|
Military
Handbooks And Standards Plus NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents
Pertaining To Reliability And Life Cycle Cost |
Military Handbooks and Standards
along with NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents pertaining to
reliability issues are here for quick search and download as PDF files. Brief
summaries of each document are provided.
You can also see a terse
list of the files for download.
Military
Standards (MIL-STD) are generally imposed requirements and give details
on what to do.
Military
Handbooks (MIL-HDBK) are generally how to do documents intended to
standardize and educate.
Military/Government (AD)
are archive direction numbers for technical documents which can (theoretically) be retrieved from the
National Technical Information Service NTIS. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents
have these designators:
NUREG-(nnn) publications by NRC staff
NUREG/BR-(nnn) brochures by NRC staff
NUREG/CP-(nnn) conference proceedings by NRC staff
NUREG/CR-(nnn) publications by NRC contractors
NUREG/IA-(nnn) publications resulting from International Agreements
Easy access to important reliability documents is a service to the reliability
community by Barringer & Associates,
Inc. If you have other reliability and life cycle cost
documents you feel should be included, send an Email notice with their URL’s to
Paul
Barringer. Additional MIL-HDBK,
MIL-STD, and Defense/Federal specification documents are available from ASSIST Quick Search.
AD-A050837 A
Redundancy Notebook, December 1997. 68 Pages.
RADC-TR-77-287
The objective of the report is
to present in a coherent fashion the information and tools necessary for the
evaluation of most types of redundancy design configurations with which a reliability
engineer is faced. The report contains a
number of alternative evaluation approaches, both classical and unique. Closed form results and algorithms are
derived for the evaluation of the reliability of various types of redundant
configurations.
AD-A053406 Storage Reliability Of
Missile Material Program, February 1978. 66 Pages. Also identified as LC-78-2
This
report summarizes analyses on the non-operating reliability of missile ordnance
devices. The objective of the program is
the development of non-operating (storage) reliability prediction and assurance
techniques for missile materiel.
Included are analyses of solid propellant rocket motors, gas generators,
igniters, safe and arm devices, and other explosive devices. Reliability models are developed for each
component type.
AD-A066579
Reliability-Centered Maintenance,
December 1978. 520
Pages. 25 Meg file.
This is also known as the F.
Stanley Nowlan and Howard F. Heap RCM report, or just
the Nowlan & Heap report.
This book explains basic
concepts, principles, definitions, and applications of a logical discipline for
development of efficient schedule (preventive) maintenance programs for complex
equipment, and the on-going management of such programs. Such programs are called reliability-centered
maintenance (RCM) programs because they are centered on achieving the inherent
safety and reliability capabilities of equipment at a minimum costs. A U.S. Department of Defense objective in
sponsoring preparation of this document was that it serves as a guide for
application to a wide range of different types of military equipment.
There are essentially only four
types of tasks in a scheduled maintenance program. Mechanics can be asked to:
1.
Inspect
an item to detect a potential failure mode.
2.
Rework
an item before a maximum permissible age is exceeded.
3.
Discard
an item before a maximum permissible age is exceeded.
4.
Inspect
an item to find failures that have already occurred but were not evident to the
equipment operating crew
A
central problem addressed in this book is how to determine which types of
scheduled maintenance tasks, if any, should be applied to an item and how
frequently assigned tasks should be accomplished. The use of a decision diagram as an aid in
this analysis is illustrated. The net
result is a structured, systematic blend of experience, judgment, and
operational data/information to identify and analyze which type of maintenance
task is both applicable and effective for each significant item as it relates
to a particular type of equipment. A
concluding chapter emphasizes the key importance of having a mutually
supportive partnership between the personnel responsible for equipment design
and the personnel responsible for equipment maintenance if maximum RCM results
are to be achieved.
Appendices
are included as follows:
1.
Procedures
for auditing the development and implementation of an RCM program.
2.
A
historical review of equipment maintenance evolution.
3.
Techniques
of performing actuarial analyses.
4.
An annotated bibliography.
The
Nowlan & Heap report,
slightly modified, is available as bound paperback from the book shop from MRO-Zone
Book Shop.
AMSAA Design For Reliability Handbook, Date circa 2009, Pages 50
This guide is written as an overview for both the manager and the analyst. It extends coverage of the design for reliability (DFR) process topics identified in ANSI/GEIA-STD-0009 [Reliability Program Standard for Systems Design, Development, and Manufacturing was adopted on 20 August 2009 for use by the department of Defense(DoD), and the document is available for US$100 from TechAmerica and ANSI. This document consists of the following four objectives:
1. Understand Customer/User Requirements and Constraints;
2. Design and Redesign for Reliability;
3. Produce Reliable Systems/Products; and
4. Monitor and Assess user Reliability].
The Design For Reliability Handbook expands upon the mathematical and engineering process steps required to ensure robust design.
While this manual is intended to provide a general understanding of the concepts and principles required, and serve as an outline to robust design, it is not meant to be employed without project specific tailoring. When used in conjunction with project specifications, it should serve as a basis for identification and planning of the appropriate process steps that should be utilized during the design process thus improving the system reliability of fielded systems.
AMSAA-TR-652 AMSAA
Reliability Growth Guide, September 2000, Pages 205
Reliability
growth is the improvement in a reliability parameter over a period of time due
to changes in product design or the manufacturing process. It occurs by surfacing failure modes and
implementing effective corrective actions.
Reliability growth management is the systematic planning for reliability
achievement as a function of time and other resources, and controlling the
ongoing rate of achievement by reallocation of these resources based on
comparisons between planned and assessed reliability values. To help manage these reliability activities
throughout the development life cycle, AMSAA has developed reliability growth
methodology for all phases of the process, from planning to tracking to
projection. The report presents this
methodology and associated reliability growth concepts.
[The
technique is also referenced in the literature as reliability growth plots,
Crow-AMSAA plots, Crow AMSAA plots, CA plots, C-A plots, C/A plots, Duane
Plots, etc. See the November 2002 Problem of the
Month.]
Because
of the file sizes, the report is downloadable in sections:
Cover
pages through Section 1-Introduction: Pages Cover-24 (1.6 Meg)
Section
2-Reliabilty Growth Planning: Pages 18-47 (2.1 Meg)
Section
3-Reliability Growth Tracking: Pages 48-86 (2.2 Meg)
Section
4-Reliability Growth Projection: Pages 87-133 (2.5 Meg)
Appendix
A-Background: Pages A1-A5 (0.3 Meg)
Appendix
B-Tables For Section 2: Pages B1-B43 (3.2 Meg)
Appendix
C-Derivations For Section 2: Pages C1-C8 (0.2 Meg)
Appendix
D-Derivations For Section 4: Pages D1-D12 (0.4 Meg)
Appendix
E-Distribution List: Pages E1-D3 (0.1 Meg)
AMSAA-TR-736 Development Of A Mathematical Tool For Implementation Of Prognostics Based On Life History, October 2003, 100 pages.
In order to increase mission reliability and reduce the logistics footprint, considerable interest is now being focused on the implementation of prognostics. One approach to prognostics is to track usage in terms of mile, hours or cycles, and generate replacement-before-failure rules for components subject to aging whenever the system is preparing to enter a period during which failures must be zealously avoided (e.g., deployments or combat pulses). This report documents the development and notional application of a new tool that implements this approach. The tool, which is an extension of Mathematica, generates graphs and tables for a variety of metrics that one could use in an interactive decision-making process. Mathematica is a leading commercial software package for performing mathematics. Key chapters in this report constitute a basic set of electronic templates for applying the new tool. The tool itself is provided in the appendices.
AMSAA-TR-2006-4 Development
Of A Mathematical Tool For Implementation Of A Prognosistics Decision-Making Process Based On
Component Life History, March 2006, 134 pages. The key benefit of prognostics is that it can be used to reduce
failure risks during deployments and missions when failure is particularly
disadvantageous and maintenance inconvenient due to the reduced logistics
footprint. One approach to prognostics
is to monitor usage in conjunction with an aging model thereby keeping track of
remaining component lifetime. This
enables one to track usage with on-board sensors and embed an algorithm in
on-system logistics software that will automatically generate maintenance
alerts and recommendations so that a covered component can likely be replaced
before failure as its remaining lifetime decreases and failure risk increases. An additional benefit of usage-based
prognostics is that it can also be used to identify an optimum replacement age
that minimizes life cycle costs for components that age, provided the costs of
in-service failure are greater than planned replacement which is often the
case. This report documents the
development and application of a collection of functions written in Mathematica that can be used to implement
usage-based prognostics using life distributions for components that become
less reliable with usage.
DoD Directive 50001.1 directs the acquisition details for Department of Defense Programs
(which drives life cycle cost and RAM models). DoD
Directive 5000.2 directs the management principles. DoD
Directive 5025.1-M directs procedures for managing all acquisition
programs. For other RAM details see
below.
DoD RAM Guide For Achieving Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability, 3 August 2005,
266 pages, 4.17 MB
This Guide supports the DoD’s fundamental principles ond
procedures as documented in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 to acquire quality products that
satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and
operational support in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable
price. This guide supports that
objective by focusing on the four key steps necessary for building systems with
the required levels of RAM:
1. Understand and document user needs and
constraints,
2. Design and redesign for RAM
3. Produce reliable and maintainable systems,
and
4. Monitor field experience and sustain RAM
performance
Chapter 1 introduces RAM, what it is, why it is important, current RAM problems
in the DoD, and activities
appropriate to achieving satisfactory levels. It concludes with a guide for senior
management. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the four-step model for achieving RAM, Chapter 3 focuses on Step 1
including RAM metrics, Joint capabilities integration and development, and
pre-acquisition activities. Chapter 4
focuses on Step 2 and scopes successful approaches for designing-in reliability
and maintainability. Chapter 5 focuses
on Step 3 and expands this discussion through the testing, production and
fielding of capabilities. Chapter 6
focuses on Step 4 and addresses methods for sustaining RAM through the
operational life and providing lessons learned for the following generation of
capabilities. Throughout the document,
the guide also highlights the integration of RAM activities with the defense
acquisition management framework, the joint capabilities integration and
development system, and the systems engineering technical reviews.
DOD3235.1H Test & Evaluation of System Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability—A Primer ,
March 1982. 287 Pages.
The
purpose of this primer is to provide instruction in the analytical assessment
of system reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)
performance. This text presents concepts
and techniques for designing test plans which can verify that previously
established system suitability requirements have been achieved. Test resource availability may be adversely
affected by cost, schedule and operational urgency constraints. In such cases, alternate test plans which
represent the most meaningful, timely and cost effective approach, consistent
with these constraints, must be develop.
It is essential that all participants understand the critical issues
being addressed and the acquisition risks inherent in conducting a limited test
program. The design and execution of
sound test programs is no accident. It
requires numerous hours of research and planning and a thorough understanding
of testing techniques, the test system and its operating scenario. Further, the test results must support the
development of realistic performance estimates for the entire production run,
after having tested relatively few systems.
Herein lies the usefulness of the statistical
concepts contained in this text. Topics
addressed in this text will familiarize the reader with the statistical
concepts relevant to test design and performance assessment. In short, these topics, when combined with
common sense and technical expertise formulate the basis of all sound test
programs.
DOD-HDBK-791 Maintainability Design Techniques, March 1988. 232 Pages
The
purpose of this handbook is to provide Army design engineers with guidelines to
assist them in incorporating maintainability into
Army materiel early in research and development. Information collected from maintenance
records provides practical examples—good and bad—that illustrate the design
principles that result in maximum maintainability. The designer can use these principles to
build maintainability into materiel and thereby contribute substantially to
solving the Army’s maintenance problem.
Chapter
1 is an introduction to the principle of maintainability, its importance, and
methods of achieving it. The following
10 chapters refer to simplification, standardization and interchangeability,
accessibility, modularization, identification and labeling, testability and
diagnostics techniques, prevention maintenance, human factors, and environmental
factors—describe in detail their role in achieving the maintainability
principles.
Data
includes ergonomic details.
DOE-NE-STD-1004-92 Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document, February 1992. 69 Pages.
DOE
Order 5000.3A, “Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information,”
requires the investigation and reporting of occurrences (including the
performance of root cause analysis [RCA]) and the selection, implementation,
and follow-up of corrective actions. The
level of effort expended should be based on the significance attached to the
occurrence. Most off-normal occurrences
need only a scaled-down effort while most emergency occurrences should be
investigated using one or more of the formal analytical models. A discussion of methodologies, instructions,
and worksheets in this document guides the analysis of occurrences as specified
by DOE Order 5000.3A.
DOD-STD-1686 concerning electrostatic
discharge see DOD-HDBK-263 and MIL-STD-1686 which is
described below.
DOD-STD-1701(NS) Hardware Diagnostic Test System Requirements, June 1985, Pages 11 (This is NOT an authentic copy)
This
document establishes the general procedures, terms and conditions governing the
preparation and completion of a hardware diagnostic test system (HDTS). The purpose of this Standard is to establish
the development criteria for the preparation and completion of the hardware
diagnostic test system for systems, subsystems, and equipments.
DOD-STD-2167A Defense System Software Development, February 1988, Pages 49
This
standard establishes uniform requirements for software development that are
applicable throughout the system life cycle.
The requirements of this standard provide the basis for Government
insight into a contractor’s software development, testing and evaluation
efforts.
This
standard is not intended to specify or discourage the use of any particular
software development method. The
contractor is responsible for selecting software development methods (for
example, rapid prototyping) that best support the achievement of contract
requirements.
