification Logistics Management Information, November 1996. 80 Pages.
This specification describes information required by the government to perform acquisition logistics management functions. The principle focus of this specification is on providing the DOD with a contractual method for acquiring support and support-related engineering and logistics data from contractors. The DOD uses this data in-house in existing logistics DOD materiel management processes such as those for initial provisioning, cataloging, and item management. Data products intended primarily for in-house use by the contractor during his/her own design process or those developed internally by the DOD are beyond the scope of this document. Depending on specific program requirements, this information may be in the form of summary reports, a set of specific data products, or both. This specification identifies content requirements for information summaries and format requirement of data products. It may e used on all system/end item acquisition programs The contractor may, and is encouraged to, suggest alternative means of satisfying requirements of this specification to make information more readily available and to utilize more efficient business practices. The mechanics of delivery (e.g., electronic data interchange, hard copy, etc.) are not within the scope of this specification and should be addressed separately. Data entry media, storage, and maintenance procedures are left to the contractor.
MIL-S-52779 Software Quality Assurance Program Requirements was cancelled on 29 June 1990 and superseded by DoD-STD-2168 which is shown above.
MIL-STD-001591 A Command, Control and Communications (C3) System & Component Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems, Analysis/Synthesis Of. December 1978. 23 Pages
standard establishes uniform criteria for conducting trade studies to determine
the optimal design for command, control and communication system and component
fault diagnosis/isolation subsystems, hereafter referred to as Fault
Identification & Test Subsystems (FITS).
FITS include the hardware and/or software necessary for the detection
and isolation of failures.
MIL-STD-105 Sampling Procedures and Tables For Inspection By Attributes, May 1989 Rev E, 75 Pages
This publication provides sampling procedures and reference tables for use in planning and conducting inspection by attributes. The sampling concept is based on the probabilistic recurrence of events when a series of lots or batches are produced in a stable environment. The sampling plans described in this standard are applicable to AQL’s of 0.01 ercent or higher and therefore not suitable for applications where quality levels in the defective parts per million range can be realized. Also see MIL-STD-1916.
MIL-STD-202G Test Methods Standard Electronic And Electrical Component Parts, February 2002. 193 Pages
This standard establishes uniform methods for testing electronic and electrical component parts, including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military operations, and physical and electrical tests. For the purpose of this standard, the term “component parts” includes such items as capacitors, resistors, switches, relays, transformers, inductors, and others. This standard is intended to apply only to small component parts, weighting up to 300 pounds or having a root mean square test voltage up to 50,000 volts unless otherwise specifically invoked. The test methods described herein have been prepared to serve several purposes:
a. To specify suitable conditions obtainable in the laboratory that give test results equivalent to the actual service conditions existing in the field, and to obtain reproducibility of the results of tests. The tests described herein are not to be interpreted as an exact and conclusive representation of actual service operation in any one geographic location, since the only true test for operation in a specific location is an actual service test at that point.
b. To describe in one standard (1) all of the test methods of a similar character which appeared in the various joint or single-service electronic and electrical component parts specifications, (2) those test methods which are feasible for use in several specifications, and (3), the recognized extreme environments, particularly temperatures, barometric pressures, etc., at which component parts will be tested under some of the presently standardized testing procedures. By so consolidating, these methods may be kept uniform and thus result in conservation of equipment, man-hours, and testing facilities. In achieving these objectives, it is necessary to make each of the general tests adaptable to a broad range of electronic and electrical component parts.
c. The test methods described herein for environmental, physical, and electrical tests shall also apply, when applicable, to parts not covered by an approved military specification, military sheet from standard, specification sheet, or drawing.
MIL-STD-271 Requirements For Nondestructive Testing Methods. 31 October 1973 27 May 1998. Rev. F with one change notice and two cancellation notices.
This standard covers nondestructive testing method requirements for radiographic, magnetic particles, liquid penetrant, ultrasonic, eddy current and visual inspections. These requirements are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of inspections performed. This standard does not contain acceptance criteria for the inspection methods defined.
This standard covers the requirements for conducting nondestructive test used in determining the presence of surface and internal discontinuities in metals. It also contains the minimum requirements necessary to qualify nondestructive test and inspection personnel, procedures, and nondestructive test equipment.
MIL-STD-271 has been superseded by NAVSEA Technical Publication T9074-AS-GIB-010/271 “Requirements for Nondestructive Testing Methods”, Stock Number 0910LO7314700. Copies of NAVSEA Technical Publications are available from the Naval Inventory Control Point, Code 1 Support Branch, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111—5094. This is explained in cancellation notice 2 dated 27-May-1998.
MIL-STD-331 Fuze And Fuze Components, Environmental And Performance Tests For, 5 January 2005, Rev. C, 295 pages (14.4 Meg PDF file size)
This standard describes tests used by the department of Defense (DoD) to determine the safety, reliability and performance characteristics of weapon system fuzes and fuze components at any stage in their life cycles.
This is a test method type standard evolved over the years reflecting increased standardization of environmental and performance tests among the services and improvements in fuze design, test technology and safety.
MIL-STD-414 Sampling Procedures And Tables For Inspection Buy Variables For Percent Defective, 8 May 1955 with changes notice through 02 February 1995. 118 pages (5.5Meg PDF file size)
This Standard establishes sampling plans and procedures for inspection by variables for use in Government procurement, supply and storage, and maintenance in inspection operations.
This Standard has been superseded by ANSI/ASQC Z1.9-2003 Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Variables for Percent Nonconforming.
MIL-STD-461 Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics Of Subsystems And Equipment, 10 December 2007, Rev. F, 269 pages, (1.6 Meg PDF file size)
This standard establishes interface and associated verification requirements for the control of electromagnetic interference (EMI) emission and susceptibility characteristics of electronic, electrical, and electromechanical equipment and subsystems designed or procured for use by activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD)
MIL-STD-470B Maintainability Program For Systems And Equipment, May 1989. 78 Pages
This standard provides task descriptions for maintainability program. The Tasks, as tailored, will be applied to systems and equipment development, acquisitions and modifications. Software maintainability is no covered by this standard.
This military standard consists of basic application requirements, specific tailorable maintainability program tasks, and an appendix which includes and application matrix and guidance and rationale for task selection.
MIL-STD-471ANot3 Maintainability Verification/Demonstration/Evaluation, March 1973. 64 Pages.
This standard provides procedures and test methods for verification, demonstration, and evaluation of qualitative and quantitative maintainability requirements. It also provides for qualitative assessment of various integrated logistic support factors related to and impacting the achievement of maintainability parameters and time downtime, e.g., technical manuals, personnel, tools and test equipment, maintenance concepts, and provisioning.
MIL-STD-498 Software Development And Documentation, December 1994. 229 Pages.
The purpose of this standard is to establish uniform requirements for software development and documentation.
This standard and its Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) are meant to be tailored for each type of software to which they are applied. While tailoring is the responsibility of the acquirer, suggested tailoring may be provided by prospective and selected developers. General tailoring guidance can be found in Section 6 and in DOD-HDBK-248. Tailoring guidance specific to this standard can be found in Appendixes G and H and in guidebooks and handbooks planned for this standard.
MIL-STD-690D Failure Rate Sampling Plans And Procedures, June 2005. 43 Pages
This standard provides procedures for failure rate (FR) qualification, sampling plans for establishing and maintaining FR levels at selected confidence levels, and lot conformance inspection procedures associates with FR testing for the purpose of direct reference in appropriate military electronic parts established reliability (ER) specifications. Figures and table throughout this standard are based on exponential distribution. Weibull distribution will be acceptable in certain components such as capacitors. Use of Weibull distribution for any component must be approved by the qualifying activity. This standard also provides guidance to specification writers in the use of this standard (see appendix A) and references material for uses of ER parts.
MIL-STD-721-RevC Definitions Of Terms For Reliability And Maintainability, June 1981. 18 Pages.
This Standard defines words and terms most commonly used which are associated with Reliability and Maintainability (R & M). It is intended to be used as a common base for R & M definitions and to reduce the possibility of conflicts, duplications, and incorrect interpretations either expressed or implied elsewhere in documentation. The definitions addressed the intent and policy of DoD Directive 5000.40. Statistical and mathematical terms which have gained wide acceptance are not defined in this standard since they are included in other documents.
MIL-STD-750 Test Method Standard Test Methods For Semiconductor Devices, 20 November 2006, Rev. E, (9.6 Meg PDF file size)
This standard establishes uniform methods for testing semiconductor devices, including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military operation, and physical and electrical tests. For the purpose of this standard, the term “devices” includes such items as transistors, diodes, voltage regulators, rectifiers, tunnel diodes, and other related parts. This standard is intended to apply only to semiconductor devices.
MIL-STD-756B Reliability Modeling and Prediction, November 1981. 100 Pages including change Notice 1.
Reliability prediction is an essential function in evaluating a design from concept through development and in controlling changes during production. Prediction provides a rational basis for design decisions such as the choice between alternatives concepts, choice of part quality levels, derating to be applied, use of proven versus state-of-the-art techniques, and other factors.
It is essential that common ground rules be established for techniques and data sources used in the formulation of reliability models and predictions so that they may be applied and interpreted uniformly. This standard establishes procedures and ground rules intended to achieve this purpose.
It must be recognized that reliability prediction is a best estimate of the reliability anticipated from a given design within data limitations and the extent of item definition. A properly performed reliability prediction is invaluable to those responsible for making program decisions regarding the feasibility and adequacy of a design approach.
Reliability predictions are generally based on experience data from similar items, or their components, used in a same or similar manner. Extreme caution must be exercised in ascertaining the similarity of other items and the degree of similarity in the conditions of use. This standard emphasizes verification and justification of the validity and applicability of data sources to the preparation of predictions.
The necessity for determining the costs of achieving and sustaining the reliability of an item requires that reliability be considered from two perspectives, reliability as a measure of operational effectiveness (Mission Reliability) and reliability as a measure of ownership cost (Basic Reliability). The incorporation of redundancies and alternative modes of operation to improve Mission Reliability invariable decreases Basic Reliability and increases procurement and logistic support costs. This standard addresses Mission Reliability prediction and Basic Reliability prediction as separate but companion predictions both of which are essential to adequately quantify the reliability of an item.
The need for updating a given prediction will vary from program to program and cannot be precisely established in a general standard. Updating will depend primarily on the degree to which the item has been defined, and the availability of pertinent data. Provisions should be made for reliability prediction updates at all design review points and other major program milestones.
This standard establishes uniform procedures and ground rules for the preparation of Mission Reliability and Basic Reliability models and predictions for electronic, electrical, electromechanical, mechanical, and ordnance systems and equipments, hereinafter referred to as items. Item complexity may range from a complete weapon system to the simplest subdivision of a system. The primary value of Reliability Prediction is as a design tool to provide relative measures of item reliability to design decisions. Great caution must be used when applying and translating the absolute value of the Reliability Prediction to measures of Field Reliability.
MIL-STD-778 is superseded by MIL-STD-721-RevC Definitions Of Terms For Reliability And Maintainability,
MIL-STD-781D Reliability Testing For Engineering Development, Qualification, And Production, October 1986. 47 Pages.
This standard specifies the general requirements an specific tasks for reliability testing during the development, qualification, and production of systems and equipment.
This standard establishes the tailorable requirements for reliability testing performed during integrated test programs specified in MIL-STD-785. Task descriptions for Reliability Development/Growth Testing (RD/GT), Reliability Qualification Testing (RQT), Production Reliability Acceptance Tests (PRAT), and Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) are defined. Tasks specified in this standard are to be selectively applied in DOD contracted procurements, requests for proposals, statements of works (SOWs) and Government in-house developments which require reliability testing of systems and equipment.
MIL-STD-785-RevB Reliability Program For Systems And Equipment, September 1980. 88 Pages.
This military standard consists of basic application requirements, specific tailorable reliability program tasks, and an appendix which includes an application matrix and guidance and rationale for task selection.
Effective reliability programs must be tailored to fit program needs and constraints, including life cycle costs (LCC). This document is intentionally structured to discourage indiscriminate blanket applications. Tailoring is forced by requiring that specific tasks be selected and for those tasks identified, that certain essential information relative to implementation of the task be provided by the procuring activity.
Many of the tasks solicit facts and recommendations from the contractors on the need for, and scope of, the work to be done rather than requiring that a specific task be done in a specific way. The selected tasks can be tailored to meet specific and peculiar program needs.
Although not all encompassing, the guidance and rational provided in Appendix A is intended to serve as an aid I selecting and scoping the tasks and requirements.
Contains the most common description of a reliability program with specific tasks to be considered in developing a reliability program:
· Conceptual phase
· Demonstration and validation phase
· Full-scale engineering development phase
· Production phase
· Reliability accounting
· Reliability engineering
· Basic reliability
· Mission reliability
· Life units
· Environmental stress screening
· Reliability development/growth test
· Reliability qualification test
· Production reliability acceptance test
Includes an application matrix of 18 tasks to be considered in developing a reliability program:
1. Reliability program plan
2. Monitor/control of subcontractors and suppliers
3. Program reviews
4. Failure reporting, analysis, and corrective action systems (FRACAS)
5. Failure review board (FRB)
6. Reliability modeling
7. Reliability allocations
8. Reliability predictions
9. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FEMCA)
10. Sneak circuit analysis (SCA)
11. Electronic parts/circuits tolerance analysis
12. Parts program
13. Reliability critical items
14. Effects of functional testing, storage, handling, packaging, transportation, and maintenance
15. Environmental stress screening (ESS)
16. Reliability development/growth testing
17. Reliability qualification test program (RQT)
18. Production reliability acceptance test program (PRAT)
MIL-STD-790F Standard Practice For Established Reliability And High Reliability Qualified Products List (QPL) Systems For Electrical, Electronic, And Fiber Optic Parts Specifications. August 1995. 17 Pages.
This standard is for direct reference in established reliability and high reliability electrical, electronic, and fiber optic parts specifications and establishes the criteria for a manufacturer’s qualified product systems.
MIL-STD-810 Test Method Standard For Environmental Engineering Considerations And Laboratory Tests, 1 January 2000 to 5 May 2003 for 3 change notices, Rev. F, 782 pages, (11.4 Meg PDF file size)
This standard contains materiel acquisition program planning and engineering direction for considering the influences that environmental stresses have on materiel throughout all phases of its service life. It is important to note that this document does not imposed design or test specifications. Rather, it describes the environmental tailoring process that results in realistic materiel designs and test methods based on materiel system performance requirements.
MIL-STD-882-RevD Standard Practice For Systems Safety, February 2000. 31 Pages.
The system safety practice as defined herein conforms to the acquisition procedures in DoD regulation 5000.2-R and provides a consistent means of evaluating identified risks. Mishap risk must be identified, evaluated, and mitigated to a level acceptable (as defined by the system user or customer) to the appropriate authority and compliant with federal (and state where applicable) laws and regulations, Executive Orders, treaties, and agreements. Program trade studies associated with mitigating mishap risk must consider total life cycle cost in any decision. When requiring MIL-STD-882 in a solicitation or contract and no specific paragraphs of this standard are identified, then apply on those requirements presented in section 4.
For this MIL-STD, think risk matrices as described at http://www.barringer1.com/nov04prb.htm for making risk-based decisions.
MIL-STD-882 supersedes MIL-STD-1574.
MIL-STD-883F Test Method Standard Microcircuits, June 2004. 708 Pages.
This standard establishes uniform methods, controls, and procedures for testing microelectronic devices suitable for use within Military and Aerospace electronic systems including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military and space operations; mechanical and electrical tests; workmanship and training procedures; and such other controls and constraints as have been deemed necessary to ensure a uniform level of quality and reliability suitable to the intended applications of those devices. For the purpose of this standard, the term “devices” includes such items as monolithic, multichip, film and hybrid microcircuits, microcircuit arrays, and the elements from which the circuits and arrays are formed. This standard is intended to apply only to microelectronic devices.
MIL-STD-973 Configuration Management, 17 April 1992, 258 pages.
This standard defines configuration management requirements which are to be selectively applied, as required, throughout the life cycle of any configuration items (CI). This standard supersedes:
MIL-STD-481 Configuration Control – Short Form
MIL-STD-482 Configuration Status
MIL-STD-483 Configuration Management Practices
MIL-STD-1456 Configuration Management Plan
MIL-STD-1521 Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments, and Computer Software
MIL-STD-973 has these revisions:
Interim Change Notice 1 on 01-Dec-1992, 102 pages
Interim Change Notice 2 on 24-Nov-1993, 18 pages
Interim Change Notice 3 on 13-Jan-1995, 121 pages
Cancellation Change Notice 4 on 30-Sep-2000, 1 page
MIL-STD-1309D Definition of Terms for Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment. February 1992, 65 Pages.
The purpose of this standard is to standardize the definitions of the most commonly used terms for testing, measurement, and diagnostics. This standard establishes the definitions most commonly used for test, measurement, and diagnostics.
MIL-STD-1344 Test Methods For Electrical Connectors. 19 May 1969. Rev. A through 6 changes notices to 22 October 2004, 193 Pages, (5.3 Meg PDF file)
This standard establishes uniform test methods for testing electrical connections.
MIL-STD-1388Rev1A Logistic Support Analysis, April 1983. 121 Pages.
This standard provides general requirements and task descriptions governing performance of Logistic Support analysis (LSA) during the life cycle of systems and equipment. Superseded by MIL-HDBK-502.
MIL-STD-1388Rev2B DOD Requirements For A Logistic Support Analysis Record, March 1991. 614 Pages.
This standard prescribes the data element definitions (DED), data field lengths, and formats for Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) Record (LSAR) data. It identifies the LSAR reports that are generated from the LSAR data and identifies the LSART relational tables and automated data processing (ADP) specifications for transmittal and delivery of automated LSAR data. Superseded by MIL-PRF-49506.
MIL-STD-1472D Human Engineering Design Criteria For Military Systems, Equipment And Facilities, March 1989. 409 Pages.
This standard establishes general human engineering design criteria for military systems, subsystems, equipment and facilities.
Data includes extensive ergonomic details.
MIL-STD-1523 Age Controls Of Age-Sensitive Elastomeric Materiel, 1 February 1984, 12 pages including two change notices for cancellation in lieu of: 1) SAE AS1933, “Age Control for Hose Containing Age-Sensitive Elastomeric Material” for hose application and 2) SAE ARP5316, “Storage of Aerospace Elastomeric Seals and Seal Assemblies which include and Elastomer Element prior to Hardware Assembly”
This document establishes requirements for the maximum ages of age sensitive elastomeric items for use in military aircraft and missiles and for space vehicles at the time of acceptance by a Government acquiring activity. The provisions of this document apply to hoses and O-rings from specific classes of elastomers which are resistant to lubricants, hydraulic fluids, and petroleum base fuels and which conform to the specifications cited herein.
Age control is the designation of a specific maximum period of age after cure date that will assure desired performance characteristics of an elastomer. Age control is based on the premise that elastomers are age sensitive.
An age sensitive material is one whose physical property values or physical form slowly drift outside the useable range. These changes in elastomeric materials are caused by exposure to harmful influences such as: oxygen and ozone especially in the presence of ultra-violet light, moisture, high temperatures, swelling agents such as fuel and other solvents, corrosive vapors and mechanical stress which modify the network structure of the elastomeric component of the item and may modify the reinforcing action of the fillers. The presence of protective substances and the chemical composition retard these changes. Upon depletion of these protective materials, the rate of degradation increases and the item more rapidly approaches the end of its service life.
MIL-STD-1543B Reliability Program Requirements for Space and Missile Systems, October 1988. 100 Pages.
The high reliability required of all space and launch vehicles is achieved by the designs, including the design margins, and by the manufacturing processes and controls imposed at every level of fabrication, assembly, and test. The design and design margins should ensure that the equipment is capable of performing in the operational environment. The reliability program requirements stated in this standard have been established to ensure the timely and economical attainment of system reliability as an integral part of the acquisition process. The requirements are a composite of those that have been found to be cost effective on previous space programs
This standard establishes uniform reliability program requirements and tasks for use during design, development, fabrication, test, and operation of space and launch vehicles.
Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) Contractor Participation
Requirements, February 1986, 29 pages.
GIDEP is a cooperative data interchange among Government and Industry participants seeking to reduce or eliminate expenditures of time and money by making maximum use of existing knowledge. GIDEP provides a means to exchange certain types of data essential during the life cycle of systems and equipment.
GIDEP was initially established to minimize duplicate testing of parts and materials through the interchange of environmental test data and technical information among contractors and Government agencies involved in design, development, and fabrication of Government-funded equipment. Information contained within the GIDEP storage and retrieval system includes environmental test reports and procedures, reliability specifications, failure analysis data, failure rate data, calibration procedures, and other technical information related to the application, reliability, quality assurance, and testing of parts and related materials.
MIL-STD-1562 Lists Of Standard Microcircuits, September 1991, 181 pages
purpose of this standard is to:
a) Provide equipment designers, manufacturers and users with lists of microcircuits considered to be most acceptable for military applications.
b) Control and minimize the variety of microcircuits used by military activities in order to facilitate effective logistic support of equipment in the field
c) Concentrate economic support, improvement and production of the microcircuits listed in this standard.
MIL-STD-1576 Electroexplosive Subsystem Safety Requirements And Test Methods For Space Systems. 31 July 1884 and change notice 1 dated 04 September 1992. 151 Pages, (8.7 Meg PDF files)
This Stndard establishes the general requirements and test methods fo the design and development of electroexplosive subsystems to preclude hazards from unintentional initiation and from failure to fire. These requirements apply to all subsystems utilizing electrically initiated explosive or pyrotechnic components.
This Standard applies to all space vehicles systems (e.g., launch vehicles, upper stages, boosters, payloads, and related systems).
MIL-STD-1586 Quality Program Requirements For Space And Launch Vehicles, June 1998, 39 pages.
The purpose of this standard is to specify special quality program requirements to meet the high standards necessary for space and launch vehicles.
MIL-STD-1591 On-Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Sub-Systems, Analysis/Synthesis Of January 1977. 22 Pages
This standard establishes uniform criteria for conducting trade studies to determine the optimal design for an on-aircraft fault diagnosis/isolation system, thereafter referred to as the On-Board Built-In Test System (ONBIT).
This standard is applicable to DoD procurements which include the development of on-aircraft fault diagnosis/isolation systems where a selection cam be made between such alternatives as central computer controlled on-board centrally polled built-in test equipment (BITE), decentralized BITE, detached Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), etc., or combinations of the preceding. The fault diagnosis/isolation systems of interest are those used to diagnose/isolate faults at the flight line (organizational) level of maintenance.
MIL-STD-1798 Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program, Rev B,
January 24, 2010,
Supersedes April 15, 2008, 54 Pages, Supersedes MIL-HDBK-1798A 24 September 2001 and MIL-STD-1798 20 June 1988.
The purpose of this standard is to describe the general process to achieve and maintain the physical and functional integrity of the mechanical elements of airborne, support, and training systems. The goal of this integrity program is to ensure the operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness (OSS&E) of a weapon system, while reducing total life cycle cost. The process described herein establishes a disciplined engineering process that will ensure the physical and functional integrity of the system being procured and sustained. This standard allows the
process to be tailored in a competitive environment to meet specific equipment, subsystem, and/or system requirements. The Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program (MECSIP) is implemented in the planning process and continued until retirement of the system.
The MECSIP Program will be established and maintained in accordance with this standard and/or tailored to satisfy specific program strategy.