This
standard, together with the other DOD and military documents referenced in
Section 2, provides the means for establishing, evaluating, and maintaining
quality in software and associated documentation.
Data
Item Descriptions (DIDs) applicable to this standard are listed in Section
6. These DIDs describe a set of
documents for recording the information required by this standard. Production of deliverable data using
automated techniques is encouraged.
Per
DODD 5000.43, Acquisition Streamlining, this standard must be appropriately
tailored by the program manager to ensur that only
cost-effective requirements are cited in defense solicitations and
contracts. Tailoring guidance can be
found in DOD-HDBK-248, Guide for Applicable and Tailoring of Requirements for
Defense Material Acquisitions.
The
predecessor document
is available. Also available is the cancellation
document. The referenced document MIL-STD-498 is
also available below along with the cancellation
document.
DOD-STD-2168
Software Quality Program, 29 April 1988, 15
pages, supersedes MIL-S-52779.
This standard contains
requirements for the development, documentation, and implementation of a
software quality program. This program
includes planning for and conducting evaluations of the quality of software,
associated documentation, and related activities, and planning for and
conducting the follow-up activities necessary to assure timely and effective
resolution of problems.
DOD-SEFGuide,
System Engineering Fundamentals, January 2001,
222 pages.
This
book provides a basic, conceptual-level description of engineering management
disciplines that relate to the development and life cycle management of a
system. For the non-engineer it provides
an overview of how a system is developed.
For the engineer and project manager it provides a basic framework for
planning and assessing system development.
The book is divided into four parts: Introduction; Systems Engineering
Process; Systems Analysis and Control; and Planning, Organizing, and Managing.
DOE-STD-113499 Review Guide For
Criticality Safety Evaluations,
September 1999. 23
Pages.
This
Department of Energy Standard is approved for use by all DOE criticality safety
personnel. It contains guidelines that
should be followed when reviewing Criticality Safety Evaluations that were
developed by DOE Contractors to demonstrate the safety of fissile materials
handling at DOE Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities.
Adherence to these guidelines will enhance consistency and uniformity of
review of Criticality Safety Evaluations across the DOE complex and compliance
with either DOE Order 5480.24 or DOW Order 420.1 requirements.
MIL-HDBK-5 Metallic Materials And Elements For Aerospace
Vehicle Structures, Rev MIL-HDBK-5H, 1 December 1988. 1653 pages (37 Meg PDF file size!)
[Metallic
Materials Properties Development and Standardization (MMPDS) prepared by
Battelle makes MIL-HDBK-5 obsolete and MMPDS-03 is the current version
available in 6 volumes for US$599 for hard copy or US$499 for downloads—please
note MMPDS-03 is covered under US Copyright—see http://mmpds.org
for further information.]
MIL-HDBK-5H
is intended primarily as a source of design allowables,
which are those strength properties of metallic materials and elements
(primarily fasteners) that are widely used in the design of aerospace
structures. These metallic materials
include all systems potentially useful in aerospace and aircraft applications,
including those involving reinforcing components. This document also contains information and
data for other properties and characteristics, such as fracture toughness
strength, fatigue strength, creep strength, rupture strength, fatigue-crack
propagation rate, and resistance to stress corrosion cracking. The use of this type of information is not
mandatory.
In
addition to the properties of the materials and elements themselves, there are
some of the more commonly used methods and formulas by which the strengths of
various structural elements or components are calculated. In some cases, the methods presented are
empirical and subject to further refinements.
MIL-HDBK-61 Configuration Management
Guidance, Rev A, 7 February 2001.
221 pages (1.4 Meg PDF file size)
This
handbook provides guidance to DoD
managers assigned the responsibility for configuration management on how to
ensure the application of product and data configuration management to defense
materiel items, in each phase of their life cycle. Acquisition practices, including the manner
in which CM is specified in a contract, and the
process of monitoring contractor application are evolving as the result of two
interacting transistions.
MIL-HDBK-103 Lists Of Standard
Microcircuit Drawings, March 2008, 861 pages
The
Standard Microcircuit Drawing Program (SMDP) is directly under the auspices of
the DoD Parts Management Program (PMP). The PMP is implemented by MIL-HDBK-512,
“Parts Management.”
MIL-HDBK-108 Sampling Procedures And Tables For Life And Reliability Testing (Base
on Exponential Distribution), April 1960. 78 Pages (6 Meg PDF file size)
Also referred to as H-108)
This
handbook has been prepared to meet a growing need for the use of standard
sampling procedures and tables for life and reliability testing in Government
procurement, supply, and maintenance quality control operations as well as in
research and development activities where applicable.
A
characteristic feature of most life tests is that the observations are ordered
in time to failure. If, for example, 20
radio tubes are placed on life test, an t1
denotes the time where the ith tube fails,
the data occur in such a way that t1≤t2≤…≤ t20. The same kind of ordered observations will
occur whether the problem under consideration deals with the life of electric
bulbs, the life of electronic components, the life of all bearings, or the
length of life of human beings after they are treated for a disease. The examples just given all
involved ordering in time.
In
destructive testing involving such situations as the current needed to blow a
fuse, the voltage needed to break down a condenser, the force needed to rupture
a physical material, the test can often be arranged in such a way that every
item in the sample is subjected to precisely the same stimulus (current,
voltage, stress). If this is done, then
clearly the weakest item will be observed to fail first, the second weakest
next, etc. While the random variable
considered mostly in this handbook is time to failure, it should be emphasized,
however, that the methodology provided herein can be adapted to the testing situations
mentioned above where the random variable is current, voltage, stress, etc.
MIL-HDBK-109 Statistical Procedures For Determining
Validity Of Suppliers’ Attributes Inspection, 6 May 1960. 42 pages. (2.8 meg PDF file size) Also referred to as H-109.
The
purpose of this handbook is to provide appropriate statistical tests and tables
of critical values to Department of Defense procurement inspection and quality
control activities for use in determining the validity of suppliers’ inspection
records when sampling inspection by attributes is specified. Such records serve to assure the consumer
that only supplies conforming with technical
requirements are being offered for acceptance.
Also
see ANSI/ASQ
Z1.4-2003: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes.
MIL-HDBK-189 Reliability Growth Management, February 1981. 155 Pages. (5.2 Meg PDF file size)
This
handbook provides procuring activities and development contractors with an
understanding of the concepts and principles of reliability growth, advantages
of managing reliability growth, and guidelines and procedures to be used in
managing reliability growth. It should
be noted that this handbook is not intended to serve as a reliability growth
plan to be applied to a program without any tailoring. This handbook, when used in conjunction with
knowledge of the system and its development program, will allow the development
of a reliability growth management plan that will aid in developing a final
system that meets its requirements and lowers the life cycle cost of the
fielded systems. [This document describes the Duane method of reliability
growth and becomes the Duane AMSAA methodology which today is described as the
Crow-AMSAA reliability growth model.]
MIL-HDBK-217F Reliability Prediction Of
Electronic Equipment, January 1990. 205 Pages. (15.3 Meg PDF file size)
The
purpose of this handbook is to
establish and maintain consistent and uniform methods for estimating the
inherent reliability (i.e., the reliability of a mature design) of military
electronic equipment and systems. It
provides a common basis for reliability predictions during acquisition programs
for military electronic systems and equipment.
It also establishes a common basis for comparing and evaluating
reliability predictions of related or competitive designs. The handbook is intended to be used as a tool
to increase the reliability of the equipment being designed.
The application of this handbook contains two methods of reliability
prediction – “Part Stress Analysis” in Sections 5 through 23 and “Parts Count”
in Appendix A. These methods vary in
degree of information needed to apply them.
The
MIL-HBK-251 Reliability/Design
Thermal Applications, January 1978, 697 Pages. (54 Meg file size!)
This
handbook has been prepared specifically to guide engineers in the thermal
design of electronic equipment with improved reliability. The primary purposes are: to permit engineers
and designers, who are not heat transfer experts, to design electronic
equipment with adequate thermal performance with a minimum of effort; to assist heat transfer experts, who are not
electronic experts; to aid designers in better understanding the thermal
selection of Department of Defense specification and standards for equipment;
and to assist Navy personnel in evaluating thermal design during the various
stages of equipment procurement and development.
This
handbook recommends and presents electronic parts stress analysis methods which
lead to the selection of maximum safe temperatures for parts so that the
ensuing thermal design is consistent with the required equipment
reliability. These maximum parts
temperatures must be properly selected since they are the goals of the thermal
design, a fact with is often overlooked.
Many thermal designs are inadequate because improper maximum parts
temperatures were selected as design goals.
Consequently, the necessary parts stress analysis procedures have been
emphasized.
MIL-HDBK-259 Life Cycle Cost In
Navy Acquisitions, April 1983. 71 Pages. (3.4 Meg file size)
This handbook provides basic
information on life cycle cost analysis as a management tool for controlling
and reducing total costs. The emphasis
is on what the life cycle cost techniques are rather than on how to implement
them. The intent is to furnish an
overview of the points to address and the procedures to use when performing
life cycle cost analysis so that the analyst, wheatear government or
contractor, will be better able to conform to the acquisition manger’s
objectives. Without going into great
depth, those issues of most interest to the beginner are discussed, thus making
this handbook particularly used as an initial step in learning about and
understand life cycle cost in Navy acquisitions. These issues are:
a. what is life cycle cost
b. what are the objectives and requirements of
life cycle cost
c.
what costs are relevant and significant
d.
what are the analysis procedures
e.
what data sources and estimating techniques
should be used
f.
when and how to choose or develop a
computerized model
Experience has show
that these are the most pressing questions for those who are undertaking their first
life cycle costing effort, and a document which addresses these questions can,
in some measure, help to instill a cost management discipline which will result
in more efficient cost reduction and cost control efforts in Navy acquisitions.
MIL-HDBK-263B Electrostatic Discharge Control Handbook For
Protection Of Electrical And Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment
(Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices), July 1994. 171 Pages.
(15.1Meg PDF file size)
This
handbook provides guidance, not mandatory requirements, for the establishment
and implementation of an Electrostatic Discharge (EDS) Control Program in
accordance with the requirements of MIL-STD-1686. This document is applicable to the protection
of electrical and electronic parts, assemblies and equipment from damage due to
ESD. It does not provide information for
the protection of electrically initiated explosive devices.
Various
segments of industry are aware of the damage static electricity can impose on
metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) parts.
The sensitivity of other parts to electrostatic discharge damage has
also become evident through use, testing, and failure analysis. Trends in technology utilizing new materials,
processes and design techniques, including increased packaging densities result
in some parts being more susceptible to ESD.
Electrical
and electronic parts which have been determined to be ESD sensitive (ESDS)
include: microelectronic discrete and integrated semiconductor devices; thick
and thin film resistors, chips and hybrid devices; and piezoelectric
crystals. Subassemblies, assemblies and
equipment containing these parts are also ESDS.
Materials
which are prime generators of electrostatic voltages include, but are not
limited to, common plastics such as polyethylene, vinyls,
foam, polyurethane, synthetic textiles, fiberglass, glass, rubber, and other
commonly used materials. Damaging
electrostatic voltage levels are commonly generated by contact and subsequent
separation of these materials by industrial processes and personnel movement.
MIL-HDBK-274 Electrical Grounding For
Aircraft Safety, 1 November 1983 with change notices for 29
June 1990. 363 pages. (14.4 Meg PDF file size)
The
purpose of this handbook is to provide aircraft maintenance personnel with the
information required for electrical safety grounding of each type of
operational aircraft in the U.S. Navy inventory. In addition, this handbook provides
background information pertaining to the operational concerns for aircraft
grounding, static electricity theory and how it affects aircraft, and
techniques used for measurement of grounding points.
MIL-HDBK-276-1 Life Cycle Cost Model For Defense Materiel Systems Data Collection
Workbook, February 1984. 407
Pages. (29.5 Meg PDF file size)
This handbook describes the
elements to be considered in determining the life cycle cost of a materiel
system. These cost elements and cost
factors form the input and output structure of the Life Cycle Cost Model for
Defense Materiel Systems. The handbook
is meant to be a workbook for determining life cycle costs. Normally, a subset of the cost structure
contained in this handbook and the Model will be prescribed for any given
procurement. The emphasis is on what
costs should be considered in developing life cycle cost estimates for
controlling and reducing total costs.
The handbook and the Model are specifically designed to give the analyst
and the program manger complete control over the subset of the Model’s cost
elements which is applicable to the system being costed
and to select the most appropriate cost estimating methodology for each cost
element.
MIL-HDBK-286 A
Guide for DOD-STD-2168 Defense System Software Quality Program, December
1990. 66 pages.
This handbook describes the
intent of DOD-STD-2168’s requirements, interprets those requirements, and
provides recommendations for applying the standard on a software acquisition or
support contract. See DOD-STD-2168
above and MIL-HDBK-287
below.
MIL-HDBK-287 A
Tailoring Guide for DOD-STD-2167A, Defense System Software Development,
August 1989, 210 Pages.
This handbook provides guidance to
Government program managers and other program office staff responsible for
tailoring DOD-STD-2167A
for a software development or support contract.
It explains key concepts of DOD-STD-2167A, presents tailoring
considerations for DOD-STD-2167A, and describes how to tailor the standard and
its associated Data Item Descriptions.
MIL-HDBK-338 Electronic Reliability Design Handbook, October 1998. 1042 Pages.