The STD also describes FRACAS details.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, November 1980. 54 Pages. (FMEA and FMECA)
MIL-STD-1629-RevA-ChangedNotice-1 Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, June 1983. 11 Pages.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA-ChangedNotice-2 Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, November 1984. 7 Pages.
standard establishes requirements and procedures for performing a failure mode,
effects (FMEA), and criticality analysis (FEMCA) to systematically evaluate and
document, by item failure mode analysis, the potential impact of each
functional or hardware failure on mission success, personnel and system safety,
system performance, maintainability, and maintenance requirements. Each potential failure is ranked by the severity
of its effect in order that appropriate corrective actions may be taken to
eliminate or control the high risk items.
Also used for root cause failure analysis (RCA).
The precursor military procedures document MIL-P-1629 of the same title as MIL-STD-1629 dated November 9, 1949 is no longer available. If you have a copy, please send a PDF file to me at mailto:email@example.com for posting.
MIL-STD-1686C Electrostatic Discharge Control Program For Protection Of Electrical And Electronic Parts Assemblies And Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices), October 1995. 18 Pages.
The purpose of this standard is to establish comprehensive requirements for an ESD control program to minimize the effects of ESD on parts, assemblies, and equipment. An effective ESD control program will increase reliability and decrease both maintenance actions and lifetime costs. This standard shall be tailored for various type of acquisitions.
The standard defines the performance requirements for an ESD control program for electrical and electronic parts, assemblies, and equipment, susceptible to damage from ESD. Electrically initiated explosive devices and part level design are excluded from these requirements. This standard covers identification, testing, classification, assembly and equipment design criteria, protected areas, handling procedures, training, marking of hardware, protective covering and packaging, and provides for quality assurance requirements, audits and reviews.
MIL-STD-1843 Reliability-Centered Maintenance for Aircraft, Engines and Equipment.
This standard establishes the methodology and decision logic for the USA Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) program. It forms the basis for developing the preventive maintenance actions needed to provide safe, reliable equipment that assures mission accomplishment at reasonable cost.
Although the primary purpose of preventive maintenance is to assure that inherent (designed) reliability is sustained, preventive maintenance by itself may not produce the reliability required to meet mission requirements. Therefore, this standard considers equipment redesign as an option to improving equipment reliability when it is economically feasible to do so.
The focus is on reliability, safety and mission accomplishment at reasonable cost. This standard, when conscientiously applied, forces a vigorous examination of these three factors and prevents indiscriminate actions which are not cost effective.
This document, which is based on the Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning Document MSG-3, outlines the procedures for developing preventive maintenance requirements through the use of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Analysis (RCMA) for Air Force aircraft and engine systems, aircraft and engine structures and equipment, including peculiar and common Support Equipment (SE) Communications and Electronics (C-E) equipment, vehicles, weapons and other similar equipment items.
MIL-STD-1916 Department Of Defense Test Method Standard, April 1996. 33 Pages
The purpose of this standard is to encourage defense contractors and other commercial organizations supplying goods and services to the U.S. Government to submit efficient and effective process control (prevention) procedures in place of prescribed sampling requirements. The goal is to support the movement away from an AQL-based inspection (detection) strategy to implementation of an effective prevention-based strategy including a comprehensive quality system, continuous improvement and a partnership with the Government. The underlying theme is a partnership between DoD and the defense supplier, with the requisite competence of both parties, and a clear mutual benefit from process capable of consistently high quality products and services. The objective is o create an atmosphere where every noncompliance is an opportunity for corrective action and improvement rather than one where acceptable quality levels are the contractually sufficient goals.
MIL-HDBK-2035 Nondestructive Testing Acceptance Criteria. 4 July 1991 to 15 May 1995, Rev. A, 88 pages, (5.4 Meg PDF file)
MIL-STD-2035 has been redesignated as a Test Method Standard.
The acceptance criteria contained herein are for use in determining the acceptability of nondestructive test (NDT) discontinuities in castings, welds, forgings, extrusions, cladding, and other products where specified by the applicable Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) drawing, specification, contract, order or directive. Acceptance criteria contained herein are based upon inspection methods performed in accordance with MIL-STD-271.
MIL-STD-2074(AS) Failure Classification For Reliability Testing, February 1978. 12 Pages.
This standard establishes criteria for classification of failures occurring during reliability tests.
This standard, when made a part of the procurement document or the equipment specification, applies to any reliability test, including, but not limited to, tests performed in accordance with MIL-R-22973, MIL-R-23094, and MIL-STD-781.
MIL-STD-2077B General Requirements Test Program Sets, April 1991, 34 Pages.
This standard contains the requirements to achieve cost effective acquisition and life cycle maintenance of Operation Test Programs Sets/Test Program Sets (OTPS/TPSS). This document establishes a standard for design, development, documentation, configuration management, validation, verification, quality assurance and preparation for delivery of OTPS/TPSS. A TPS is composed of a Test Program (TP), interface Device (ID), and Test Program Instruction (TPI). The OTPS shall be the result of merging one or more PTSS into a group which share a single ID. This document is specifically limited to OTPS/TPS development for Automatic Test Equipment (STE) systems.
MIL-STD-2155 Failure Reporting, Analysis And Corrective Action System, July 1985. 17 Pages.
This standard establishes uniform requirements and criteria for a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) to implement the FRACAS requirement of MIL-STD-785. FRACAS is intended to provide management visibility and control for reliability and maintainability improvement of hardware and associated software by timely and disciplined utilization of failure and maintenance data to generate and implement effective corrective actions to prevent failure recurrence and to simplify or reduce the maintenance tasks.
On 11 December 1995 the document was
converted from MIL-STD-2155 to MIL-HDBK-2155 with
“NOTE: MIL-STD-2155 has been redesigned as a Handbook and is to be used for guidance purposes only. For administrative expediency, the only physical change from MIL-STD-2155 is the cover page [designating the document as MIL-HDBK-2155]. However, this document is no longer to be cited as a requirement. If cited as a requirement, Contractors may disregard the requirement of this document and interpret its contents only as guidance.”
MIL-STD-2164 Environment Stress Screening Process for Electronic Equipment, April 1985. 49 Pages.
This standard defines the requirements for ESS of electronic equipment, including environmental test conditions, durations of exposure, procedures, equipment operation, actions taken upon detection of defects, and test documentation. The standard provides for a uniform ESS ot be utilized for effectively disclosing manufacturing defects in electronic equipment.
The process described herein shall be applied to electronic assemblies, equipment and systems, in six broad categories as distinguished according to their field service applications:
1. Fixed ground equipment
2. Mobile ground vehicle equipment
3. Shipboard equipments-Sheltered and Exposed to atmospheric environment
4. Jet aircraft equipment
5. Turbo-propeller and rotary-wing aircraft equipment
6. Air launched weapons and assembled external storage
Large, heavy items: When applying this standard to large, heavy items, the following shall be considered:
1. Potential fatigue
2. Adequate environmental inputs
3. Availability of suitable environmental generation facilities
4. Technical validly of testing at lower assembly levels, i.e., drawers, chassis, etc.
MIL-STD-2165 Testability Program For Electronic Systems And Equipment, January 1985. 80 Pages.
This standard provides uniform procedures and methods for establishing a testability program, for assessing testability in designs and for integration of testability into the acquisition process for electronic systems and equipments.
This standard is applicable to the development of electronic components, equipments, and systems for the Department of Defense. Appropriate tasks of this standard are to be applied during the Conceptual phase, Demonstration and Validation phase, Full Scale Development phase and Production phase of the system acquisition process.
MIL-STD-2173 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Requirements for Naval Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Support Equipment. January 1986, 265 Pages
The purpose of this standard is to provide the procedures for a Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) analysis for Naval Aircraft, weapons systems, and support equipment (SE). This standard is to be used by contractors during development of new systems and equipment, and by analysis and auditors within the Naval Air Systems Command for determining preventive maintenance requirements and developing age exploration requirements. The tasks shall also be use to update the initial Reliability-Centered Maintenance analysis and analyze newly discovered failure modes. For additional information on application, refer to Appendix F on additional guidance.
MIL-STD-45662 Calibration Systems Requirements, August 1988. 13 Pages
This MIL-STD provides requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a calibration system to control the accuracy of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) and measurement standards used to assure that supplies and services delivered to the Government comply with prescribed technical requirements. This document was rescinded in February 1995 in deference to ISO-10012-1 [ISO-10012 is for all organizations and covers the entire Measurement and Management System of an organization, whereas ISO/IEC 17025 is specifically for calibration laboratories or product testing laboratories only to verify the laboratory is competent (capable) to perform the measurements or tests].
NASA-1358 System Engineering “Toolbox” for Design-Oriented Engineers, December 1994. 306 Pages.
The purpose of this system engineering toolbox is to provide tools and methodologies available to the design-oriented systems engineer. A tool, as used herein, is defined as a set of procedures to accomplish a specific function. A methodology is defined as a collection of tools, rules, and postulates to accomplish a purpose. A thorough literature search was performed to identify the prevalent tools and methodologies. For each concept addressed in the toolbox, the following information is provided:
4. example, if practical,
6. limitations, and
7. bibliography and/or references.
This toolbox is intended solely as guidance for potential tools and methodologies, rather than direction or instruction for specific technique selection or utilization. It is left to the user to determine which technique(s), at which level of detail are applicable, and what might be the expected “value added” for their purposes. Caution should be exercised in the use of these tools and methodologies. Use of the techniques for the sake of “using techniques” is rarely resource-effective. In addition, while techniques have been categorized for recommended areas of use, this is not intended to be restrictive. Readers are encouraged to question, comment (app. A) and, in general, use this reference as one source among many. The reader is also cautioned to validate results from a given tool to ensure accuracy and applicability to the problem at hand.
NASA-FTA-1.1 Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications, August 2002. 218 Pages.
This handbook is an update of the original Fault Tree Handbook published in 1981. It is written for the informed reader who has some knowledge of system analysis and has knowledge of basic mathematics. This handbook is intended for system analysts, system engineers, and managers. No previous knowledge or training in statistics, reliability, or risk analysis is assumed. Basic concepts of statistical analysis, reliability analysis, and risk analysis are presented in relevant chapters and in the appendices.
The first part of the handbook describes the concepts, steps, tools, and uses of fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a deductive, failure-based approach. As a deductive approach, FTA starts with an undesired event, such as failure of a main engine, and then determines (deduces) its causes using a systematic, backward-stepping process.
The second part of the handbook contains examples of the application of FTA in studies that have been previously performed. The focus is on aerospace applications. The examples include the rupture of a pressure tank (a classic FTA example), failure to initiate and terminate thrust in a monopropellant propulsion system, failure of a redundant container seal (design analysis), and a dynamic FT analysis of a mission avionics system..
NASA-Metrology Metrology—Calibration and Measurement Processes Guidelines, June 1994. 330 Pages.
and techniques acceptable in fulfilling metrology, calibration, and measurement
process quality requirements for NASA programs are outlined in the
Publication. The intention of this
Publication is to aid NASA Engineers and systems contractors in the design,
implementation, and operation of metrology, calibration, and measurement
systems. It is also intended as a
resource to guide NASA personnel in the uniform evaluation of such systems
supplied or operated by contractors.
NASA-PRA-1.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners, August 2002. 323 Pages.
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures Guide is neither a textbook nor a sourcebook of PRA methods and techniques for the subject matter. It is the recommended approach and procedures, based on the experience of the authors, of how PRA should be performed for aerospace applications. It therefore serves tow purposes:
1. To complement the training material taught in the PRA course for practitioners and, together with the Fault Tree Handbook, to provide PRA methodology documentation.
2. To assist aerospace PRA practitioners in selecting and analysis approach that is best suited for their applications.
The material of this Procedures Guide is organized into three parts:
1. A management introduction to PRA is presented in Chapters 1-3. After a historic introduction on PRA at NASA and a discussion of the relation between PRA and risk management, an overview of PRA with simple examples is presented.
2. Chapters 4-14 cover probabilistic methods for PRA, methods for scenario development, uncertainty analysis, data collection and parameter estimation, human reliability analysis, software reliability analysis, dependent failure analysis, and modeling of physical processes for PRA.
3. Chapter 15 provides a detailed discussion of the “scenario-based” PRA process using two aerospace examples.
The only departure of this Procedures Guide from the description of Experience-based recommended approaches is in the areas of Human Reliability (Chapter 9) and Software risk Assessment (Chapter 11). Analytical methods in these two areas are not mature enough, at least in aerospace applications. Therefore, instead of recommended approaches, these chapters describe some popular methods for the sake of completeness. It is the hope of the authors that in future editions it will be possible to provide recommended approaches in these two areas also.
NASA-RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance Guide For Facilities And Collateral Equipment, February 2002. 356 Pages.
NASA-RP-1253 Reliability Training, June 2000. 366 Pages.
The theme of this manual is failure physics—the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and what can be done about it. The intent is to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability, and to assist in achieving low-cost reliable products. In a broader sense the manual should do more. It should underscore the urgent need for mature attitudes toward reliability. Five of the chapters were originally presented as a classroom course to over 1000 Martin Marietta engineers and technicians. Another four chapters and three appendixes have been added. We begin with a view of reliability from the years 1940 to 2000. Chapter 2 starts the training material with a review of mathematics and a description of what elements contribute to product failures. The remaining chapter elucidates basic reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate failures.
NASA-SP-576 NASA Risk-Informed Handbook, April 2010,
The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the risk-informed decision making (RIDM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, with a specific focus on programs and projects in the Formulation phase, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. Appendix A provides a cross-reference between the RIDM-related requirements in NPR 8000.4A and the sections of this handbook for which guidance is provided.
handbook supports RIDM application within the NASA systems engineering process,
and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA
Systems Engineering Handbook. Figure 1
shows where the specific processes from the discipline-oriented NPR 7123.1,
NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements, and NPR 8000.4 intersect
with product-oriented NPRs, such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and
Project Management Requirements; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and
Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements; and
NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management
Requirements. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook
is intended to provide guidance on the specific systems engineering processes
established by NPR 7123.1, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the
specific RIDM processes established by NPR 8000.4A.
This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.
NASA-SP-610S NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, June 1995, 149 Pages.
This handbook is intended to provide information on systems engineering that will be useful to NASA system engineers, especially new ones. Its primary objective is to provide a generic description of systems engineering as it should be applied throughout NASA. Field centers’ handbooks re encouraged to provide center-specific details of implementation.
For NASA system engineers to choose to keep a copy of this handbook at their elbows, it must provide answers that cannot be easily found elsewhere. Consequently, it provides NASA-relevant perspectives and NASA-particular data. NASA management instructions (NMIs) are referenced when applicable.
This handbook’s secondary objective is to serve as a useful companion to all of the various courses in systems engineering that are being offered under NASA’s auspices.
NASA-SP-8053 Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects on Materials, June 1970, 48 Pages
Space vehicles are subject to bombardment by nuclear particles and electromagnetic rations from both external and onboard sources. During some missions, radiation exposure may be sufficient to degrade the critical properties of structural materials and jeopardize flightworthiness of the spacecraft.
This monograph is concerned with the identification of the significant property changes induced in structural materials by radiation from the nuclear reactor, the isotope power source, and from space, and the exposure levels at which ehese effects become important. Structural materials are defined as those that provide fundamental load-carrying capability or protection against the natural space environment while satisfying a functional requirement (e.g., viewing port of astronaut). Material properties affected by radiation are discussed in three categories in this monograph. These are:
1. Mechanical: Tensile strength, elasticity, elongation, impact properties, fatigue strength, hardness, shear strength, and dimensional stability.
2. Thermal: Thermal conductivity and stored energy.
3. Optical: Emissivity, absorptance, and reflectance.
NASA-SP-8054 Space Radiation Protection, June 1970, 50 Pages
Space vehicles are subjected to a variety of penetrating energetic rations present in space that generally have adverse effects on vehicle materials, components, or occupants, and these may require some form of radiation protection. Adverse effects manifest themselves in the form of changes in properties of materials or components which impair their function, or they are physiological changes in vehicle occupants which impair their function or compromise their well-being. If insufficient radiation protection is provided, these effects can result in mission failure or permanent injury to vehicle occupants, or both.
The purpose of this monograph is to establish criteria and procedures for determining doses caused by penetrating space radiation and for the design of appropriate protection for space vehicles. The objective is to avoid exceeding specified allowable levels of radiation does and/or dose rate for the duration of the mission. The approach is first to calculate the doses received by each radiation-sensitive item, considering the protection inherent in the vehicle structure and contents, and the space radiation environment encountered during the mission. If any doses exceed allowable limits, then the design of shielding is implemented to reduce the doses to meet the specifications, unless the adjustment of mission parameters or system design (or specifications) can eliminate the necessity.
The prevailing types and sources of penetrating space radiation are:
1. Solar cosmic rays, consisting chiefly of protons, with some alpha particles (helium nuclei) ejected sporadically from the sun during some solar-flare events.
2. Magnetically trapped protons and electrons in the vicinity of the earth and other planets.
3. Galactic cosmic rays, consisting of a continuous flux of protons and comparatively fewer heavier nuclei.
NASA-STD-8729.1 Planning, Developing And Managing An Effective Reliability And Maintainability (R&M) Program, December 1998, 77 Pages
This technical standard for reliability and maintainability (R&M) provides guidance to customers (or purchasers) and suppliers (or contractors) on R&M requirements development, design implementation, and evaluation. It has been developed to provide a centralized source of information for establishing R&M performance-based requirements, design factors, and metrics for use on all new NASA programs/projects and contracts. It addresses the challenge of managing mission risk in the development and operation of cost and time constrained flight programs/projects and other NASA assets.
This document is intended as a guide to current techniques to identify and meet customer product performance expectations. It is structured to reflect the requirements of NPG 7120.5A “NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements” and the programmatic policy of NPD 8720.1 “NASA Reliability and Maintainability Program Policy” as they relate to the R&M disciplines in the Formulation, approval, Implementation, and Evaluation sub processes of NASA programs/projects. It replaces previous NASA handbooks which were derived from military standards and which mandated general reliability and maintainability requirements for NASA programs/projects. This movement away from rigid standards and toward flexible guidelines reflects government’s increased willingness to accept mature, controlled commercial practices and seek industry solutions in the development of civil and military systems. This guidance is intended to assist engineering managers in achieving the following R*M objectives throughout the life cycle of NASA in-house and contracted activities:
· Provide realistic R&M requirements for system development specifications and requirements documents.
· Allow for early and continuing attention to R&M principles during system design.
· Achieve system reliability and maintainability as defined by the mission objectives.
· Control system life cycle cost by addressing operations and maintenance support costs drivers during system design.
· Measure, report and assess R&M performance through the system life cycle.
· Maintain a comprehensive and readily accessible database of success and failure data for use in prediction, problem trending, and assessment of progress toward system success goals through the system’s life cycle as well as for establishment of R&M performance requirements for follow-on or new programs/projects.
· Emphasize continuous R&M improvement in each successive generation of the system and its elements.
NASA-TM-4322 NASA Reliability Preferred Practices for Design and Test, September 1991. 89 Pages.
This manual is produced to communicate within the aerospace community design practices that have contributed to NASA mission success. The information presented has been collected from various NASA field centers and reviewed by a committee consisting of senior technical representatives from the participating centers.
The information presented in this manual represents the “best technical advice” that NASA has to offer on reliability design and test practices. The practices contained in this manual should not be interpreted as requirements but rather as proven technical approaches that can enhance system reliability. Application of the practices and guidelines is strongly encouraged, but the final decision regarding applicability resides with the particular program or project office.
The manual is divided into two technical sections. Section II contains reliability practices, including design criteria, test procedures, or analytical techniques that have been successfully applied on previous space flight programs. Section III contains reliability guidelines, including techniques currently applied to space flight projects, where insufficient information exists to certify that the technique will contribute to mission success.
NASA-TM-4628 Recommended Techniques for Effective Maintainability, December 1994. 120 Pages.
Maintainability is a process for assuring the ease by which a system can be restored to operation following a failure. Designing and operating cost effective, maintainable systems (both on-orbit and on the ground) as become a necessity within NASA. In addition, NASA cannot afford to lose public support by designing less than successful projects. In this era of shrinking budgets, the temptation to reduce up front cost rather than consider total program life cycle costs should be avoided. In the past, relation of R&M requirements to reduce up front costs has resulted in end-items that did not perform as advertised and could not be properly maintained in a cost effective manner. Additional costs result when attempts are made late in the design phase to correct for the early relaxation of requirements.
The purpose of this manual is to present a series of recommended techniques that can increase overall operation effectiveness of both flight- and ground-based NASA systems. Although each technique contains useful information, none should be interpreted as a requirement. The objective is to provide a set of tools to minimize the risk associated with:
· Restoring failed functions (both ground and flight based)
· Conducting complex and highly visible maintenance operations
· Sustaining a technical capability to support the NASA mission utilizing aging equipment or facilities
This document provides:
1. program management considerations – key elements of an effective maintainability effort;
2. design and development considerations;
3. analysis and test considerations – quantitative and qualitative analysis processes and testing techniques; and
4. operations and operational design considerations that address NASA field experience.
Updates will include a section applicable to on-orbit maintenance with practical experience from NASA EVA maintenance operations (including ground and on-orbit operations and ground-based simulations). This document is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing the systems development process in accordance with the NASA “better, faster, smaller, and cheaper” goal without compromising mission safety.
NATO-AQAP-100 Policy On An Integrated Systems Approach To Quality Through The Life Cycle, February 2002. 36 Pages.
The activities of the Armed Forces in NATO are carried out as a result of a political decision process, primarily in order to provide a defence service to society in the member nations. Collaboration between NARO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners is a way of mitigating some of the cost of defence systems and providing a mutual defence capability.
The defence capability depends, to a great extent, on the quality of defence systems containing integrated hardware, software, facilities, people, and underlying processes. Quality is best achieved though an integrated systems approach throughout the life cycle. This document provides information and guidance on the NATO Policy for such an approach.
This policy recognizes that quality management is a continuous process involving multiple participants, including industry, that supports the development, delivery and sustainment of military capability from concept to disposal. The overall aim is to acquire products that fulfill the requirements seen in a life cycle perspective, to optimize internal and external interfaces, and to develop good commercial relationships with industry.
This document should be used, as a part of the overall policy of an organization, to ensure quality of life cycle processes, products and services. The document is not intended to be used as a contractual document.
NATO-ARMP-1 NATO Requirements For Reliability And Maintainability, June 2002. 21 Pages.
For the purpose of this standard, all the reliability and maintainability activities together constitute the R&M programme.
SAE Standard JA1000 fully applies for reliability and associated activities.
[The scope of SAE JA1000: This SAE Standard establishes the requirement for suppliers to plan a reliability program that satisfies the following three requirements: a) the supplier shall ascertain customer requirements, b) The supplier shall meet customer requirements, c) The supplier shall assure that customer requirements have been met. An implementation guide is also available as SAE JA1000/1.]
SAE Standard JA 1010 fully applies for Maintainability and associated activities.
[The scope of SAE JA1010: This SAE Standard establishes the requirement for suppliers to plan a maintainability program that satisfies the following three requirements: A) The supplier and customer shall reach agreement on program requirements, b) The supplier shall meet customer requirements, c) The supplier shall assure that customer requirements have been met. Applicability—This document applies to activities related to the specification, design, development, and assurance of any system (hardware and/or software) product or processes. Tailoring—This document does not specify the activities, tasks or methods to be included in the program. Rather, the content of each program must be tailored to satisfy customer requirements using the most appropriate means. An implementation guide is also available as SAE JA1010/1.]
NATO-ARMP-4 Guidance For Writing NATO R&M Requirements Documents, October 2001. 52 Pages.