This
Handbook provides procuring activities and development contractors with an
understanding of the concepts, principles, and methodologies covering all
aspects of electronic systems reliability engineering and cost analysis as they
relate to the design, acquisition, and deployment of DoD
equipment/systems. The sections include:
|
Reference Documents Definitions General Statements Reliability/Maintainability/Availability Theory Reliability Specification, Allocation and
Prediction |
Reliability Data Collection and Analysis, Software Reliability Systems Reliability Engineering Production and Use (Deployment) R&M R&M Management Considerations |
Special
details are described on pages:
·
Pages 987-1042 Section 12: describes reliability management
considerations
·
Page 988
describes performance-based specifications for reliability
·
Page 991
describes 10 reliability program management issues from customer and
supplier perspectives
·
Page 993
describes a template for reliability program elements
·
Page 1003 describes a checklist for
reliability program elements
·
Page 1005 describes how reliability
activities are phased into projects
·
Page 1006 describes how reliability
activities by life cycle cost phases
·
Page 1012 describes the relationship
between reliability and risk reduction with trade-off studies
·
Page 1018 describes software reliability
·
Page 1028 shows a graph with 70-95% of
electronic equipment costs determined by the time equipment is specified on the
bill of materials and accepted by the design review and a graph showing
expenditures incurred during the life cycle.
·
Page 1031 describes life cycle cost
concepts and activities performed during the different phases of
concept/definition/development/production
·
Page 1032 describes types of product
performance agreements
MIL-HDBK-344A Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) Of Electronic Equipment, August
1993 102 Pages.
This
Handbook provides uniform procedures, methods and techniques for planning,
monitoring and controlling the cost effectiveness of ESS programs for
electronic equipment. It is intended to
support the requirements of MIL-STD-785,
Task 301, “Environmental Stress Screening” and/or MIL-STD-781,
Task 401, “Environmental Stress Screening: and to implement Air Force R &M
2000 ESS recommendations and guidelines.
The
Handbook is intended for use by procuring activities and contractors during
development and production. It is not
intended that the Handbook procedures and techniques be used in a cookbook
fashion. Knowledge of the equipment and
the manufacturing process is essential for a properly planned and tailored ESS
program. The data base needed for a
systematic approach to ESS application is not fully developed. Use of the Handbook by Government procuring
agencies and equipment manufacturers will foster the development of an improved
and broader data base.
A
properly applied ESS program can significantly impact the quality and
reliability of electronic products delivered to the Government. ESS is interrelated with the requirements set
forth in MIL-Q-9858, MIL-STD-785, MIL-STD-781,
and MIL-HDBK-781. Quality Control is a manufacturing function
and Reliability Engineering is a design function. Although the Quality and Reliability
disciplines are related, in practice, they are conducted as separate programs
without common objectives. The Handbook
uses the ESS program as a means for integrating Quality Control and Reliability
Engineering tasks so as to assure achievement of reliability objectives during
manufacture. Supporting software is
available from Rome Laboratory that fully automates the details manual
procedures contained herein.
MIL-HDBK-454 General Guidelines For Electronic Equipment, 15
April 2007. 208 Pages. This document was formerly MIL-STD-454.
This
handbook is the technical baseline for the design and construction of
electronic equipment for the Department of Defense. It captures in one document, under suitable
subject heading, fundamental design guidelines for multiple general electronic
specifications. The opportunity to focus
on a single document, afforded to contractors, results in substantial savings
to the Government.
This
handbook provides guidance and lessons learned in the selection of
documentation for the design of electronic equipment. This hand book is for guidance only. The handbook cannot be cited as a
requirement. If it is, the contractor
does not have to comply.
Also
see MIL-HDBK-5400.
MIL-HDBK-470A Designing And Developing Maintainable Products
And Systems, Volume 1 & Volume 2, August 1997. 716 Pages.
This was previously known as MIL-STD-470.
This
handbook is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department
of Defense (DoD).
It was developed by the DoD with the
assistance of the military departments, federal agencies, and industry and
replaces in their entirety MIL-HDBK-470 and MIL-HDBK-471 (both formerly
military standards). The handbook
provides guidance to maintainability managers and engineers in developing and
implementing a sound maintainability program for all types of products.
This
handbook is for guidance only. This handbook
cannot be cited as a requirement. If it
is, the contractor does not have to comply.
Maintainability
is a discipline that has become more important over the past 30 years as
military systems became more complex, support costs increased, and defense
budgets decreased. It is also important
in the commercial sector, where high levels of maintainability are increasingly
becoming an important factor in gaining customer loyalty. In fact, American products that once were
shunned in favor of foreign alternatives recently have made or are making a
comeback. This shift in consumer
preferences has been directly attributed to significant improvements in the
quality of the American products, a quality that includes good maintainability.
MIL-HDBK-472 Maintainability Prediction, May 1966 +
change notice 1 from 12 Jan 1984. 176 +
122 = 298 Pages.
The
purpose of the Maintainability Prediction Handbook is to familiarize project
managers and design engineers with current maintainability prediction
procedures. To achieve this objective,
particular care has been exercised in selecting and including only those
procedures which are currently used in predicting the maintainability of
equipment and systems. The highlights of
each maintainability prediction procedure are presented in a clear, lucid and
intelligible manner and include useful supplementary information applicable to
specific procedures.
The
prediction of the expected number of hours that a system or device will be in
an inoperative or “down state” while it is undergoing maintenance is of vital
importance to the user because of the adverse effect that excessive downtime
has on mission success. Therefore, one
the operational requirements of a system are fixed, it is imperative that a
technique be utilized to predict its maintainability in quantitative terms as
early as possible during the design phase.
This prediction should be updated continuously as the design progresses
to assure a high probability of compliance with specified requirements.
A
significant advantage of using a maintainability prediction procedure is that
it highlights for the designer, those areas of poor maintainability which
justify product improvement, modification, or a change of design. Another useful feature of maintainability
prediction is that it permits the user to make an early assessment of whether
the predicted downtime, the quality, quantity of personnel, tools and test
equipment are adequate and consistent with the needs of system operational
requirements.
MIL-HDBK-502 Acquisition Logistics, May 1997.
139 Pages.
The
Department of Defense is focusing on total cost of ownership throughout the
life cycle. Achieving affordable support
depends upon effective acquisition logistics management and planning.
This
handbook offers guidance on acquisition logistics as an integral part of the
systems engineering process. The
information contained herein is applicable, in part or in whole, to all types
of materiel and automated information systems and all acquisition
strategies. However, this handbook does
not present a “cookbook” approach to acquisition logistics—such an approach
would not accommodate the vast, widely varying array of potential materiel
acquisitions. It does offer examples and
points to consider to help you shape your overall thought process. It addresses:
·
How systems engineering fits into the
acquisition process
·
Supportability analyses as part of the
systems engineering process
·
How to develop supportability requirements
·
The acquisition and generation of support
data
·
Logistics considerations for contracts.
·
The logisticians role on integrated product
teams.
MIL-HDBK-512 Parts
Management, October 2000. 13 Pages.
This
handbook provides guidance for implementing an effective Parts Management
Program (PMP) on Department of Defense (DoD), industry
and commercial acquisitions. The
guidance in this document supports acquisition strategies and systems
engineering practices of DoD 5000.2-R. This document provides performance-based
parts management process guidance which is intended to be adapted to individual
program needs and which provides appropriate latitude for innovative approaches
and design solutions by the contractors.
The objectives of a PMP are to reduce total cost of ownership and
increase logistics readiness, and are achieved through:
·
Promoting interoperability.
·
Enhancing the interchangeability,
reliability, and availability of parts
·
Minimizing diminishing source impacts and
parts obsolescence.
·
Assisting in meeting end item performance.
·
Assisting with parts selection and
qualification procedures.
·
Becoming compatible with the business
environment and trends.
·
Minimizing the proliferation of parts and
drawings through standardization.
MIL-HDBK-695 Rubber Products: Recommended Shelf Life, 23 May 2005, Rev. D, 45 Pages.
(2 Meg PDF file size)
This
handbook establishes guidelines for time periods for the expected life of
elastomeric products during shelf storage.
The use of the expected shelf storage lives listed herein is NOT MADE
MANDATORY by this handbook. The decision
as to whether or not a product will have a limit placed upon the time that it
may remain in storage is a function of the agency responsible for the product’s
ultimate use.
Products included-
a.
Products fabricated solely from
rubber. These include solid rubber,
cellular rubber and hard rubber (ebonite) items
b.
Composites in which the rubber is present
as a discrete phase. Examples are
cables, fabric reinforced gaskets, non-aerospace hose, rubber coated fabrics,
shock mounts and tires.
c.
Kits, accessories and outfits. The shelf life for these items should be
determined by the component with the earliest expiration date.
Products excluded-
a.
Rubber-base adhesives, coatings, sealers,
and liquid rubber materials packaged in cans or tubes.
b.
Rubber tapes.
c.
Aerospace o-rings
and other molded seals. Refer to SAE
ARP5316 for recommended shelf lives.
d.
Aerospace bulk hoses and hose
assemblies. Consult SAE AS1933A for age
control limits for acceptance of aerospace bulk hoses and hose assemblies.
e.
Non-aerospace bulk hoses and hose
assemblies (surface vehicle, industrial and marine application).
f.
Unvulcanized rubber, such as tread repair stock and tank lining sheet stock.
g.
Composites in which the rubber is in
admixture with other ingredients, for example, rubber-asbestos packings and rubber-cork gaskets.
h.
Subassemblies, assemblies and systems which
contain elastomeric items as component parts, such as small arms, weapons,
vehicles, aircraft, missiles and space vehicles.
i.
Products fabricated from flexible materials
that are not elastomeric, for example, some plastics.
Application-
The
information contained in this handbook is intended as a guide for use by those
agencies whose responsibility is to place control requirements on rubber
products, as well as by those activities whose responsibility it is to control
the age of products stocked in Government storage facilities. The handbook is not intended for use in
controlling the age of rubber products prior to their acceptance by the
Government or by Government contractors.
The handbook does not make mandatory the disposition of rubber products
that have been in storage longer than the periods recommended. The decision as to whether or not to dispose
of “overage” products is a function of the storage, supply or using
facilities. Responsible activities
should make every attempt to limit the procurements of rubber products to the
extent that large volumes of “overage” products should be tested to determine
whether or not they meet the requirements of the applicable
specifications. Procurement documents
should require the mold marking of the cure date, such as the year and month on
the rubber product (or on its package) and careful records kept of the cure
date of all stored rubber products. When
age limitations of the details specification listed herein conflict with the
requirements herein, the requirements of the detail specification will govern.
MIL-HDBK-764 System Safety Engineering Design Guide For
Army Materiel, January 1990, 346 Pages.
Most
all of the disciplines involved in the design, engineering, production, and
deployment of Army systems are concerned in some way with system safety. Accordingly, one of the primary functions of
the system safety engineer is to integrate the safety-related planning done by
various other disciplines. These other
disciplines are responsible for specific categories of safety planning, but
their primary responsibilities are for other services. For example, reliability engineers are
concerned with the failure rates of all components in a piece of equipment,
whether or not such failures are safety related.
System
safety engineers have found that accidents are caused by adverse environmental
effects and by errors in design, production, operations, maintenance, and
disposal. Thus each technical discipline
or management activity that can contribute to the elimination or minimization
of these accident causes should be integrated into the system safety
activities. Some of the principal
technical activities that can affect the safety of a system are:
·
Human Factors Engineering
·
Reliability Engineering
·
Maintainability Engineering
·
Maintenance Engineering
·
Test Engineering
·
Quality Engineering And Control
·
Industrial Hygiene
·
Training
·
System Safety Engineering And Management
Activities
·
Contracting
·
Budgeting
·
Legal
Data
includes ergonomic details.
MIL-HDBK-781A Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for Engineering
Development, Qualification, and Production, April 1996. 411 Pages.
This
handbook contains test methods, test plans, and environmental profile data presented
in a manner which facilitates their use with tailorable
tasks when appropriate.
The
testing of equipment procured for new military systems is an increasingly
complex process. Test methods, test
plans, and test environments must be selected which will ensure that
contractually required reliability levels are attained in the field and early
defect failures are removed prior to field deployment. MIL-HDBK-781 provides a menu of test plans,
test methods, and environmental profiles.
The most appropriate material may be selected for each program and
incorporated into the tailored reliability test program.
The
handbook sections on reliability test methods and test plans present methods
for growth monitoring, environmental stress screening, mean-time-between-failure
assurance testing, sequential tests, fixed-duration tests, and all-equipment
tests, including a durability/economic Life Test. The sections on test environmental profiles
provide typical test environments for fixed-ground equipment, mobile ground
vehicle, shipboard, jet aircraft, turboprop and helicopter, and missiles and
assembled external stores equipment. The
references provided will expand the user’s knowledge and aid in the design and
implementation of reliability test programs through more details data.
MIL-STD-810
Test Methods Standard For Engineering Considerations And Laboratory Tests, January 2000, 783 pages including changes notices 1 & 2
for revision F.
This test method standard has
the primary emphases on tailoring a materiel item’s environmental design and
test limits to the conditions that the specific materiel will experience
throughout its service life, and establishing laboratory test methods that
replicate the effects of environments on materiel rather than trying to
reproduce the environments themselves.
The standard is in two parts:
1. Part
One describes management, engineering, and technical roles in the
environmental design and test tailoring process.
2. Part
Two contains environmental laboratory test methods to be applied according
to the general and specific test tailoring guidelines described in Part One.