In order to achieve high operational effectiveness with low life cycle cost the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) of defence materiel should be given full consideration at all stages of the procurement cycle. This process should begin at the concept stage of the project and be continued, in a disciplined manner, as an integral part of the design, development, production and testing process and subsequently into service.
This ARMP provides guidance on writing R&M requirement documents during the life cycle of a project using the NATO Phased Armament Programming System (NATO PAPS) as a framework.
This document also contains the necessary information and advice to write quantitative reliability and maintainability requirements, and availability and risk requirements which are derived therefrom.
Realistic R&M requirements should be stated properly and consistently in each milestone of the NATO PAPS. The purpose of this document is to:
a. Describe the concepts and factors affecting the formulation of R&M requirements to assist operational requirements staff to define the basic R&M requirements, and the procurement agency to convert these requirements into contractually agreed specifications.
b. Describe a framework for the development of the R&M content of each PAPS milestone.
NATO-ARMP-5E Guidance on Reliability & Maintainability Training, February 1989. 29 Pages.
In the most simple terms, people who require training in the theory and practice of R&M are:
a) those who are full-time and specialized R&M practitioners, advisers or consultants
b) those whose work involves them in decisions or management processes concerned with R&M or brings them into contact with specialized R&M practitioners
By its very nature, specialized R&M knowledge is normally only acquired by attendance at a second degree course or equivalent; such training will normally be conducted only by Universities or comparable Institutions. The definition of such training is not an appropriate subject for this publication and will not be considered further. It remains only to be said that, in the procurement of modern military equipment, the availability of specialized R&M advice at this level is regarded as essential. Suitable trained and qualified specialist must therefore be available and their advice sought at the earliest possible date.
This publication is addressed to the second category and its emphasized that training at this level should cover the broadest possible field: purchasing and procurement staff concerned with the procurement of NATO materiel, contractors involved in design, development and production and also those responsible for NATO material in-service.
NATO-ARMP-6E Reliability And Maintainability Part 6: In-Service R&M, December 1988. 24 Pages.
To achieve and maintain R&M objectives defined during design, development and production of defence materiel there may be a need to assess and where necessary improve In-Service R&M.
Assessment and where appropriate improvement of the In-Service R&M may be carried out by various authorities – the original equipment contractor, the purchaser, the military user, another contractor or any combination of these.
This Part of the Defence Standard defines those measures which must be considered by the sponsor, the Procurement Executive and the Contractor, when there is a need for the preparation of an In-Service R&M Assessment Plan, within the overall R&M plan for the specified defence materiel.
It should be regarded as an expansion of Def Stan 00-04 (Part 1)/2 (ARMP-1) and Def Stan 00-40 (Part 2)/1 (ARMP-2) Appendices A paragraph 325.
NATO-ARMP-7 NATO R&M Terminology Applicable To ARMPs, July 2001. 25 Pages.
This glossary is complied by direction of the Group of National Directors for Quality Assurance in accordance with Part 1 of AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms & Definitions – Policy & Procedures for the NATO Terminology Standardisation Programme. This glossary is not exhaustive. It is not designed to compete with any existing reliability and Maintainability (R&M) glossary of terms, as it is only relevant to terms included in Allied Reliability and Maintainability Publications (ARMPs) which are not explicitly defined in those documents. In addition, where the terms in this glossary differ from NATO-agreed terms, they are to be considered for ARMP use only. Its purpose is to explain specialist terms in the ARMPs, thereby promoting mutual understating.
The use of ISO 8402-1994 and IEC-50(191) terms has been approved by the appropriate organizations.
NATO-ARMP-8E Reliability And Maintainability Part 8: Procurement Of Off-The-Shelf Equipment, July 1992. 27 Pages.
This part of the Standard provides guidance on the measures to be taken for achieving acceptable levels of R&M in the procurement of Off-the-Shelf (OTS) [COTS] equipment.
NAVAIR-00-25-403 Management Manual, Guidelines For The Naval Aviation Reliability-Centered Maintenance Process, July 2005, 195 pages
This manual is the primary guidance document for anyone tasked with implementing and RCM program or performing an RCM analysis on Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) managed equipment. Other RCM documents are available from NAVAIR.
NAVAIR-Instruction-4790.20A Reliability-Centered Maintenance Program, May 1999, 8 Pages
This document defines the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Program and establish RCM Program policy, procedures, and responsibilities with the Naval Aviation Systems Team (TEAM)
NAVAIR-RCM-VS-SAE-JA1011-Comparison, NAVAIR RCM Is Compliant With SAE JA1011, July 2004, 22 Pages
The intent of this document is to demonstrate that the RCM process provided in NAVAIR 00-25-403 is compliant with SAE JA1011.
NIST-HDBK-135 Life-Cycle Costing Manual for the Federal Energy Management Program, February 1996. 222 Pages.
Handbook 1235 is a guide to understanding the life-cycle cost (LCC) methodology and criteria established by the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) for the economic evaluation of energy and water conservation projects and renewable energy projects in all federal buildings. It expands on the life-cycle cost methods and criteria contained in the FEMP rules published in 10 CFR 436, Subpart A, which applies to all federal agencies. The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate the implementation of the FEMP rules by explaining the LCCC method, defining the measures of economic performance used, describing the assumptions and procedures to follow in performing evaluations, giving examples, and noting NIST computer software available for computation and reporting purposes. An annual supplement to Handbook 135, Energy Price Indices and Discount Factors for LCC Analysis, NISTIR 85-3273-X is also published by NIST to provide the current discount rate and discount factors needed for conducting an LCC analysis in accordance with the FEMP rules. This annual supplement is required when using Handbook 135.
NIST-HDBK-NISTIR-6806 Project-Oriented Life-Cycle Costing Workshop For Energy Conservation In Buildings, September 2001. 341 Pages.
This student manual for the Project-Oriented Life-Cycle Costing Workshop for Energy Conservation in Buildings is a workbook for a two-day course on life-cycle costing developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). The methodology and procedures in this manual are consistent with 10 CFR Part 436A and its amendments, which provide guidelines for the economic analysis of investments in energy and water conservation and renewable energy projects for federal buildings. These guidelines are explained in detail in Life-Cycle Costing Manual for the Federal Energy Management Program, handbook 135, 1995 edition. The methodology is also consistent with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards on Building Economics, in particular ASTM Standard Practices E917, E964, E1057, E1121, and E1185.
NISTIR-327321 Energy Price Indices and Discount Factors for Life-Cycle Cost Analysis – April 2010, May 2005. 81 Pages.
This is the April 2010 edition of energy price indices and discount factors for performing life-cycle cost analyses of energy and water conservation and renewable energy projects in federal facilities. It will be effective from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. This publication supports the federal life-cycle costing methodology described in 10CFR436A and Circular A-94 by updating the energy price projections and discount factors that are described, explained, and illustrated in NIST Handbook 135 (HB 135, Life-Cycle Costing Manual for the Federal Energy Management Program).
NUREG-74/014 (WASH-1400) Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, October 1975, 228 pages and the file size is 12 meg.
This report with Farmer’s risk plots (Figures 1-1 and Figure 6-1 for fatalities due to man-caused events and Figure 1-2 and Figure 6-2 fatalities due to nature plus Figure 6-3 for accidents involving property damage) is often referred to as WASH-1400 or the Rasmussen Report [Professor Norman Rasmussen]. The report used probabilistic risk assessments in the form of fault trees to demonstrate the risk of death to individuals was very small and at an acceptable level compared to risk of other types of accidents as shown in Table 6-3 reproduced below which shows:
TABLE 6-3 INDIVIDUAL RISK OF EARLY FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES
(U.S. Population Average 1969)
Total Number Early Fatality
Accident Type for 1969 Probability/yr(a)
Motor Vehicle 55,791 3 x 10-4
Falls 17,827 9 x 10-5
Fires and Hot Substance 7,451 4 x 10-5
Drowning 6,181 3 x 10-5
Poison 4,516 2 x 10-5
Firearms 2,309 1 x 10-5
Machinery (1968) 2,054 1 x 10-5
Water Transport 1,743 9 x 10-6
Air Travel 1,778 9 x 10-6
Falling Objects 1,271 6 x 10-6
Electrocution 1,148 6 x 10-6
Railway 884 4 x 10-6
Lightning 160 5 x 10-7
Tornadoes 118(b) 4 x 10-7
Hurricanes 90(c) 4 x 10-7
All Others 8,695 4 x 10-5
All Accidents (from Table 6-1) 115,000 6 x 10-4
Nuclear Accidents (100 reactors) - 2 x 10-10 (d)
(a) Based on total U.S. population, except as noted.
(b) (1953-1971 avg.)
(c) (1901-1972 avg.)
(d) Based on a population at risk of 15 x 106.
NUREG-75/014 was superseded by NUREG-1150 described below for Severe Accident Risks.
Appendix III & IV describe failure data (Appendix III) and common mode failures with bounding techniques and special techniques (Appendix IV). It contains 170 pages and the file size is 8.5 Meg.
Appendix V provides quantitative results of accident sequences. It contains 142 pages and the file size is 6.1 Meg.
Appendix VI shows calculation of reactor accident consequences. It contains 500 pages and the file size is 23.7 Meg.
Appendix VII through X describes release of radioactivity in reactor accidents (Appendix VII). Physical processes in reactor meltdown accidents (Appendix VIII), safety design rationale for nuclear power plants (Appendix IX), and design adequacy (Appendix X). It contains 682 pages and the file size is 32.9 Meg.
NUREG-0492 Fault Tree Handbook, January 1981. 209 Pages.
This handbook has been developed not only to serve as text for the System Safety and Reliability Course, but also to make available to others a set of otherwise undocumented material on fault tree construction and evaluation. The publication of this handbook is in accordance with the recommendations of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report (NUREG/CR-0400) in which it was stated that the fault/event tree methodology both can and should be used more widely by the NRC. It is hoped that this document will help to codify and systematize the fault tree approach to system analysis.
The principal concern of this book is the fault tree technique, which is a systematic method for acquiring information about a system. The information so gained can be used in making decisions, and therefore, before we even define system analysis, we will undertake a brief examination of the decision making [decision making] process. Decision making is a very complex process, and we will highlight only certain aspects which help to pat a system analysis in proper context.
NUREG-0585 Three Mile Island Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report. 55 Pages
The principal conclusion of the Task Force is that, although the accident at Three Mile Island stemmed from many sources, the most important lessons learned fall in a general area we have chosen to call operational safety. This general area includes the topics of human factors engineering, qualification, and training of operations personnel; integration of the human-element in the design, operation, and regulation of system safety; and quality assurance of operations. Specifically, the primary deficiency in reactor safety technology identified by the accident was the inadequate attention that had been paid by all levels and all segments of the technology to the human element and its fundamental role in both the prevention of accidents and the response to accidents. Thus, our policy recommendations and our specific ideas for stimulating and accomplishing change concentrate heavily on operations reliability and the associated design and licensing review measures that support or augment operations reliability. But an important qualifier must be added to this conclusion. That is, if the basic responsibility for public safety is to remain in the private sector, in the hands of the individual licensees for commercial nuclear power plants, then significant change in the attention to operations reliability must take place in the licensed industry. Operations is a "hands-on" concept and high operations reliability can only be achieved in practice by those responsible for "hands-on" functions.
NUREG-700 Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines. 659 Pages
The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE)
aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan
(NUREG-0800). Detailed design review procedures are provided in the HFE Program
Review Model (NUREG-0711). As part of the review process, the interfaces
between plant personnel and plant's systems and components are evaluated for
conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design ReviewGuidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 2), provides the
guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address
the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces
(HSIs). Since these guidelines only
address the HFE aspects of design and not other
related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural
design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of
actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a
design specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are
organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I
contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: displays, user-interface
interaction and management, and controls. These elements are used as building blocks
to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the
guidelines for reviewing six such systems: alarm system, group-view display
system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, computerized
operator support system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines
for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for
the review of HSI support, i.e., maintainability of digital systems.