When applied properly, the
environmental management and engineering processes described in this standard
can be of enormous value in generating confidence in the environmental
worthiness and overall durability of materiel system design.
MIL-HDBK-1670
Environmental Criteria And Guidelines For Air-Launched Weapons, December 2007, 118 pages
This handbook is converted
from MIL-STD-1670. As air-launched
weapons become more complex, the definition of the service environment and the
attainment of high operational reliability become more complex and more
critical. High operational reliability
is directly dependent on how well the operational environment is defined and
properly provided for during the equipment design and test phases. The pas practice of qualifying weapons to
arbitrary vibration levels and temperature extremes of standards and
specifications without first investigating the weapon’s expected life cycle
environment has resulted in weapons severely deficient in reliability when used
in the operational environment. The
document provides methods for defining the weapon’s expected total service
environment early in the design phase and translating this environment into
design criteria that is to e demonstrated prior to
the weapon’s operational use.
This
handbook establishes guidelines for the development of environmental
engineering design and test requirements for air-launched weapons. It provides acquisition activities with
guidelines for the implementation of the required “most realistic environmental
test” in addition to MIL-STD-810.
MIL-HDBK-1798 (Superseding MIL-STD-1798) Mechanical
Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program, December 1997, 34 Pages.
This
standard sets forth programmatic tasks for the development, acquisition
maintenance, modification, and operation of mechanical equipment and mechanical
elements of airborne, support and training subsystems to assure operation
soundness, dependability and affordability throughout the life cycle of Air
Force Systems. The Mechanical Equipment
and Subsystems Integrity Program, MECSIP, consists of a series of disciplined
time phased actions, procedures, analyses, tests, etc., which when developed
and applied in accordance with this standard will ensure more reliable,
affordable, and supportable equipment and subsystems, thus contributing to the
enhancement of total systems mission effectiveness and operational suitability.
MIL-HDBK-1823 Nondestructive Evaluation System Reliability Assessment, April
1999. 112 Pages.
This
handbook provides uniform guidance requirements for establishing NDE procedures
used to inspect new or in-service hardware for which a measure of NDE
reliability is required. They are,
specifically, Eddy Current (EC), Fluorescent Penetrant (PT), Ultrasonic (UT),
and Magnetic Particle (MT) Testing. This
document may be used for other NDE procedures if they are similar in output to
those listed herein, such as Radiographic testing, Holographic testing, Shearographic testing, etc.
NDE
systems are classified into either of two categories: those which produce only
qualitative information as to the presence or absence of a flaw, i.e., hit/miss
data, and systems which also provide some quantitative measure of the size of
the indicated flaw, i.e., â vs. a data .
MIL-HDBK-2036 Preparation Of
Electronic Equipment Specifications, 1
November 1999, 157 pages.
This
handbook provides guidance to specifiers and the
acquisition community for the development of requirements for end-item
specifications and commercial item descriptions. This handbook also provides guidance for the
evaluation of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and nondevelopmental
items (NDI) as to their suitability for use in military environments.
This
document provides guidance for the tailoring of general and detailed
requirements which must be addressed in the preparation of specifications for
electronic equipment used in ships (including submarines), space, mobile
(vehicular) and land applications. The
document also includes a system classification details for establishing system
priority to set the severity levels to be achieved along with probability of
mission successes and confidence levels in design life validation which
includes environmental conditions plus inclusion of a long list of military and
commercial specifications.
MIL-HDBK-2084 Handbook For Maintainability Of Avionic And
Electronic Systems And Equipment, July 1995, 34 pages.
This
document was originally MIL-STD-2084 before designation as a handbook.
Maintainability
is an attribute of design and is a measure of the ease, rapidity, and accuracy
with which systems or equipment can be restored to operation status following
failure or repair. A high degree of
readiness and availability of avionic and electronic systems and equipment can
be assured only when their design allows for positive and accurate
identification of operational status, and when items are found defective, rapid
and efficient fault isolation, removal, replacement, and subsequent repair.
The
special features designed and built into systems which make them easy to
maintain and efficient to support result when maintainability is clearly
defined as a system requirement and the maintainability program is established
as a functional area of design. The
purpose of this standard [handbook] is not to subrogate the maintainability
program requirements of MIL-STD-470,
but merely to amplify the design criteria requirements of the maintainability
program and to emphasize maintainability by design.
Under
the concept of maintainability by design, emphasis is placed on those design
areas which tend to have the greatest influence on ease of maintenance. This includes requirements for
modularization, replacement at higher levels, and increased depth of
localization. These physical and
technical considerations of maintainability design are necessary if complex
avionic and electronic systems and equipment are to be supported efficiently at
all levels of maintenance.
MIL-HDBK-2164A
Environmental Stress Screening Process, June
1996. 45 Pages.
This
handbook provides guidelines for Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) of electronic
equipment, including environmental screening conditions, durations of exposure,
procedures, equipment operation, actions taken upon detection of defects, and
screening documentation. These
guidelines provide for a uniform ESS process that may be utilized for
effectively disclosing manufacturing defects in electronic equipment caused by
poor workmanship and faulty or marginal parts.
It will also identify design problems if the design is inherently
fragile or if qualification and reliability growth tests were too benign or not
accomplished. The most common stimuli
used in ESS are temperature cycling and random vibration. A viable ESS program must be dynamic; the
screening program must be actively managed, and tailored to the particular
characteristics of the equipment being screened. It should be noted that there are no
universal screens applicable to all equipment.
ESS
is part of a viable engineering development, manufacturing corrective action
and overhaul process rather than a test in the normal accept/reject sense. Guidance in developing a screen can be found
in Figure 1. Those participating in the
effort, including the contractor should never be led to believe that a
“failure” is bad and would be held against them. ESS is intended to stimulate defects, not to
simulate the operating environment, and therefore, factory failures are
encouraged. The root causes of ESS
failures need to be found and corrected before there is a complete process.
MIL-HDBK-5400 Electronic Equipment, Airborne General
Guidelines For, 15 June 1992 and 30 November 1995, 91
Pages, (3.3 Meg PDF files)
This
handbook contains general guidelines for electronic equipment for operation in
piloted aircraft and helicopters, missiles, boosters and allied vehicles. Detail electrical and mechanical design,
performance and test requirements should be as specified in the detail
specification or contract.
This
handbook provides guidance for implementing and tailoring guidelines and
documents contained in MIL-HDBK-454 Standard General Guidelines For Electronic Equipment, which
have applicability in the design and production of electronic equipment for
airborne applications. Included in this
handbook are references to the applicable requirements, and index of applicable
documents, and a guide for tailoring and application of those requirements and
documents in conjunction with the various equipment design, development and
production phases.
This
document supersedes MIL-E-5400 and MIL-STD-5400.
MIL-HDBK-46855 Human Engineering
Program Process And Procedures, 17 May
1999, 276 pages, supersedes DOD-HDBK-763 and MIL-H-46855.
This handbook provides human
engineering (HE)
(a) program tasks
(b) procedures and
preferred practices, and
(c) methods for
application to system acquisition.
The program tasks outline the work to be accomplished by a contractor or
subcontractor in conducting an HE effort integrated with the total system
engineering and development effort. They
serve as a basis for offerors to provide HE program
information during the solicitation process.
An
HE effort should be provided to
(a) develop or
improve all human interfaces of the system
(b) achieve
required effectiveness of human performance during system operation,
maintenance, support, control, and transport, and
(c) make
economical demands upon personnel resources, skills, training, and costs.
MIL-P-24534 Planned Maintenance System: Development Of Maintenance Requirement Cards, Maintenance Index Pages,
And Associated Documentation, 26
April 1978 – 7 May 1985, Rev. A, 150 pages, (5.4 Meg PDF file)
This
specification identifies the requirements and standards for the development and
production of Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRCs), Maintenance Index Pages
(MIPs), and other associated documentation used with the Navy Maintenance and
Material Management (3-M) Systems, Planned Maintenance System (PMS), OPNAVINST
4790.4, Volume I. This specification
implements Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) (see 6.3.33) methodology for
the determination of maintenance requirements (see 6.5) and applies to all
levels of system or equipment grouping, and to all scheduled maintenance,
whether equipment is in use, ready for use, or in standby or lay up condition.
This specification addresses the total scheduled maintenance program for
a ship, irrespective of the maintenance echelon possessing the capability to
perform the maintenance; that is organizational, intermediate, and depot level
scheduled maintenance tasks are considered.
This specification provides procedures for development of unscheduled
maintenance within the PMS program.
Planned maintenance system documentation shall be developed in
accordance with this specification. This
specification is intended for use by PMS development activities and by
activities which manage, monitor, or coordinate that development.
MIL-PRF-19500L Performance Specification Semiconductor Devices, General Specification
For, October 1998. 119 Pages.
This
specification established the general performance requirements for
semiconductor devices. Detail
requirements and characteristics are specified in the performance specification
sheet. Revisions to this and performance
specification sheets are structured to assure the interchangeability of devices
of the same part type regardless of manufacturing date coed or conformance
inspection (CI) completion date. Five
quality levels for encapsulated devices are provided for in this specification,
differentiated by the prefixes JAN, JANTX, JANTXV, JANJ, and JANS. Seven radiation hardness assurance (RHA)
levels are provided for the JANTXV and JANS quality levels. These are designated by the letters M, D, L,
R, F, G, and H following the quality levels portion of the prefix. Two quality levels for unencapsulated
devices are provided for in this specification differentiated by the prefixes
JANHX and JANKC.
MIL-PRF-38534D Performance Specification Hybrid Microcircuits, General Specification
For, January 1999. 82 Pages.
This
specification establishes the general performance requirements for hybrid
microcircuits, Multi-Chip Modules (MCM) and similar devices and the verification
requirements for insuring that these devices meet the applicable performance
requirements. Verification is
accomplished through the use of one of two quality programs (Appendix A). The main body of this specification describes
the performance requirements and the requirements for obtaining a Qualified
Manufacturers List (QML) listing. The
appendices of this specification are intended for guidance to aid a manufacture
in developing their verification program.
Detail requirements, specification characteristics, and other provisions
which are sensitive to the particular intended use should be specified in the
applicable device acquisition specification.
This document supersedes MIL-STD-1772.
MIL-PRF-38535E Performance Specification Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits)
Manufacturing, General Specification For, December 1997. 127 Pages.
This
specification establishes the general performance requirements for integrated
circuits or microcircuits and the quality and reliability assurance
requirements which must be met for their acquisition. The intent of this specification is to allow
the device manufacturer the flexibility to implement best commercial practices
to the maximum extent possible while still providing product which meets the
military performance needs. Details
requirements, specific characteristics of microcircuits, and other provisions
which are sensitive to the particular use intended will be specified in the
device specification. Quality assurance
requirements outlined herein are for all microcircuits built on a manufacturing
line which is controlled through a manufacturer’s Quality Management (QM)
program and has been certified and qualified in accordance with requirements
herein. Several levels of product
assurance including Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) are provided for in this
specification. The certification and
qualification sections found herein outline the requirements to be met by a
manufacturer to be listed on a Qualified Manufacturer Listing (QML). After listing of a technology flow on a QML,
the manufacturer must continually meet or improve the established baseline of
certified and qualified procedures, the QM program, the manufacturer’s review
system, the status reporting and quality and reliability assurance requirements
for al QML products. The manufacturer
may present alternative methods of addressing the requirements contained in
this document. This specification
requires a manufacturer to establish a process flow baseline. If sufficient quality and reliability data is
available, the manufacture, through the QM program and the manufacture’s review
system, may modify substitute or delete tests.
MIL-PRF-49506 Performance Specification Logistics Management Information, November
1996. 80 Pages.
This
specification describes information required by the government to perform
acquisition logistics management functions.
The principle focus of this specification is on providing the DOD with a
contractual method for acquiring support and support-related engineering and
logistics data from contractors. The DOD
uses this data in-house in existing logistics DOD materiel management processes
such as those for initial provisioning, cataloging, and item management. Data products intended primarily for in-house
use by the contractor during his/her own design process or those developed
internally by the DOD are beyond the scope of this document. Depending on specific program requirements,
this information may be in the form of summary reports, a set of specific data
products, or both. This specification
identifies content requirements for information summaries and format requirement
of data products. It may e used on all system/end item acquisition programs The contractor may, and is encouraged to,
suggest alternative means of satisfying requirements of this specification to
make information more readily available and to utilize more efficient business
practices. The mechanics of delivery
(e.g., electronic data interchange, hard copy, etc.) are not within the scope
of this specification and should be addressed separately. Data entry media, storage, and maintenance
procedures are left to the contractor.
MIL-S-52779 Software Quality Assurance Program Requirements was cancelled on 29
June 1990 and superseded by DoD-STD-2168 which is shown above.
MIL-STD-001591
A Command,
Control and Communications (C3) System & Component Fault
Diagnosis, Subsystems, Analysis/Synthesis Of. December 1978. 23 Pages
This
standard establishes uniform criteria for conducting trade studies to determine
the optimal design for command, control and communication system and component
fault diagnosis/isolation subsystems, hereafter referred to as Fault
Identification & Test Subsystems (FITS).
FITS include the hardware and/or software necessary for the detection
and isolation of failures.
MIL-STD-105 Sampling Procedures and Tables For Inspection
By Attributes, May 1989 Rev E, 75 Pages
This
publication provides sampling procedures and reference tables for use in planning
and conducting inspection by attributes.