NUREG-0711 Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model, February 2004, 124 Pages
This document is used by the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, combined operating licenses, and for license amendments. The purpose of these reviews is to verify that accepted HFE practices and guidelines are incorporated into the applicant’s HFE program. The review methodology provides a basis for performing reviews that address the twelve elements of an HFE program: HFE Program Management, Operating Experience Review; Functional Requirements Analysis and Function Allocation, Task Analysis, Staffing, Human Reliability Analysis, Human-System Interface Design, Procedure Development, Training Program Development, Human Factors Verification and Validation, Design Implementation, and Human Performance Monitoring. Each review element is divided into four sections: Background, Objective, Applicant Submittals, and Review Criteria. References to sources of additional information are also provided for each element.
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is an integral activity of a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). A PRA is submitted in accordance with current NRC requirements, if applicable. Human reliability analysis (HRA) seeks to evaluate the potential for, and mechanisms of, human error that may affect plant safety. Thus, it is an essential element in achieving the HFE design goal of providing a design that will minimize personnel errors, allow their detection, and provide recovery capability.
NUREG-1093 Reliability and Risk Analysis Methods Research Plan, October 1984, 93 Pages.
This document presents a plan for reliability and risk analysis methods research to be performed mainly by the Reactor Risk Branch (RRB), Division of Risk Analysis and Operations (DRAO), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. It includes those activities of other DRAO branches which are very closely related to those of the RRB. Related or interfacing programs of other division, offices and organizations are merely indicated.
The primary use of this document is envisioned as an NRC working document, covering about a 3-year period, to foster better coordination in reliability and risk analysis methods development between the offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research and Nuclear Reactor Regulation. It will also serve as an information source for contractors and others to more clearly understand the objectives, needs, programmatic activities and interfaces together with the overall logical structure of the program.
NUREG-1150 Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
This 1991 report from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission improves on the probabilistic risk assessment of the Walsh-1400 report summarized in NUREG-75 which is available in PDF format above. Report NUREG-1150 is less pessimistic, i.e., less concervative than NUREG-75/014 from the 1974/1975 period. NUREG-1150 shows the current generation of nuclear plants for production of electricity exceeds the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s requirements for safety goals.
The report is available in three volumes:
Volume 1 describes the Final Summary
Report. It has three parts:
Part 1 provides the background and objectives of the assessment and summarizes methods used for risk studies. It contains 59 pages and the file size is 3.6 Meg.
Part 2 provides a summary of results obtained for each of the five plants studied. It contains 124 pages and the file size is 6.2 Meg.
provides perspectives on the results and discusses the role of this work in the
larger contest of the NRC. It contains
105 pages and the file size is 6.5 Meg.
Volume 2 describes Appendices A, B, and C of the Final Report
Appendix A describes the risk methods used. It contains 73 pages and the file size is 4.4 Meg.
Appendix B shows examples of the risk calculations. It contains 78 pages and the file size is 5.1 Meg.
Appendix C describes issues important to quantification of risks. It contains 162 pages and the file size is 9.5 Meg.
Volume 3 describes Appendices D and E of the Final Report
Appendix D & E contains comments received about the report and staff responses. Appendix D refers to the first draft on February 1987, and Appendix E refers to the second version of the report on June 1989. It contains 90 pages and the file size is 6.4 Meg.
NUREG-1420 Special Committee Review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Severe Accident Risks Report (NUREG-1150), August 1990. 93 Pages
In April 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) published a draft report “Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Fiver U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” NUREG-1150. This report updated, extended and improved upon the information presented in the 1974 “Reactor Safety Study,” WASH-1400. Because the information in NUREG-1150 will play a significant role in implementing the NRC’s Severe Accident Policy, its quality and credibility are of critical importance. Accordingly, the Commission requested that the RES conduct a peer review of NUREG-1150 to ensure that the methods, safety insights and conclusions presented are appropriate and adequately reflect the current state of knowledge with respect to reactor safety.
To this end, RES formed a special committee in June of 1989 under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Committee, composed of a group of recognized national and international experts in nuclear reactor safety, was charged with preparing a report reflecting their review of NUREG-1150 with respect to the adequacy of the methods, data, analysis and conclusions it set forth. The report which precedes reflects the results of this peer review.
NUREG-1526 Lessons Learned from Early Implementation of The Maintenance Rule at Nine Nuclear Power Plants, June 1995, 48 Pages
This report summarizes the lessons learned from the nine pilot site visits that were performed to review early implementation of the maintenance rule using the draft NRC Maintenance Inspection Procedure. Licensees followed NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." In general, the licensees were thorough in determining which structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were within the scope of the maintenance rule at each site. The use of an expert panel was an appropriate and practical method of determining which SSCs are risk significant. When setting goals, all licensees considered safety but many licensees did not consider operating experience throughout the industry. Although required to do so, licensees were not monitoring at the system or train level the performance or condition for some systems used in standby service but not significant to risk. Most licensees had not established adequate monitoring of structures under the rule. Licensees established reasonable plans for doing periodic evaluations, balancing unavailability and reliability, and assessing the effect of taking equipment out of service for maintenance. However, these plans were not evaluated because they had not been fully implemented at the time of the site visits.
Technical Basis and Implementation Guidelines for A Technique for Human Event
Analysis (ATHEANA). April 2000,
NUREG-1624-cover-ch5, 115 pages
NUREG-1624-Section-6-through-11, 177 pages
NUREG-1624-Appendices, 277 pages
This report describes the most recent version of a second-generation human reliability analysis (HRA) method called "A Technique for Human Event Analysis," (ATHEANA), NUREG-1624, Rev. 1. ATHEANA is the result of development efforts sponsored by the Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)'s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. ATHEANA was developed to address limitations identified in current HRA approaches by providing a structured search process for human failure events and unsafe acts, providing detailed search processes for error-forcing context, addressing errors of commission and dependencies, more realistically representing the human-system interactions that have played important roles in accident response, and integrating advances in psychology with engineering, human factors, and PRA disciplines. The report is divided into two parts. Part I introduces the concepts upon which ATHEANA is built and describes the motivation for following this approach. Part 2 provides the practical guidance for carrying out the method. Appendix A provides retrospective ATHEANA based analyses of significant operating events. Appendices B-E provide sample ATHEANA prospective analyses (HRAs) for four specific human performance issues [for these reactors: Three Mile Island 2, Crystal River Unit 3, North Anna 2, Salem Unit 1, and Wolf Creek, Davis-Besse].
NUREG-1792 Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), April 2005, 110 Pages
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is establishing “good practices” for
performing human reliability analyses (HRAs)
and reviewing HRAs to assess the quality of those analyses. The good practices were developed as part of
the NRC’s activities to address quality issues related to probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) and, as such, support the implementation of Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.200, “An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,” dated
The HRA good practices documented in this report are of a generic nature; that is, they are not
tied to any specific methods or tools
that could be employed to perform an HRA.
As such, the good practices support the implementation of RG 1.200 for
Level 1 and limited Level 2 internal event PRAs with the reactor at full
power. Their elements are directly
linked to RG 1.200, which reflects and endorses (with certain clarifications
and substitutions) the “Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear
Power Plant Applications” (RA-S-2002 and Addenda RA-Sa-2003) promulgated by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and “Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance” (NEI
00-02, Revision A3) promulgated by the Nuclear Energy Institute.
This report is not intended to constitute a standard and, hence, it does not provide de facto requirements; rather, this report is intended for use as a reference guide. Consequently, the authors did not write this report with the expectation that all good practices should always be met. That is, the decisions regarding which good practices are applicable — and the extent to which those practices should be met — depends on the nature of the given regulatory application.
Therefore, it is important to understand that certain practices may not be applicable for a given analysis, or their applicability may be of limited scope.
NUREG-1842 Evaluation of Human Reliability Analysis Methods Against Good Practice, August 2006, 279 Pages
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed guidance for performing or evaluating human reliability analyses (HRAs) to support risk-informed regulatory decision-making and, in particular, the implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.200, “An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,” dated February 2004. The NRC’s detailed HRA guidance was developed in two phases. The first phase focused on developing “Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis,” as documented in NUREG-1792, dated April 2005. The second phase, summarized in this report, evaluated the various HRA methods that are commonly used in regulatory applications in the United States, with a particular focus on the extent to which they provide guidance to satisfy the good practices. Since the good practices closely parallel the requirements of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard (RA-S-2002) promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the HRA methods are also evaluated against that standard by implication. Toward that end, this report includes observations regarding the respective strengths and limitations of the HRA methods, as well as summaries of the scope, underlying knowledge base, and sources of quantification data associated with each method.
NUREG-1852 Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire, October 2007, 101 Pages
This report provides criteria and associated technical bases for evaluating the feasibility and reliability of postfire operator manual actions implemented in nuclear power plants. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed this report as a reference guide for agency staff who evaluate the acceptability of manual actions, submitted by licensees as exemption requests from the requirements of Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R, “Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,” to Title10, Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50), as a means of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions during and after fire events. The staff may use this information in the review of future postfire operator manual actions to determine if the feasibility and reliability of the operator manual action were adequately evaluated.
ATHEANA User’s Guide,
June 2007, 134 Pages
This manuscript provides a user’s guide for the human reliability analysis (HRA) method known as “A Technique for Human Event Analysis” (ATHEANA), which the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documented in NUREG-1624, Rev. 1, dated May 2000. As the first publication of its kind, this user’s guide describes both the quantitative and qualitative ATHEANA analysis approaches, fully describing the revised quantification approach and presenting a simpler description of the other ATHEANA elements needed to perform an HRA as part of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Toward that end, this user’s guide strives to present the steps for applying ATHEANA in a straightforward and succinct manner, so that HRA experts can easily and effectively apply the technique. Consequently, although the authors relied on NUREG-1624 as a primary resource for its development, the NRC is publishing this user’s guide as a standalone document, such that it can be used by analysts to apply the ATHEANA technique without the need to use NUREG-1624.
Also see above for NUREG-1624 (in three parts), see below for NUREG/CR-6350, and Wikipedia for more details.
NUREG-1921 EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines, November 2009, 322 Pages
During the 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed methods for fire risk analysis to support its utility members in the preparation of responses to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, “Individual Plant Examination - External Events” (IPEEE). This effort produced a Fire Risk Assessment methodology for operations at power that was used by the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) in support of the IPEEE program and several NPPs overseas. Although these methods were acceptable for accomplishing the objectives of the IPEEE, EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized that they required upgrades to support current requirements for risk-informed, performance-based (RI/PB) applications.
In 2001, EPRI and the USNRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) embarked on a cooperative project to improve the state-of-the-art in fire risk assessment to support a new
risk-informed environment in fire protection. This project produced a consensus document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), entitled “Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities” which addressed fire risk for at power operations. NUREG/CR-6850 developed high level guidance on the process for identification and inclusion of human failure events (HFEs) into the fire PRA (FPRA), and a methodology for assigning quantitative screening values to these HFEs. It outlined the initial considerations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and related fire effects that may need to be addressed in developing best-estimate human error probabilities (HEPs). However, NUREG/CR-6850 did not describe a methodology to develop best-estimate HEPs given the PSFs and the fire-related effects.
In 2007, EPRI and RES embarked on another cooperative project to develop explicit guidance for estimating HEPs for human failure events under fire generated conditions, building upon existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. This document provides a methodology and guidance for conducting a fire HRA. This process includes identification and definition of
post-fire human failure events, qualitative analysis, quantification, recovery, dependency, and uncertainty. This document provides three approaches to quantification: screening, scoping, and
detailed HRA. Screening is based on the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850, with some additional guidance for scenarios with long time windows. Scoping is a new approach to quantification
developed specifically to support the iterative nature of fire PRA quantification. Scoping is intended to provide less conservative HEPs than screening, but requires fewer resources than a
detailed HRA analysis. For detailed HRA quantification, guidance has been developed on how to apply existing methods to assess post-fire fire HEPs.
NUREG/CR-1614 Approaches to Acceptable Risk: A Critical Guide, December 1980, 336 Pages
Acceptable-risk decisions are an essential step in the management of technological hazards. In many situations, they constitute the weak (or missing) link in the management process. The absence of an adequate decision-making methodology often produce’s indecision, inconsistency, and dissatisfaction. The result is neither good for hazard management nor good for society.
This report offers a critical analysis of the viability of various approaches as guides to acceptable-risk decisions. It does so by:
(1) Defining acceptable-risk decisions and examining some frequently proposed but inappropriate, solutions.
(2) Characterizing the essential features of acceptable-risk problems that make their resolution so difficult. These are: uncertainty about how specific decision problems are to be defined, difficulties in ascertaining crucial facts, the problematic nature of the value issues that arise, the vagaries of human behavior that render responses to hazards unpredictable, and inability to assess the adequacy of decision-making processes and the degree to which their conclusions are to be trusted.
(3) Creating a taxonomy of decision-making methods, identified by how they attempt to address the features of acceptable-risk problems listed below. The major categories discussed here are:
- Professional judgment: allowing technical experts to devise solutions;
- Bootstrapping: searching for historical precedents that embody guides to future decisions; and
- Formal analysis: theory-based procedures for modeling problems and calculating the best decision.
(4) Specifying the objectives that an approach should satisfy in order to guide social policy. These are: comprehensiveness, logical soundness, practicality, openness to evaluation, political acceptability, institutional compatibility, and conduciveness to learning.
(5) Rating the success of the approaches in meeting these objectives. Namely: How well does each approach satisfy each objective? How satisfactory are the approaches relative to one another? How might one choose the most adequate approach for different decision problems?
The following conclusions emerge from our analysis:
(1) Acceptable-risk problems are decision problems, that is, they require a choice between alternatives. That choice depends upon the alternatives, values, and beliefs that are considered. As a result, there is no single all-purpose number that expresses "acceptable risk" for a society.
(2) Values and uncertainties are an integral part of every acceptable-risk problem. As a result, there are no value-free processes for choosing between risky alternatives. The search for an "objective method" is doomed to failure and may blind the searchers to the value laden assumptions they are making.
(3) None of the approaches considered here offers an unfailing guide to selecting the most acceptable alternative. Each gives special attention to some features of acceptable-risk problems, while ignoring others. As a result, not only does each approach fail to give a definitive answer, but it is predisposed to representing particular interests and recommending particular solutions. Hence, choice of a method is a political decision with a distinct message about who should rule and what should matter.
(4) Acceptable-risk debates are greatly clarified when the participants are committed to separating issues of fact from issues of value. Yet, however sincere these attempts, a clear-cut separation is often impossible. Beliefs about the facts of the matter shape our values; in turn, those values shape the facts we search for and how we interpret what we find.
(5) The controlling factor in many acceptable-risk decisions is how the problem is defined (i.e., which options and consequences are considered, what kinds of uncertainty are acknowledged, and how key terms are operationalized). As a result, definitional disputes underlie some of the most rancorous political debates.
(6) Values, like beliefs, are acquired through experience and contemplation. Acceptable-risk problems raise many complex, novel, and subtle value issues, for which we may not have well-articulated preferences. In such situations, the values we express may be greatly influenced by transient factors, including subtle.-aspects of how the question is posed.
(7) Even the most knowledgeable experts may have an incomplete understanding of new and intricate hazards. Indeed, some limits on breadth of perspective may be a concomitant of acquiring a particular disciplinary or world outlook. In such cases, non-experts may possess important supplementary information or viewpoints on hazards and their consequences.
NUREG/CR-1916 A Risk Comparison, February 1981, 100 Pages
report presents data for the comparison of societal risk from natural and
man-made hazards. Only fatalities resulting from the hazards are used in the
comparison, with the data and the comparative analysis taken from current
literature. In comparing societal risks for most of the hazards, both expected
values and frequency vs. consequence curves are presented. For a subset of
hazards, notably the power generation technologies (nuclear, coal, oil, and
gas), which have not exhibited high consequence events (catastrophes), the
comparisons are based on estimated expected values only.
Individual risk data are presented in two ways, a probability of death within a year and the amount of life shortening of an average life span.
NUREG/CR-2258 Fire Risk Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants, September 1981, 193 Pages
A methodology for evaluating the frequency of' severe consequences due to fires in nuclear power plants is presented. The methodology produces a log of accident scenarios and then assesses the frequency of occurrence of each. Its framework is given in six steps. In the first two steps, the accident scenarios are identified qualitatively and the potential
of fires to cause initiating events is investigated. The last four steps are aimed at quantification. The frequency of fires is obtained for different compartments in nuclear power plants using Bayesian techniques. The results are compared with those of classical methods and the variation of the frequencies with time is also examined. The combined effects of fire growth, detection, and suppression on component failure are modeled. The susceptibility of cables to fire and their failure modes are discussed. Finally, the limitations of the methodology and suggestions for further research are given.
NUREG/CR-2350 Sensitivity Analysis Techniques: Self-Teaching Curriculum, June 1982, 146 Pages
This is a tutorial on Latin Hypercube Sampling. This document provided a solid foothold in the computer modeling world for Latin Hypercube Sampling to speed completion of computer simulations by a factor of roughly 10. The complete file is 47 Meg.
Other background details are available from Ron Iman’s website http://swtechcon.com/by_publication.shtml#CIS particularly the 5-part series download from Communications in Statistics in 1980 and 1982 referring to “Small Sample Sensitivity Analysis Techniques for Computer Models with an Application to Risk Assessment”, pages 1749-1842.
This report contains discussions and exercises that illustrate the application of the sensitivity analysis techniques developed at Sandia National Laboratories for the Risk Methodology for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste Project. With this report the user may familiarize himself with the application of the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) program and the Stepwise Regression (STEP) program with the groundwater transport model NWFT/DVM to do sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. The user may require the User’s Guides for LHS (Sand 79-1473), STEP (SAND 79-1472), and NWFT/DVM (NUREG/CR-2081) to make full use of this self-teaching curriculum. This report is one of a series of self-teaching curricula prepared under a technology transfer contract for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
NUREG/CR-3385 Measures of Risk Importance And Their Applications, May 1986, 116 Pages
The objectives of this work are to evaluate the importance of the containment and the different safety functions as assessed in probabilistic risk analyses. To accomplish this objective, risk importance measures are defined to evaluate a feature's importance in further reducing the risk and its importance in maintaining the present risk level. One defined importance measure, called the feature's risk reduction worth, is useful for prioritizing feature improvements which can most reduce the risk. The other defined importance, called the feature's risk achievement worth, is useful for prioritizing features which are most important in reliability assurance and maintenance activities.
Any type of feature can be evaluated for its risk reduction worth and its risk achievement worth; safety functions, safety systems, components, surveillance tests, human activities, mitigation functions, and containments can all be quantified as to their worths. Evaluating the worth in a structured manner from general safety function worths to detailed component, test,
and human activity worths allows one to successively focus on the important items. The worths also provide important information for cost-benefit and value-impact analysis, as the report describes. The limitations, assumptions and uncertainties of Probabilistic Risk Analysis should be considered when making risk based decisions. Sensitivity analysis can be used to identify the
importance of assumptions and areas where more in-depth analysis is needed. Since much of the information contained in the risk importance measures is relative, much of the analyses can be made robust to risk analysis uncertainties.
The defined risk worth measures are applied to the risk analyses performed in the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program (RSSMAP). Four plants were analyzed in RSSMAP: Oconee, Grand Gulf, Calvert Cliffs, and Sequoyah, and the risk worths are applied to each of the plant's risk analysis. Safety functions, safety systems, containment, and certain components and human activities are specifically evaluated for their worths.
NUREG/CR-4772 Accident Sequence Evaluation Program Human Reliability Analysis Procedure, February 1987, 170 Pages
This document presents a shortened version of the procedure, models, and data for human reliability analysis (HRA) which are presented in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis With Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications (NUREG/CR-1278, August 1983). This shortened version was prepared and tried out as part of the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and managed by Sandia National Laboratories. The intent of this new HRA procedure, called the "ASEP HRA Procedure," is to enable systems analysts, with minimal support from experts in human reliability analysis, to make estimates of the human error probabilities and other human performance characteristics that are sufficiently accurate for many probabilistic risk assessments. The ASEP HRA Procedure consists of a Pre-Accident Screening HRA, a Pre-Accident Nominal HRA, a Post-Accident Screening HRA, and a Post-Accident Nominal HRA and evaluation of the procedure in four nuclear power plants by four different systems analysts and related personnel, including human reliability specialists. The changes consist of some additional explanatory material (including examples), and more detailed definitions of some of the terms.
NUREG/CR-5500-Vol-10 Reliability Study: Combustion Engineering Reactor Protection System, 1984-1998, November 2001, 464 Pages
This report documents an analysis of the safety-related performance of the reactor protection system (RPS) at U.S. Combustion Engineering commercial reactors during the period 1984 through 1998. The analysis is based on the four variations of Combustion Engineering reactor protection system designs. RPS-operational data were collected for all U.S. Combustion Engineering commercial reactors from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System and Licensee Event Reports. A risk-based analysis was performed on the data to estimate the observed unavailability of the RPS, based on fault tree models of the systems. An engineering analysis of trends and patterns was also performed on the data to provide additional insights into RPS performance. RPS unavailability results obtained from the data were compared with existing unavailability estimates from Individual Plant Examinations and other reports.
NUREG/CR-5500-Vol-11 Reliability Study: Babcock & Wilcox Reactor Protection System, 1984-1998, November 2001, 341 Pages
This report documents an analysis of the safety-related performance of the reactor protection system (RPS) at U.S. Babcock & Wilcox commercial reactors during the period 1984 through 1998. The analysis is based on the Oconee and Davis-Besse plant designs. RPS operational data were collected for all U.S. Babcock & Wilcox commercial reactors from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System and Licensee Event Reports. A risk-based analysis was performed on the data to estimate the observed unavailability of the RPS, based on fault tree models of the systems. An engineering analysis of trends and patterns was also performed on the data to provide additional insights into RPS performance. RPS unavailability results obtained from the data
were compared with existing unavailability estimates from Individual Plant Examinations and other reports.
NUREG/CR-6101 Software Reliability and Safety in Nuclear Reactor Protection Systems, June 1993, 150 Pages
Planning the development, use and regulation of computer systems in nuclear reactor protection systems in such a way as to enhance reliability and safety is a complex issue. This report is one of a series of reports from the Computer Safety and Reliability Group, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, that investigates different aspects of computer software in reactor protection systems. There are two central themes in the report. First, software considerations cannot be fully understood in isolation from computer hardware and application considerations. Second, the process of engineering reliability and safety into a computer system requires activities to be carried out throughout the software life cycle. The report discusses the many activities that can be carried out during the software life cycle to improve the safety and reliability of the resulting product. The viewpoint is primarily that of the assessor, or auditor.
NUREG/CR-6350 A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA), May 1996, 114 Pages
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has become an important tool in the nuclear power industry, both for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the operating utilities. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a critical element of PRA; however, limitations in the analysis of human actions in PRAs have long been recognized as a constraint when using PRA. A multidisciplinary HRA framework has been developed with the objective of providing a structured approach for analyzing operating experience and understanding nuclear plant safety, human error, and the underlying factors that affect them. The concepts of the framework have matured into a rudimentary working HRA method. A trial application of the method has demonstrated that it is possible to identify potentially significant human failure events from actual operating experience which are not generally included in current PRAs, as well as to identify associated performance shaping factors and plant conditions that have an observable impact on the frequency of core damage. A general process was developed, albeit in preliminary form, that addresses the iterative steps of defining human failure events and estimating their probabilities using search schemes. Additionally, a knowledgebase was developed which describes the links between performance shaping factors and resulting unsafe actions.