The sampling concept is based on the probabilistic recurrence of events
when a series of lots or batches are produced in a stable environment. The sampling plans described in this standard
are applicable to AQL’s of 0.01 ercent or higher and
therefore not suitable for applications where quality levels in the defective
parts per million range can be realized.
Also see MIL-STD-1916.
MIL-STD-202G Test Methods Standard Electronic And Electrical Component Parts,
February 2002. 193 Pages
This
standard establishes uniform methods for testing electronic and electrical
component parts, including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to
deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military
operations, and physical and electrical tests.
For the purpose of this standard, the term “component parts” includes
such items as capacitors, resistors, switches, relays, transformers, inductors,
and others. This standard is intended to
apply only to small component parts, weighting up to 300 pounds or having a
root mean square test voltage up to 50,000 volts unless otherwise specifically invoked. The test methods described herein have been
prepared to serve several purposes:
a.
To specify suitable conditions obtainable
in the laboratory that give test results equivalent to the actual service
conditions existing in the field, and to obtain reproducibility of the results
of tests. The tests described herein are
not to be interpreted as an exact and conclusive representation of actual
service operation in any one geographic location, since the only true test for
operation in a specific location is an actual service test at that point.
b.
To describe in one standard (1) all of the
test methods of a similar character which appeared in the various joint or
single-service electronic and electrical component parts specifications, (2)
those test methods which are feasible for use in several specifications, and
(3), the recognized extreme environments, particularly temperatures, barometric
pressures, etc., at which component parts will be tested under some of the
presently standardized testing procedures.
By so consolidating, these methods may be kept uniform and thus result
in conservation of equipment, man-hours, and testing facilities. In achieving these objectives, it is
necessary to make each of the general tests adaptable to a broad range of
electronic and electrical component parts.
c.
The test methods described herein for
environmental, physical, and electrical tests shall also apply, when
applicable, to parts not covered by an approved military specification,
military sheet from standard, specification sheet, or drawing.
MIL-STD-271 Requirements For
Nondestructive Testing Methods. 31 October 1973 27 May 1998. Rev. F with one change notice and two
cancellation notices.
This
standard covers nondestructive testing method requirements for radiographic,
magnetic particles, liquid penetrant, ultrasonic, eddy current and visual
inspections. These requirements are
designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of inspections performed. This standard does not contain acceptance
criteria for the inspection methods defined.
This
standard covers the requirements for conducting nondestructive test used in
determining the presence of surface and internal discontinuities in
metals. It also contains the minimum
requirements necessary to qualify nondestructive test and inspection personnel,
procedures, and nondestructive test equipment.
MIL-STD-271
has been superseded by NAVSEA Technical Publication T9074-AS-GIB-010/271 “Requirements
for Nondestructive Testing Methods”, Stock Number 0910LO7314700. Copies of NAVSEA Technical Publications are
available from the Naval Inventory Control Point, Code 1 Support Branch,
MIL-STD-331 Fuze
And Fuze Components, Environmental And
Performance Tests For, 5 January 2005, Rev. C, 295 pages (14.4
Meg PDF file size)
This
standard describes tests used by the department of Defense (DoD)
to determine the safety, reliability and performance characteristics of weapon
system fuzes and fuze
components at any stage in their life cycles.
This
is a test method type standard evolved over the years reflecting increased
standardization of environmental and performance tests among the services and
improvements in fuze design, test technology and
safety.
MIL-STD-414 Sampling Procedures And
Tables For Inspection Buy Variables For Percent Defective, 8 May 1955 with changes notice through 02 February 1995. 118
pages (5.5Meg PDF file size)
This
Standard establishes sampling plans and procedures for inspection by variables
for use in Government procurement, supply and storage, and maintenance in
inspection operations.
This
Standard has been superseded by ANSI/ASQC
Z1.9-2003 Sampling Procedures
and Tables for Inspection by Variables for Percent Nonconforming.
MIL-STD-461
Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics Of
Subsystems And Equipment, 10 December
2007, Rev. F, 269 pages, (1.6 Meg PDF file size)
This
standard establishes interface and associated verification requirements for the
control of electromagnetic interference (EMI) emission and susceptibility
characteristics of electronic, electrical, and electromechanical equipment and
subsystems designed or procured for use by activities and agencies of the
Department of Defense (DoD)
MIL-STD-470B Maintainability Program For Systems And Equipment, May 1989. 78 Pages
This
standard provides task descriptions for maintainability program. The Tasks, as tailored, will be applied to
systems and equipment development, acquisitions and modifications. Software maintainability is no covered by
this standard.
This
military standard consists of basic application requirements, specific tailorable maintainability program tasks, and an appendix
which includes and application matrix and guidance and rationale for task
selection.
MIL-STD-471ANot3 Maintainability Verification/Demonstration/Evaluation, March
1973. 64 Pages.
This
standard provides procedures and test methods for verification, demonstration, and
evaluation of qualitative and quantitative maintainability requirements. It also provides for qualitative assessment
of various integrated logistic support factors related to and impacting the
achievement of maintainability parameters and time downtime, e.g., technical
manuals, personnel, tools and test equipment, maintenance concepts, and
provisioning.
MIL-STD-498 Software Development And Documentation,
December 1994. 229 Pages.
The
purpose of this standard is to establish uniform requirements for software
development and documentation.
This
standard and its Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) are meant to be tailored for
each type of software to which they are applied. While tailoring is the responsibility of the
acquirer, suggested tailoring may be provided by prospective and selected
developers. General tailoring guidance
can be found in Section 6 and in DOD-HDBK-248. Tailoring guidance specific to this standard
can be found in Appendixes G and H and in guidebooks and handbooks planned for
this standard.
MIL-STD-690D Failure Rate Sampling
Plans And Procedures, June 2005. 43 Pages
This
standard provides procedures for failure rate (FR) qualification, sampling
plans for establishing and maintaining FR levels at selected confidence levels,
and lot conformance inspection procedures associates with FR testing for the
purpose of direct reference in appropriate military electronic parts
established reliability (ER) specifications.
Figures and table throughout this standard are based on exponential distribution. Weibull distribution will be acceptable in
certain components such as capacitors.
Use of Weibull distribution for any component must be approved by the
qualifying activity. This standard also
provides guidance to specification writers in the use of this standard (see
appendix A) and references material for uses of ER parts.
MIL-STD-721-RevC Definitions Of Terms For Reliability And
Maintainability, June 1981. 18
Pages.
This
Standard defines words and terms most commonly used which are associated with
Reliability and Maintainability (R & M).
It is intended to be used as a common base for R & M definitions and
to reduce the possibility of conflicts, duplications, and incorrect
interpretations either expressed or implied elsewhere in documentation. The definitions addressed the intent and
policy of DoD Directive 5000.40. Statistical and mathematical terms which have
gained wide acceptance are not defined in this standard since they are included
in other documents.
MIL-STD-750 Test Method Standard Test Methods For Semiconductor Devices,
20 November 2006, Rev. E, (9.6 Meg PDF file size)
This
standard establishes uniform methods for testing semiconductor devices,
including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to deleterious
effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military operation, and
physical and electrical tests. For the purpose
of this standard, the term “devices” includes such items as transistors,
diodes, voltage regulators, rectifiers, tunnel diodes, and other related
parts. This standard is intended to
apply only to semiconductor devices.
MIL-STD-756B Reliability Modeling and
Prediction, November 1981. 100 Pages
including change Notice 1.
Reliability
prediction is an essential function in evaluating a design from concept through
development and in controlling changes during production. Prediction provides a rational basis for
design decisions such as the choice between alternatives concepts, choice of
part quality levels, derating to be applied, use of
proven versus state-of-the-art techniques, and other factors.
It
is essential that common ground rules be established for techniques and data
sources used in the formulation of reliability models and predictions so that
they may be applied and interpreted uniformly.
This standard establishes procedures and ground rules intended to achieve
this purpose.
It
must be recognized that reliability prediction is a best estimate of the
reliability anticipated from a given design within data limitations and the
extent of item definition. A properly
performed reliability prediction is invaluable to those responsible for making
program decisions regarding the feasibility and adequacy of a design approach.
Reliability
predictions are generally based on experience data from similar items, or their
components, used in a same or similar manner.
Extreme caution must be exercised in ascertaining the similarity of
other items and the degree of similarity in the conditions of use. This standard emphasizes verification and
justification of the validity and applicability of data sources to the
preparation of predictions.
The
necessity for determining the costs of achieving and sustaining the reliability
of an item requires that reliability be considered from two perspectives,
reliability as a measure of operational effectiveness (Mission Reliability) and
reliability as a measure of ownership cost (Basic Reliability). The incorporation of redundancies and
alternative modes of operation to improve Mission Reliability invariable
decreases Basic Reliability and increases procurement and logistic support
costs. This standard addresses Mission
Reliability prediction and Basic Reliability prediction as separate but
companion predictions both of which are essential to adequately quantify the
reliability of an item.
The
need for updating a given prediction will vary from program to program and
cannot be precisely established in a general standard. Updating will depend primarily on the degree
to which the item has been defined, and the availability of pertinent data. Provisions should be made for reliability
prediction updates at all design review points and other major program
milestones.
This
standard establishes uniform procedures and ground rules for the preparation of
Mission Reliability and Basic Reliability models and predictions for
electronic, electrical, electromechanical, mechanical, and ordnance systems and
equipments, hereinafter referred to as items. Item complexity may range from a complete
weapon system to the simplest subdivision of a system. The primary value of Reliability Prediction
is as a design tool to provide relative measures of item reliability to design
decisions. Great caution must be used
when applying and translating the absolute value of the Reliability Prediction
to measures of Field Reliability.
MIL-STD-778 is superseded by
MIL-STD-721-RevC Definitions Of Terms For Reliability And
Maintainability,
MIL-STD-781D Reliability Testing For Engineering Development, Qualification, And Production, October 1986. 47 Pages.
This
standard specifies the general requirements an specific tasks for reliability
testing during the development, qualification, and production of systems and
equipment.
This
standard establishes the tailorable requirements for
reliability testing performed during integrated test programs specified in MIL-STD-785. Task descriptions for Reliability
Development/Growth Testing (RD/GT), Reliability Qualification Testing (RQT),
Production Reliability Acceptance Tests (PRAT), and Environmental Stress
Screening (ESS) are defined. Tasks
specified in this standard are to be selectively applied in DOD contracted
procurements, requests for proposals, statements of works (SOWs) and Government
in-house developments which require reliability testing of systems and
equipment.
MIL-STD-785-Rev B Reliability Program For Systems And Equipment,
September 1980. 88 Pages.
This
military standard consists of basic application requirements, specific tailorable reliability program tasks, and an appendix which
includes an application matrix and guidance and rationale for task selection.
Effective
reliability programs must be tailored to fit program needs and constraints,
including life cycle costs (LCC). This
document is intentionally structured to discourage indiscriminate blanket applications. Tailoring is forced by requiring that
specific tasks be selected and for those tasks identified, that certain
essential information relative to implementation of the task be provided by the
procuring activity.
Many
of the tasks solicit facts and recommendations from the contractors on the need
for, and scope of, the work to be done rather than requiring that a specific
task be done in a specific way. The
selected tasks can be tailored to meet specific and peculiar program needs.
Although
not all encompassing, the guidance and rational provided in Appendix A is
intended to serve as an aid I selecting and scoping the tasks and requirements.
Contains
the most common description of a reliability program with specific tasks to be
considered in developing a reliability program:
·
Conceptual phase
·
Demonstration and validation phase
·
Full-scale engineering development phase
·
Production phase
·
Reliability accounting
·
Reliability engineering
·
Basic reliability
·
·
Life units
·
Environmental stress screening
·
Reliability development/growth test
·
Reliability qualification test
·
Production reliability acceptance test
Includes
an application matrix of 18 tasks to be considered in developing a reliability
program:
1.
Reliability program plan
2.
Monitor/control of subcontractors and
suppliers
3.
Program reviews
4.
Failure reporting, analysis, and corrective
action systems (FRACAS)
5.
Failure review board (FRB)
6.
Reliability modeling
7.
Reliability allocations
8.
Reliability predictions
9.
Failure modes, effects, and criticality
analysis (FEMCA)
10. Sneak circuit analysis (SCA)
11. Electronic parts/circuits tolerance analysis
12. Parts program
13. Reliability critical items
14. Effects of functional testing, storage, handling, packaging,
transportation, and maintenance
15. Environmental stress screening (ESS)
16. Reliability development/growth testing
17. Reliability qualification test program (RQT)
18. Production reliability acceptance test program (PRAT)
MIL-STD-790F Standard Practice For Established Reliability And High Reliability Qualified
Products List (QPL) Systems For Electrical, Electronic, And Fiber Optic Parts
Specifications. August 1995. 17 Pages.
This
standard is for direct reference in established reliability and high
reliability electrical, electronic, and fiber optic parts specifications and
establishes the criteria for a manufacturer’s qualified product systems.
MIL-STD-810 Test Method Standard For Environmental
Engineering Considerations And Laboratory Tests, 1 January 2000 to 5 May 2003 for 3 change notices, Rev. F, 782 pages, (11.4
Meg PDF file size)
This
standard contains materiel acquisition program planning and engineering
direction for considering the influences that environmental stresses have on
materiel throughout all phases of its service life. It is important to note that this document
does not imposed design or test specifications.
Rather, it describes the environmental tailoring process that results in
realistic materiel designs and test methods based on materiel system
performance requirements.
MIL-STD-882-RevD Standard Practice For Systems Safety, February
2000. 31 Pages.