NUREG/CR-6753 Review of Findings for Human Contribution to Risk in Operating Events, August 2001, 107 Pages.
This report presents the findings of a study of the contributions of human performance to risk in operating events at commercial nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program and the Human Performance Events Database (HPED) were used to identify safety significant events in which human performance was a major contributor to risk. Conditional core damage probabilities (CCDPs) were calculated for these events using Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE) software and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models.
Forty-eight events described in licensee event reports and augmented inspection team reports were reviewed . Human performance did not play a role in 11 of the events, so they were excluded from the sample. The remaining 37 events were qualitatively analyzed. Twenty-three of these 37 events were also analyzed using SPAR models and methods. Fourteen events were excluded from the SPAR analyses because they involved operating modes or conditions outside the scope of the SPAR models.
The results showed that human performance contributed significantly to analyzed events. Two hundred and seventy human errors were identified in the events reviewed and multiple human errors were involved in every event. Latent errors (i.e., errors committed prior to the event whose effects are not discovered until an event occurs) were present four times more often than were active errors (i.e., those occurring during event response). The latent errors included failures to correct known problems and errors committed during design, maintenance, and operations activities. The results of this study indicate that multiple errors in events contribute to the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) basic events present in SPAR models and that the underlying models of dependency in HRA may warrant further attention.
Eddy Current Reliability Results from the Steam Generator Mock-up Analysis
Round-Robin, October 2009, 135 Pages
This report presents the results of a nondestructive evaluation round–robin designed to independently assess the reliability of steam generator (SG) tube inspection. A steam generator mock–up at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) was used for this study.
The goal of the round–robin was to assess the current state of in–service eddy–current inspection reliability for SG tubing, determine the probability of detection (POD) as a function of flaw size or severity, and assess the capability for sizing of flaws.
Eleven teams participated in analyzing bobbin and rotating coil mock–up data collected by qualified industry personnel. The mock–up contains hundreds of cracks and simulations of artifacts such as corrosion deposits and tube support plates. This configuration mimics more closely than most laboratory situations the difficulty of detection and characterization of cracks experienced in an operating steam generator.
An expert task group from industry, ANL, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the signals from the laboratory–grown cracks used in the mock–up to ensure that they provide reasonable simulations of those obtained in the field. The number of tubes inspected and the number of teams participating in the round–robin are intended to provide better statistical data on the POD and characterization accuracy than is currently available from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) qualification programs.
NUREG/CR-6823 Handbook of Parameter Estimation for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, September 2003, Pages.
Cover to Abbreviations, 23 Pages, 1.24 MB Chapter 7, 26 Pages, 1.94 MB
Chapters 1 - 2, 25 Pages, 1.89 MB Chapters 8 – 9, 31 Pages, 2.15 MB
Chapters 3 – 5, 31 Pages, 2.46 MB Appendices A – B, 41 Pages, 3.70 MB
Chapter 6, 84 Pages, 6.4 MB Appendices C – D, 33 Pages, 1.85 MB
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a mature technology that can provide a quantitative assessment of the risk from accidents in nuclear power plants. It involves the development of models that delineate the response of systems and operators to accident initiating events. Additional models are generated to identify the component failure modes required to cause the accident mitigating systems to fail. Each component failure mode is represented as an individual “basic event” in the systems models. Estimates of risk are obtained by propagating the uncertainty distributions for each of the parameters through the PRA models.
The data analysis portion of a nuclear power plant PRA provides estimates of the parameters used to determine the frequencies and probabilities of the various events modeled in a PRA. This handbook provides guidance on sources of information and methods for estimating the parameters used in PRA models and for quantifying the uncertainties in the estimates. This includes determination of both plant-specific and generic estimates for initiating event frequencies, component failure rates and unavailabilities, and equipment non-recovery probabilities.
NUREG/CR-6791 Eddy Current Reliability Results from the Steam Generator Mock-up Analysis Round-Robin, October 2009, 135 Pages
This report presents the results of a nondestructive evaluation round–robin designed to independently assess the reliability of steam generator (SG) tube inspection. A steam generator mock–up at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) was used for this study. The goal of the round–robin was to assess the current state of in–service eddy–current inspection reliability for SG tubing, determine the probability of detection (POD) as a function of flaw size or severity, and assess the capability for sizing of flaws. Eleven teams participated in analyzing bobbin and rotating coil mock–up data collected by qualified industry personnel. The mock–up contains hundreds of cracks and simulations of artifacts such as corrosion deposits and tube support plates. This configuration mimics more closely than most laboratory situations the difficulty of detection and characterization of cracks experienced in an operating steam generator. An expert task group from industry, ANL, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the signals from the laboratory–grown cracks used in the mock–up to ensure that they provide reasonable simulations of those obtained in the field. The number of tubes inspected and the number of teams participating in the round–robin are intended to provide better statistical data on the POD and characterization accuracy than is currently available from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) qualification programs.
TM 5-698-1 Reliability/Availability of Electrical & Mechanical Systems For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Facilities, 154 March 2003. 101 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide facility manages with the information and procedures necessary to baseline the reliability and availability of their facilities, identify “weak links”, and to implement cost-effective means of improving reliability and availability.
The information in this manual reflects both the move to incorporate commercial practices and the lessons learned over many ears of acquiring weapon systems “by the book”. It specifically focuses on the availability of electrical and mechanical systems for command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facilities and the role reliability plays in determining availability. The manual, in the spirit of the new policies regarding acquisition, describes the objectives of a sound strategy and the tools available to meet these objectives.
TM 5-698-2 Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 6 October 2006. 96 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide facility managers with the information and procedures necessary to develop and update a preventive maintenance (PM) program for their facilities that is based on the reliability characteristics of equipment and components and cost. Such a PM program will help to achieve the highest possible level of facility availability at the minimum cost.
The information in this manual reflects the commercial practices and lessons learned over many years of developing cost-effective preventive maintenance programs for a wide variety of systems and equipment. It specifically focuses on developing PM programs for electrical and mechanical systems used in facilities based on the reliability characteristics of those systems and economic considerations, while ensuring that safety is not compromised. The process for developing such a PM program is called reliability-Centered Maintenance, or RCM. Two appendices develop key topics more deeply: appendix B, statistical distribution; and appendix C, availability.
TM 5-698-3 Reliability Primer For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 10 July 2003. 51 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide a basic introduction to and overview of the subject of reliability. It is particularly written for personnel involved with the acquisition and support of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment.
The information in this manual reflects the theoretical and practical aspects of the reliability discipline. It includes information from commercial practices and lessons learned over many years of developing and implementing reliability programs for a wide variety of systems and equipment. Although some theory is presented, it is purposely limited and kept as simple as possible.
TM 5-698-4 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 29 September 2006. 75 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to guide facility mangers through the Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) process, directing them how to apply this type of analysis to a command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facility. . It is particularly written for personnel involved with the acquisition and support of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. These facilities incorporate several redundant systems used to achieve extremely high availability that requires specialized tools, which are described in this manual, to conduct an accurate analysis.
The information in this manual will provide the facility manager the necessary tools needed to conduct a realistic approach to establish a relative ranking of equipments’ effects on the overall system. The methods used in this manual have been developed using existing concepts from various areas. These methods include an easy to use evaluation method to address redundancy’s affect on failure rates and probability of occurrence. Because a C4ISR facility utilizes numerous redundant systems this method is very useful for conducting a FMECA of a C4ISR facility. Examples will be provided to illustrate how this can be accomplished by quantitative (with data) or qualitative means (without data). Although heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are used as examples, the FMECA process can be applied to any electrical or mechanical system.
TM 5-698-5 Survey Of Reliability And Availability Information For Power Distribution, Power Generation, And Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning (HVAC) Components For Commercial, Industrial, And Utility Installations, 22 September 2006. 38 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to explain the process of how the reliability data in appendix B of this manual regarding power generation, power distribution and Heating Ventilation and Air Condition (HVAC) components was developed. This manual is intended to summarize the entire process of obtaining the reliability metrics of the pre-described components and what types of facilities provided the data so that the facility engineer can understand the foundation behind the reliability metrics. Upon reading this document the facility engineer should be able to make a more knowledgeable assessment for applications of the data to support government, commercial, industrial and utility installations.
The information in this manual reflects the efforts of extensive hours of research and analysis, along with the cooperation and time of numerous facilities, in order to ascertain reliability characteristics of power generation, power distribution and HVAC components. This effort was sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Power reliability Enhancement Program (PREP) in order to establish reliability, availability, and maintainability characteristics of over 200 components related to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facilities. This manual describes the data collection and summarization of all of over 200 components. Collection of the data began in October 1991 and the final report was delivered in early 1994.
TM 5-698-6 Reliability Data Collection Manual For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 27 October 2006. 118 pages
This U.S. Army training manual provides guidance to facilities engineers responsible for site utility systems at command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facilities. This manual describes a level of data collection activities which should be performed on control, power generation and distribution, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment for the preparation of reliability studies for operational readiness.
information in this document will describe the required information necessary
to determine the reliability and availability of a component. Explanations and descriptions of the
different metrics are also covered as well as the preferred methods. Data collection listings are also provided
for various pieces of equipment to aid the data collection process. Gathering the correct information is the most
vital aspect of determining accurate availability and reliability values of
UK-DefStan00-43-Part1-Issue1 Reliability And Maintainability Assurance Activity Part 1: In-Service Reliability Demonstrations, January 1993. 44 Pages.
Defence Standard 00-43, Parts 1 and 2 describe two types of demonstration:
a) in-Service reliability demonstrations (ISRDs);
b) maintainability demonstrations(MDs).
ISRDs are covered in Part 1 and MDs in Part 2. Par 1 covers the purpose, rationale and procedures for ISRDs. Part 2 covers maintainability demonstrations, some of which may occur before the equipment is accepted into Service.
The sections in the Part of the Defence Standard describe the purpose, rationale and procedures for in-Service reliability demonstrations (ISRDs). The purpose of an ISRD is to demonstrate compliance with specified reliability requirements of an equipment or system. An ISRD is a final test to provide motivation and incentive to the contractor to ensure that the reliability programme is vigorously pursued. It supplements rather than replaces other activities in the reliability programme. However, an ISRD will not be appropriate for the purchase of every system, platform or equipment. Experience from completed ISRDs has shown the need for detailed guidance for both MOD [Ministry of Defence] and industry.
UK-DefStan00-44-Part2-Issue1 Reliability And Maintainability Data Collection And Classification Part 2: Data Classification And Incident Sentencing - General, April 1994. 13 Pages.
This Standard describes MOD [Ministry of Defence] practices and procedures for Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) data collection and classification in the three Services.
In the procurement and Service use of Defence equipment emphasis is placed on the specification and achievement of optimum R&M in order to realize better availability and reduced life cycle costs. An important element in procurement programmes and Service use is the assessment of achieved R&M; both to monitor progress, and for contractual purposes.
Equipment are rarely used in isolation, and its is often necessary to directly compare, or use, data from more than one equipment and/or source. Consequently, it is desirable that a common method of data classification is used. Of equal importance is the need to use a viable system that can be contractually enforced.
Data classification is the process by which incident data are sorted into different categories, (eg cause, significance, maintenance requirement, etc) and applicable to the R&M parameters being assessed. This is achieved by first sentencing the raw incident data according to formal rules and then sorting the sentenced incident data into the required classifications. Incident sentencing is a sub-activity of data classification and both are described in the Part of the Standard.
This Part of the Standard describes, in general, the common aspects of data classification and incident sentencing to be used within the MOD and on MOD contracts.
Information on other reliability standards from IEC are available on this site.
Finally an excellent summary of reliability documents (110 pages) from the Final Report: The Collection And Categorisation Of Worldwide Standards Relevant To The Use Of Programmable Electronic Systems In Safety Related Applications, by members of The European Workshop On Industrial Computer Systems, Technical Committee No 7 concerning Reliability, Safety & Security provides more details on specifications from many sources.