The
system safety practice as defined herein conforms to the acquisition procedures
in DoD regulation 5000.2-R and provides a consistent
means of evaluating identified risks.
Mishap risk must be identified, evaluated, and mitigated to a level
acceptable (as defined by the system
user or customer) to the appropriate authority and compliant with federal (and
state where applicable) laws and regulations, Executive Orders, treaties, and
agreements. Program trade studies associated
with mitigating mishap risk must consider total life cycle cost in any
decision. When requiring MIL-STD-882 in
a solicitation or contract and no specific paragraphs of this standard are
identified, then apply on those requirements presented in section 4.
For
this MIL-STD, think risk matrices as described at http://www.barringer1.com/nov04prb.htm
for making risk-based decisions.
MIL-STD-882 supersedes
MIL-STD-1574.
MIL-STD-883F Test Method Standard Microcircuits, June 2004. 708 Pages.
This
standard establishes uniform methods, controls, and procedures for testing
microelectronic devices suitable for use within Military and Aerospace
electronic systems including basic environmental tests to determine resistance
to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military
and space operations; mechanical and electrical tests; workmanship and training
procedures; and such other controls and constraints as have been deemed
necessary to ensure a uniform level of quality and reliability suitable to the
intended applications of those devices.
For the purpose of this standard, the term “devices” includes such items
as monolithic, multichip, film and hybrid microcircuits, microcircuit arrays,
and the elements from which the circuits and arrays are formed. This standard is intended to apply only to microelectronic
devices.
MIL-STD-973
Configuration Management, 17 April 1992,
258 pages.
This
standard defines configuration management requirements which are to be
selectively applied, as required, throughout the life cycle of any
configuration items (CI). This standard
supersedes:
MIL-STD-480
Configuration Control
MIL-STD-481 Configuration
Control – Short Form
MIL-STD-482
Configuration Status
MIL-STD-483
Configuration Management Practices
MIL-STD-1456
Configuration Management Plan
MIL-STD-1521
Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments,
and Computer Software
MIL-STD-973
has these revisions:
Interim Change
Notice 1 on 01-Dec-1992, 102 pages
Interim Change
Notice 2 on 24-Nov-1993, 18 pages
Interim Change
Notice 3 on 13-Jan-1995, 121 pages
Cancellation
Change Notice 4 on 30-Sep-2000, 1 page
MIL-STD-1309D Definition of Terms for Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment. February 1992, 65 Pages.
The
purpose of this standard is to standardize the definitions of the most commonly
used terms for testing, measurement, and diagnostics. This standard establishes the definitions
most commonly used for test, measurement, and diagnostics.
MIL-STD-1344 Test Methods For
Electrical Connectors. 19
May 1969. Rev. A through 6 changes notices to 22 October 2004, 193 Pages, (5.3
Meg PDF file)
This
standard establishes uniform test methods for testing electrical connections.
MIL-STD-1388Rev1A Logistic Support Analysis, April 1983. 121 Pages.
This
standard provides general requirements and task descriptions governing
performance of Logistic Support analysis (LSA) during the life cycle of systems
and equipment. Superseded by
MIL-HDBK-502.
MIL-STD-1388Rev2B DOD Requirements For A Logistic Support Analysis Record, March
1991. 614 Pages.
This
standard prescribes the data element definitions (DED), data field lengths, and
formats for Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) Record (LSAR) data. It identifies the LSAR reports that are
generated from the LSAR data and identifies the LSART relational tables and
automated data processing (ADP) specifications for transmittal and delivery of
automated LSAR data. Superseded by
MIL-PRF-49506.
MIL-STD-1472D
Human Engineering Design Criteria For Military Systems, Equipment And Facilities, March
1989. 409 Pages.
This
standard establishes general human engineering design criteria for military
systems, subsystems, equipment and facilities.
Data
includes extensive ergonomic details.
MIL-STD-1523
Age Controls Of Age-Sensitive Elastomeric Materiel, 1 February 1984, 12 pages including two change notices for
cancellation in lieu of: 1) SAE AS1933, “Age
Control for Hose Containing Age-Sensitive Elastomeric Material” for hose
application and 2) SAE
ARP5316, “Storage of Aerospace Elastomeric Seals and Seal Assemblies which
include and Elastomer Element prior to Hardware Assembly”
This
document establishes requirements for the maximum ages of age sensitive
elastomeric items for use in military aircraft and missiles and for space
vehicles at the time of acceptance by a Government acquiring activity. The provisions of this document apply to
hoses and O-rings from specific classes of elastomers which are resistant to
lubricants, hydraulic fluids, and petroleum base fuels and which conform to the
specifications cited herein.
Age
control is the designation of a specific maximum period of age after cure date
that will assure desired performance characteristics of an elastomer. Age control is based on the premise that
elastomers are age sensitive.
An
age sensitive material is one whose physical property values or physical form
slowly drift outside the useable range.
These changes in elastomeric materials are caused by exposure to harmful
influences such as: oxygen and ozone especially in the presence of ultra-violet
light, moisture, high temperatures, swelling agents such as fuel and other
solvents, corrosive vapors and mechanical stress which modify the network
structure of the elastomeric component of the item and may modify the
reinforcing action of the fillers. The
presence of protective substances and the chemical composition retard these
changes. Upon depletion of these
protective materials, the rate of degradation increases and the item more
rapidly approaches the end of its service life.
MIL-STD-1543B Reliability Program
Requirements for Space and Missile Systems, October 1988. 100 Pages.
The
high reliability required of all space and launch vehicles is achieved by the
designs, including the design margins, and by the manufacturing processes and
controls imposed at every level of fabrication, assembly, and test. The design and design margins should ensure
that the equipment is capable of performing in the operational
environment. The reliability program
requirements stated in this standard have been established to ensure the timely
and economical attainment of system reliability as an integral part of the
acquisition process. The requirements
are a composite of those that have been found to be cost effective on previous
space programs
This
standard establishes uniform reliability program requirements and tasks for use
during design, development, fabrication, test, and operation of space and
launch vehicles.
MIL-STD-1556
Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) Contractor Participation
Requirements, February 1986, 29 pages.
GIDEP is a cooperative data
interchange among Government and Industry participants seeking to reduce or
eliminate expenditures of time and money by making maximum use of existing
knowledge. GIDEP provides a means to
exchange certain types of data essential during the life cycle of systems and
equipment.
GIDEP was initially
established to minimize duplicate testing of parts and materials through the
interchange of environmental test data and technical information among contractors
and Government agencies involved in design, development, and fabrication of
Government-funded equipment. Information
contained within the GIDEP storage and retrieval system includes environmental
test reports and procedures, reliability specifications, failure analysis data,
failure rate data, calibration procedures, and other technical information
related to the application, reliability, quality assurance, and testing of
parts and related materials.
MIL-STD-1562 Lists Of Standard Microcircuits, September 1991, 181 pages
The
purpose of this standard is to:
a) Provide equipment
designers, manufacturers and users with lists of microcircuits considered to be
most acceptable for military applications.
b)
Control and minimize the variety of microcircuits used by military activities
in order to facilitate effective logistic support of equipment in the field
c)
Concentrate economic support, improvement and production of the microcircuits
listed in this standard.
MIL-STD-1576 Electroexplosive
Subsystem Safety Requirements And Test Methods For
Space Systems. 31
July 1884 and change notice 1 dated 04 September 1992. 151 Pages, (8.7 Meg PDF
files)
This
Stndard establishes the general requirements and test
methods fo the design and development of electroexplosive subsystems to preclude hazards from
unintentional initiation and from failure to fire. These requirements apply to all subsystems
utilizing electrically initiated explosive or pyrotechnic components.
This
Standard applies to all space vehicles systems (e.g., launch vehicles, upper
stages, boosters, payloads, and related systems).
MIL-STD-1586 Quality Program Requirements For Space And Launch Vehicles, June 1998, 39 pages.
The
purpose of this standard is to specify special quality program requirements to
meet the high standards necessary for space and launch vehicles.
MIL-STD-1591 On-Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Sub-Systems, Analysis/Synthesis Of January 1977. 22 Pages
This
standard establishes uniform criteria for conducting trade studies to determine
the optimal design for an on-aircraft fault diagnosis/isolation system,
thereafter referred to as the On-Board Built-In Test System (ONBIT).
This
standard is applicable to DoD procurements which
include the development of on-aircraft fault diagnosis/isolation systems where
a selection cam be made between such alternatives as central computer
controlled on-board centrally polled built-in test equipment (BITE),
decentralized BITE, detached Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), etc., or
combinations of the preceding. The fault
diagnosis/isolation systems of interest are those used to diagnose/isolate
faults at the flight line (organizational) level of maintenance.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis, November 1980. 54 Pages. (FMEA and FMECA)
MIL-STD-1629-RevA-ChangedNotice-1 Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis, June 1983. 11 Pages.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA-ChangedNotice-2 Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis, November 1984. 7 Pages.
This
standard establishes requirements and procedures for performing a failure mode,
effects (FMEA), and criticality analysis (FEMCA) to systematically evaluate and
document, by item failure mode analysis, the potential impact of each
functional or hardware failure on mission success, personnel and system safety,
system performance, maintainability, and maintenance requirements. Each potential failure is ranked by the
severity of its effect in order that appropriate corrective actions may be
taken to eliminate or control the high risk items. Also used for root cause failure analysis
(RCA).
The precursor military
procedures document MIL-P-1629 of the same title as MIL-STD-1629 dated November
9, 1949 is no longer available. If you
have a copy, please send a PDF file to me at mailto:hpaul@barringer1.com for posting.
MIL-STD-1686C Electrostatic Discharge Control Program For
Protection Of Electrical And Electronic Parts Assemblies And Equipment
(Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices), October 1995. 18 Pages.
The
purpose of this standard is to establish comprehensive requirements for an ESD
control program to minimize the effects of ESD on parts, assemblies, and
equipment. An effective ESD control
program will increase reliability and decrease both maintenance actions and lifetime
costs. This standard shall be tailored
for various type of acquisitions.
The
standard defines the performance requirements for an ESD control program for
electrical and electronic parts, assemblies, and equipment, susceptible to
damage from ESD. Electrically initiated
explosive devices and part level design are excluded from these
requirements. This standard covers
identification, testing, classification, assembly and equipment design
criteria, protected areas, handling procedures, training, marking of hardware,
protective covering and packaging, and provides for quality assurance
requirements, audits and reviews.
MIL-STD-1843 Reliability-Centered Maintenance for Aircraft, Engines and Equipment.
This standard establishes the
methodology and decision logic for the USA Reliability-Centered Maintenance
(RCM) program. It forms the basis for
developing the preventive maintenance actions needed to provide safe, reliable
equipment that assures mission accomplishment at reasonable cost.
Although
the primary purpose of preventive maintenance is to assure that inherent
(designed) reliability is sustained, preventive maintenance by itself may not
produce the reliability required to meet mission requirements. Therefore, this standard considers equipment
redesign as an option to improving equipment reliability when it is
economically feasible to do so.
The
focus is on reliability, safety and mission accomplishment at reasonable
cost. This standard, when
conscientiously applied, forces a vigorous examination of these three factors
and prevents indiscriminate actions which are not cost effective.
This
document, which is based on the Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program
Planning Document MSG-3, outlines the procedures for developing preventive
maintenance requirements through the use of Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Analysis (RCMA) for Air Force aircraft and engine systems, aircraft and engine
structures and equipment, including peculiar and common Support Equipment (SE)
Communications and Electronics (C-E) equipment, vehicles, weapons and other
similar equipment items.
MIL-STD-1916 Department Of Defense Test Method Standard, April 1996. 33 Pages
The
purpose of this standard is to encourage defense contractors and other
commercial organizations supplying goods and services to the U.S. Government to
submit efficient and effective process control (prevention) procedures in place of prescribed sampling
requirements. The goal is to support the
movement away from an AQL-based inspection (detection) strategy to implementation of an effective prevention-based
strategy including a comprehensive quality system, continuous improvement and a
partnership with the Government. The
underlying theme is a partnership between DoD and the
defense supplier, with the requisite competence of both parties, and a clear
mutual benefit from process capable of consistently high quality products and
services. The objective is o create an atmosphere where every noncompliance is an
opportunity for corrective action and improvement rather than one where
acceptable quality levels are the contractually sufficient goals.
MIL-HDBK-2035 Nondestructive Testing Acceptance
Criteria. 4 July 1991 to 15 May 1995,
Rev. A, 88 pages, (5.4 Meg PDF file)
MIL-STD-2035
has been redesignated as a Test Method Standard.
The
acceptance criteria contained herein are for use in determining the
acceptability of nondestructive test (NDT) discontinuities in castings, welds, forgings, extrusions, cladding, and
other products where specified by the applicable Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) drawing, specification, contract, order or directive. Acceptance criteria contained herein are
based upon inspection methods performed in accordance with MIL-STD-271.
MIL-STD-2074(AS) Failure Classification For Reliability Testing, February
1978. 12 Pages.
This
standard establishes criteria for classification of failures occurring during
reliability tests.
This
standard, when made a part of the procurement document or the equipment
specification, applies to any reliability test, including, but not limited to,
tests performed in accordance with MIL-R-22973, MIL-R-23094, and MIL-STD-781.
MIL-STD-2077B General Requirements Test Program Sets, April 1991, 34 Pages.
This standard contains the
requirements to achieve cost effective acquisition and life cycle maintenance
of Operation Test Programs Sets/Test Program Sets (OTPS/TPSS). This document establishes a standard for
design, development, documentation, configuration management, validation,
verification, quality assurance and preparation for delivery of OTPS/TPSS. A TPS is composed of a Test Program (TP), interface
Device (ID), and Test Program Instruction (TPI). The OTPS shall be the result of merging one
or more PTSS into a group which share a single ID. This document is specifically limited to
OTPS/TPS development for Automatic Test Equipment (STE) systems.
MIL-STD-2084 Maintainability of Avionic & Electronic Systems and Equipment
Converted from MIL-STD-2084 to MIL-HDBK-2084.
MIL-STD-2155 Failure Reporting, Analysis And Corrective
Action System, July 1985. 17 Pages.
This
standard establishes uniform requirements and criteria for a Failure Reporting,
Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) to implement the FRACAS
requirement of MIL-STD-785. FRACAS is intended to provide management
visibility and control for reliability and maintainability improvement of
hardware and associated software by timely and disciplined utilization of
failure and maintenance data to generate and implement effective corrective
actions to prevent failure recurrence and to simplify or reduce the maintenance
tasks.
MIL-STD-2164 Environment Stress
Screening Process for Electronic Equipment, April 1985. 49 Pages.
This
standard defines the requirements for ESS of electronic equipment, including
environmental test conditions, durations of exposure, procedures, equipment
operation, actions taken upon detection of defects, and test documentation. The standard provides for a uniform ESS ot be utilized for effectively disclosing manufacturing
defects in electronic equipment.
The
process described herein shall be applied to electronic assemblies, equipment
and systems, in six broad categories as distinguished according to their field
service applications:
1.
Fixed ground equipment
2.
Mobile ground vehicle equipment
3.
Shipboard equipments-Sheltered
and Exposed to atmospheric environment
4.
Jet aircraft equipment
5.
Turbo-propeller and rotary-wing aircraft
equipment
6.
Air launched weapons and assembled external
storage
Large,
heavy items: When applying this standard
to large, heavy items, the following shall be considered:
1.
Potential fatigue
2.
Adequate environmental inputs
3.
Availability of suitable environmental
generation facilities
4.
Technical validly of testing at lower
assembly levels, i.e., drawers, chassis, etc.
MIL-STD-2165 Testability Program For Electronic Systems And
Equipment, January 1985. 80 Pages.
This
standard provides uniform procedures and methods for establishing a testability
program, for assessing testability in designs and for integration of
testability into the acquisition process for electronic systems and equipments.
This
standard is applicable to the development of electronic components, equipments, and systems for the Department of Defense. Appropriate tasks of this standard are to be
applied during the Conceptual phase, Demonstration and Validation phase, Full
Scale Development phase and Production phase of the system acquisition process.
MIL-STD-2173 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Requirements for Naval Aircraft,
Weapons Systems and Support Equipment. January 1986, 265 Pages
The
purpose of this standard is to provide the procedures for a
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) analysis for Naval Aircraft, weapons
systems, and support equipment (SE).
This standard is to be used by contractors during development of new
systems and equipment, and by analysis and auditors within the Naval Air
Systems Command for determining preventive maintenance requirements and
developing age exploration requirements.
The tasks shall also be use to update the
initial Reliability-Centered Maintenance analysis and analyze newly discovered
failure modes. For additional
information on application, refer to Appendix F on additional guidance.
MIL-STD-45662 Calibration Systems Requirements, August 1988. 13 Pages
This
MIL-STD provides requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a
calibration system to control the accuracy of measuring and test equipment
(M&TE) and measurement standards used to assure that supplies and services
delivered to the Government comply with prescribed technical requirements. This document was rescinded in February 1995
in deference to ISO-10012-1
[ISO-10012 is for all organizations and covers the entire Measurement and
Management System of an organization, whereas ISO/IEC
17025 is specifically for calibration laboratories or product testing
laboratories only to verify the laboratory is competent (capable) to perform
the measurements or tests].
NASA-1358
System Engineering “Toolbox” for
Design-Oriented Engineers, December 1994.
306 Pages.
The
purpose of this system engineering toolbox is to provide tools and
methodologies available to the design-oriented systems engineer. A tool,
as used herein, is defined as a set of procedures to accomplish a specific
function. A methodology is defined as a collection of tools, rules, and
postulates to accomplish a purpose. A
thorough literature search was performed to identify the prevalent tools and
methodologies. For each concept
addressed in the toolbox, the following information is provided:
1.
description,
2.
application,
3.
procedures,
4.
example, if practical,
5.
advantages,
6.
limitations, and
7.
bibliography and/or references.
This toolbox is intended solely as
guidance for potential tools and methodologies, rather than direction or
instruction for specific technique selection or utilization. It is left to the user to determine which
technique(s), at which level of detail are applicable, and what might be the
expected “value added” for their purposes.
Caution should be exercised in the use of these tools and
methodologies. Use of the techniques for
the sake of “using techniques” is rarely resource-effective. In addition, while techniques have been
categorized for recommended areas of use, this is not intended to be
restrictive. Readers are encouraged to
question, comment (app. A) and, in general, use this reference as one source
among many. The reader is also cautioned
to validate results from a given tool to ensure accuracy and applicability to
the problem at hand.
NASA-FTA-1.1 Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications, August 2002. 218 Pages.
This
handbook is an update of the original Fault Tree Handbook published in
1981. It is written for the informed
reader who has some knowledge of system analysis and has knowledge of basic
mathematics. This handbook is intended
for system analysts, system engineers, and managers. No previous knowledge or training in
statistics, reliability, or risk analysis is assumed. Basic concepts of statistical analysis,
reliability analysis, and risk analysis are presented in relevant chapters and
in the appendices.
The
first part of the handbook describes the concepts, steps, tools, and uses of
fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a
deductive, failure-based approach. As a
deductive approach, FTA starts with an undesired event, such as failure of a
main engine, and then determines (deduces) its causes using a systematic,
backward-stepping process.
The
second part of the handbook contains examples of the application of FTA in
studies that have been previously performed.
The focus is on aerospace applications.
The examples include the rupture of a pressure tank (a classic FTA
example), failure to initiate and terminate thrust in a monopropellant
propulsion system, failure of a redundant container seal (design analysis), and
a dynamic FT analysis of a mission avionics system..
NASA-Metrology Metrology—Calibration and Measurement Processes Guidelines, June
1994. 330 Pages.
Methodologies
and techniques acceptable in fulfilling metrology, calibration, and measurement
process quality requirements for NASA programs are outlined in the
Publication. The intention of this
Publication is to aid NASA Engineers and systems contractors in the design,
implementation, and operation of metrology, calibration, and measurement
systems. It is also intended as a
resource to guide NASA personnel in the uniform evaluation of such systems
supplied or operated by contractors.
NASA-PRA-1.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and
Practitioners, August 2002. 323
Pages.
The
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures Guide is neither a textbook nor
a sourcebook of PRA methods and techniques for the subject matter. It is the recommended approach and
procedures, based on the experience of the authors, of how PRA should be
performed for aerospace applications. It
therefore serves tow purposes:
1.
To complement the training material taught
in the PRA course for practitioners and, together with the Fault Tree Handbook, to provide PRA
methodology documentation.
2.
To assist aerospace PRA practitioners in
selecting and analysis approach that is best suited for their applications.
The material of this Procedures Guide is
organized into three parts:
1.
A management introduction to PRA is
presented in Chapters 1-3. After a
historic introduction on PRA at NASA and a discussion of the relation between
PRA and risk management, an overview of PRA with simple examples is presented.
2.
Chapters 4-14 cover probabilistic methods
for PRA, methods for scenario development, uncertainty analysis, data collection
and parameter estimation, human reliability analysis, software reliability
analysis, dependent failure analysis, and modeling of physical processes for
PRA.
3.
Chapter 15 provides a detailed discussion
of the “scenario-based” PRA process using two aerospace examples.
The only departure of this Procedures Guide
from the description of Experience-based recommended approaches is in the areas
of Human Reliability (Chapter 9) and Software risk Assessment (Chapter
11). Analytical methods in these two
areas are not mature enough, at least in aerospace applications. Therefore, instead of recommended approaches,
these chapters describe some popular methods for the sake of completeness. It is the hope of the authors that in future
editions it will be possible to provide recommended approaches in these two
areas also.
NASA-RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance Guide For
Facilities And Collateral Equipment, February 2002. 356 Pages.
NASA-RP-1253 Reliability Training, June 2000. 366 Pages.
The theme of this manual is failure
physics—the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and
what can be done about it. The intent is
to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability,
and to assist in achieving low-cost reliable products. In a broader sense the manual should do
more. It should underscore the urgent
need for mature attitudes toward reliability.
Five of the chapters were originally presented as a classroom course to
over 1000 Martin Marietta engineers and technicians. Another four chapters and three appendixes
have been added. We begin with a view of
reliability from the years 1940 to 2000.
Chapter 2 starts the training material with a review of mathematics and
a description of what elements contribute to product failures. The remaining chapter elucidates basic
reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate
failures.
NASA-SP-576 NASA Risk-Informed Handbook, April 2010,
128 pages.
The
purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the risk-informed decision making (RIDM)
requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency
Risk Management Procedural Requirements, with a specific focus on programs and projects
in the Formulation phase, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational
hierarchy as requirements flow down. Appendix A provides a cross-reference
between the RIDM-related requirements in NPR 8000.4A and the sections of this
handbook for which guidance is provided.
This
handbook supports RIDM application within the NASA systems engineering process,
and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA
Systems Engineering Handbook. Figure 1
shows where the specific processes from the discipline-oriented NPR 7123.1,
NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements, and NPR 8000.4 intersect
with product-oriented NPRs, such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and
Project Management Requirements; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and
Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements; and
NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management
Requirements. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook
is intended to provide guidance on the specific systems engineering processes
established by NPR 7123.1, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the
specific RIDM processes established by NPR 8000.4A.
This
handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the
context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of
direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and
project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with
existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA
organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be
prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a
sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as
needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook
highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of
potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to
recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.
NASA-SP-610S NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, June 1995, 149 Pages.
This
handbook is intended to provide information on systems engineering that will be
useful to NASA system engineers, especially new ones. Its primary objective is to provide a generic
description of systems engineering as it should
be applied throughout NASA. Field
centers’ handbooks re encouraged to provide center-specific details of
implementation.
For
NASA system engineers to choose to keep a copy of this handbook at their
elbows, it must provide answers that cannot be easily found elsewhere. Consequently, it provides NASA-relevant
perspectives and NASA-particular data.
NASA management instructions (NMIs) are referenced when applicable.
This
handbook’s secondary objective is to serve as a useful companion to all of the
various courses in systems engineering that are being offered under NASA’s
auspices.
NASA-SP-8053 Nuclear
and Space Radiation Effects on Materials, June 1970, 48 Pages
Space vehicles are subject to
bombardment by nuclear particles and electromagnetic rations from both external
and onboard sources. During some
missions, radiation exposure may be sufficient to degrade the critical
properties of structural materials and jeopardize flightworthiness of the
spacecraft.
This monograph is concerned
with the identification of the significant property changes induced in
structural materials by radiation from the nuclear reactor, the isotope power
source, and from space, and the exposure levels at which ehese
effects become important. Structural
materials are defined as those that provide fundamental load-carrying
capability or protection against the natural space environment while satisfying
a functional requirement (e.g., viewing port of astronaut). Material properties affected by radiation are
discussed in three categories in this monograph. These are:
1. Mechanical: Tensile strength, elasticity,
elongation, impact properties, fatigue strength, hardness, shear strength, and
dimensional stability.
2. Thermal:
Thermal conductivity and stored energy.
3. Optical: Emissivity, absorptance,
and reflectance.
NASA-SP-8054 Space Radiation Protection, June 1970, 50 Pages
Space vehicles are subjected
to a variety of penetrating energetic rations present in space that generally
have adverse effects on vehicle materials, components, or occupants, and these
may require some form of radiation protection.
Adverse effects manifest themselves in the form of changes in properties
of materials or components which impair their function, or they are
physiological changes in vehicle occupants which impair their function or
compromise their well-being. If
insufficient radiation protection is provided, these effects can result in
mission failure or permanent injury to vehicle occupants, or both.
The purpose of this monograph
is to establish criteria and procedures for determining doses caused by
penetrating space radiation and for the design of appropriate protection for
space vehicles. The objective is to
avoid exceeding specified allowable levels of radiation does and/or dose rate
for the duration of the mission. The
approach is first to calculate the doses received by each radiation-sensitive
item, considering the protection inherent in the vehicle structure and
contents, and the space radiation environment encountered during the
mission. If any doses exceed allowable
limits, then the design of shielding is implemented to reduce the doses to meet
the specifications, unless the adjustment of mission parameters or system
design (or specifications) can eliminate the necessity.
The prevailing types and
sources of penetrating space radiation are:
1. Solar cosmic rays, consisting chiefly of
protons, with some alpha particles (helium nuclei) ejected sporadically from
the sun during some solar-flare events.
2. Magnetically trapped protons and electrons in
the vicinity of the earth and other planets.
3. Galactic cosmic rays, consisting of a
continuous flux of protons and comparatively fewer heavier nuclei.
NASA-STD-8729.1 Planning, Developing And Managing An Effective
Reliability And Maintainability (R&M) Program, December 1998, 77 Pages
This
technical standard for reliability and maintainability (R&M) provides
guidance to customers (or purchasers) and suppliers (or contractors) on R&M
requirements development, design implementation, and evaluation. It has been developed to provide a
centralized source of information for establishing R&M performance-based
requirements, design factors, and metrics for use on all new NASA
programs/projects and contracts. It
addresses the challenge of managing mission risk in the development and
operation of cost and time constrained flight programs/projects and other NASA
assets.
This
document is intended as a guide to current techniques to identify and meet
customer product performance expectations.
It is structured to reflect the requirements of NPG 7120.5A “NASA
Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements” and the programmatic
policy of NPD 8720.1 “NASA Reliability and Maintainability Program Policy” as
they relate to the R&M disciplines in the Formulation, approval,
Implementation, and Evaluation sub processes of NASA programs/projects. It replaces previous NASA handbooks which
were derived from military standards and which mandated general reliability and
maintainability requirements for NASA programs/projects. This movement away from rigid standards and toward
flexible guidelines reflects government’s increased willingness to accept
mature, controlled commercial practices and seek industry solutions in the
development of civil and military systems.
This guidance is intended to assist engineering managers in achieving
the following R*M objectives throughout the life cycle of NASA in-house and
contracted activities:
·
Provide realistic R&M requirements for
system development specifications and requirements documents.
·
Allow for early and continuing attention to
R&M principles during system design.
·
Achieve system reliability and
maintainability as defined by the mission objectives.
·
Control system life cycle cost by
addressing operations and maintenance support costs drivers during system
design.
·
Measure, report and assess R&M
performance through the system life cycle.
·
Maintain a comprehensive and readily
accessible database of success and failure data for use in prediction, problem
trending, and assessment of progress toward system success goals through the
system’s life cycle as well as for establishment of R&M performance
requirements for follow-on or new programs/projects.
·
Emphasize continuous R&M improvement in
each successive generation of the system and its elements.
NASA-TM-4322 NASA
Reliability Preferred Practices for Design and Test, September 1991. 89 Pages.
This manual is produced to
communicate within the aerospace community design practices that have
contributed to NASA mission success. The
information presented has been collected from various NASA field centers and
reviewed by a committee consisting of senior technical representatives from the
participating centers.
The information presented in this
manual represents the “best technical advice” that NASA has to offer on
reliability design and test practices.
The practices contained in this manual should not be interpreted as
requirements but rather as proven technical approaches that can enhance system
reliability. Application of the
practices and guidelines is strongly encouraged, but the final decision
regarding applicability resides with the particular program or project office.
The manual is divided into two
technical sections. Section II contains
reliability practices, including design criteria, test procedures, or
analytical techniques that have been successfully applied on previous space
flight programs. Section III contains
reliability guidelines, including techniques currently applied to space flight
projects, where insufficient information exists to certify that the technique
will contribute to mission success.
NASA-TM-4628
Recommended
Techniques for Effective Maintainability, December 1994. 120 Pages.
Maintainability is a process for
assuring the ease by which a system can be restored to operation following a
failure. Designing and operating cost
effective, maintainable systems (both on-orbit and on the ground) as become a necessity within NASA. In addition, NASA cannot afford to lose
public support by designing less than successful projects. In this era of shrinking budgets, the
temptation to reduce up front cost rather than consider total program life
cycle costs should be avoided. In the
past, relation of R&M requirements to reduce up front
costs has resulted in end-items that did not perform as advertised and could
not be properly maintained in a cost effective manner. Additional costs result when attempts are
made late in the design phase to correct for the early relaxation of
requirements.
The purpose of this manual is to present a series of
recommended techniques that can increase overall operation effectiveness of
both flight- and ground-based NASA systems.
Although each technique contains useful information, none should be
interpreted as a requirement. The
objective is to provide a set of tools to minimize the risk associated with:
·
Restoring failed functions (both ground and flight based)
·
Conducting complex and highly visible maintenance operations
·
Sustaining a technical capability to support the NASA mission
utilizing aging equipment or facilities
This document provides:
1. program management
considerations – key elements of an effective maintainability effort;
2. design and
development considerations;
3. analysis and test
considerations – quantitative and qualitative analysis processes and testing
techniques; and
4. operations and
operational design considerations that address NASA field experience.
Updates will include
a section applicable to on-orbit maintenance with practical experience from
NASA EVA maintenance operations (including ground and on-orbit operations and
ground-based simulations). This document
is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing the
systems development process in accordance with the NASA “better, faster,
smaller, and cheaper” goal without compromising mission safety.
NATO-AQAP-100
Policy On An
Integrated Systems Approach To Quality Through The Life Cycle, February
2002. 36 Pages.
The
activities of the Armed Forces in NATO are carried out as a result of a
political decision process, primarily in order to provide a defence
service to society in the member nations.
Collaboration between NARO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners is a way of mitigating some of the cost of defence systems and providing a mutual defence
capability.
The
defence capability depends, to a great extent, on the
quality of defence systems containing integrated
hardware, software, facilities, people, and underlying processes. Quality is best achieved though
an integrated systems approach throughout the life cycle. This document provides information and
guidance on the NATO Policy for such an approach.
This
policy recognizes that quality management is a continuous process involving
multiple participants, including industry, that supports the development,
delivery and sustainment of military capability from concept to disposal. The overall aim is to acquire products that
fulfill the requirements seen in a life cycle perspective, to optimize internal
and external interfaces, and to develop good commercial relationships with
industry.
This
document should be used, as a part of the overall policy of an organization, to
ensure quality of life cycle processes, products and services. The document is not intended to be used as a
contractual document.
NATO-ARMP-1
NATO Requirements For
Reliability And Maintainability, June 2002.
21 Pages.
For
the purpose of this standard, all the reliability and maintainability
activities together constitute the
R&M programme.
SAE
Standard JA1000 fully applies for reliability and associated activities.
[The
scope of SAE JA1000: This SAE Standard establishes the requirement
for suppliers to plan a reliability program that satisfies the following three
requirements: a) the
supplier shall ascertain customer requirements, b) The supplier shall meet
customer requirements, c) The supplier shall assure that customer requirements
have been met. An implementation guide
is also available as SAE JA1000/1.]
SAE
Standard JA 1010 fully applies for Maintainability and associated
activities.
[The
scope of SAE JA1010: This SAE Standard establishes the requirement
for suppliers to plan a maintainability program that satisfies the following
three requirements: A) The supplier and customer shall reach agreement on
program requirements, b) The supplier shall meet customer requirements, c) The supplier shall assure that customer requirements have been
met. Applicability—This document
applies to activities related to the specification, design, development, and
assurance of any system (hardware and/or software) product or processes. Tailoring—This document does not specify the
activities, tasks or methods to be included in the program. Rather, the content of each program must be
tailored to satisfy customer requirements using the most appropriate means. An implementation guide is also available as SAE JA1010/1.]
NATO-ARMP-4
Guidance For
Writing NATO R&M Requirements Documents, October 2001. 52 Pages.
In
order to achieve high operational effectiveness with low life cycle cost the
Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) of defence
materiel should be given full consideration at all stages of the procurement
cycle. This process should begin at the
concept stage of the project and be continued, in a disciplined manner, as an
integral part of the design, development, production and testing process and
subsequently into service.
This
ARMP provides guidance on writing R&M requirement documents during the life
cycle of a project using the NATO Phased Armament Programming System (NATO
PAPS) as a framework.
This
document also contains the necessary information and advice to write
quantitative reliability and maintainability requirements, and availability and
risk requirements which are derived therefrom.
Realistic
R&M requirements should be stated properly and consistently in each
milestone of the NATO PAPS. The purpose
of this document is to:
a.
Describe the concepts and factors affecting
the formulation of R&M requirements to assist operational requirements
staff to define the basic R&M requirements, and the procurement agency to
convert these requirements into contractually agreed specifications.
b.
Describe a framework for the development of
the R&M content of each PAPS milestone.
NATO-ARMP-5E Guidance on Reliability
& Maintainability Training, February 1989. 29 Pages.
In
the most simple terms, people who require training in the theory and practice of
R&M are:
a)
those who are full-time and specialized
R&M practitioners, advisers or consultants
b)
those whose work involves them in decisions
or management processes concerned with R&M or brings them into contact with
specialized R&M practitioners
By
its very nature, specialized R&M knowledge is normally only acquired by
attendance at a second degree course or equivalent; such training will normally
be conducted only by Universities or comparable Institutions. The definition of such training is not an
appropriate subject for this publication and will not be considered
further. It remains only to be said
that, in the procurement of modern military equipment, the availability of
specialized R&M advice at this level is regarded as essential. Suitable trained and qualified specialist
must therefore be available and their advice sought at the earliest possible
date.
This
publication is addressed to the second category and its emphasized that
training at this level should cover the broadest possible field: purchasing and
procurement staff concerned with the procurement of NATO materiel, contractors
involved in design, development and production and also those responsible for
NATO material in-service.
NATO-ARMP-6E
Reliability And
Maintainability Part 6: In-Service R&M, December 1988. 24 Pages.
To
achieve and maintain R&M objectives defined during design, development and
production of defence materiel there may be a need to
assess and where necessary improve In-Service R&M.
Assessment
and where appropriate improvement of the In-Service R&M may be carried out
by various authorities – the original equipment contractor, the purchaser, the
military user, another contractor or any combination of these.
This
Part of the Defence Standard defines those measures
which must be considered by the sponsor, the Procurement Executive and the
Contractor, when there is a need for the preparation of an In-Service R&M
Assessment Plan, within the overall R&M plan for the specified defence materiel.
It
should be regarded as an expansion of Def Stan 00-04
(Part 1)/2 (ARMP-1) and Def Stan 00-40 (Part 2)/1
(ARMP-2) Appendices A paragraph 325.
NATO-ARMP-7 NATO R&M Terminology Applicable To ARMPs, July 2001. 25 Pages.
This
glossary is complied by direction of the Group of
National Directors for Quality Assurance in accordance with Part 1 of AAP-6
NATO Glossary of Terms & Definitions – Policy & Procedures for the NATO
Terminology Standardisation Programme. This glossary is not exhaustive. It is not designed to compete with any
existing reliability and Maintainability (R&M) glossary of terms, as it is
only relevant to terms included in Allied Reliability and Maintainability
Publications (ARMPs) which are not explicitly defined in those documents. In addition, where the terms in this glossary
differ from NATO-agreed terms, they are to be considered for ARMP use only. Its purpose is to explain specialist terms in
the ARMPs, thereby promoting mutual understating.
The
use of ISO 8402-1994 and IEC-50(191) terms has been approved by the appropriate
organizations.
NATO-ARMP-8E
Reliability And
Maintainability Part 8: Procurement Of Off-The-Shelf Equipment, July
1992. 27 Pages.
This part of the Standard provides
guidance on the measures to be taken for achieving acceptable levels of R&M
in the procurement of Off-the-Shelf (OTS) [COTS] equipment.
NAVAIR-00-25-403 Management Manual,
Guidelines For The Naval Aviation Reliability-Centered Maintenance Process,
July 2005, 195 pages
This
manual is the primary guidance document for anyone tasked with implementing and
RCM program or performing an RCM analysis on Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
managed equipment. Other RCM documents
are available from NAVAIR.
NAVAIR-Instruction-4790.20A Reliability-Centered Maintenance Program, May 1999, 8 Pages
This
document defines the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Reliability-Centered
Maintenance (RCM) Program and establish RCM Program policy, procedures, and
responsibilities with the Naval Aviation Systems Team (TEAM)
NAVAIR-RCM-VS-SAE-JA1011-Comparison, NAVAIR RCM Is Compliant With SAE JA1011, July 2004, 22 Pages
The
intent of this document is to demonstrate that the RCM process provided in
NAVAIR 00-25-403 is compliant with SAE JA1011.
NIST-HDBK-135
Life-Cycle Costing Manual for the Federal
Energy Management Program, February 1996.
222 Pages.
Handbook 1235 is a guide to
understanding the life-cycle cost (LCC) methodology and criteria established by
the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) for the economic evaluation of
energy and water conservation projects and renewable energy projects in all
federal buildings. It expands on the
life-cycle cost methods and criteria contained in the FEMP rules published in
10 CFR 436, Subpart A, which applies to all federal agencies. The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate
the implementation of the FEMP rules by explaining the LCCC method, defining
the measures of economic performance used, describing the assumptions and
procedures to follow in performing evaluations, giving examples, and noting
NIST computer software available for computation and reporting purposes. An annual supplement to Handbook 135, Energy
Price Indices and Discount Factors for LCC Analysis, NISTIR 85-3273-X is also
published by NIST to provide the current discount rate and discount factors
needed for conducting an LCC analysis in accordance with the FEMP rules. This annual supplement is required when using
Handbook 135.
NIST-HDBK-NISTIR-6806 Project-Oriented Life-Cycle Costing Workshop For
Energy Conservation In Buildings, September 2001. 341 Pages.
This student manual for the Project-Oriented Life-Cycle Costing
Workshop for Energy Conservation in Buildings is a workbook for a two-day
course on life-cycle costing developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Energy
Management Program (FEMP). The
methodology and procedures in this manual are consistent with 10 CFR Part 436A
and its amendments, which provide guidelines for the economic analysis of
investments in energy and water conservation and renewable energy projects for
federal buildings. These guidelines are
explained in detail in Life-Cycle Costing
Manual for the Federal Energy Management Program, handbook 135, 1995 edition. The methodology is also consistent with
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards on Building
Economics, in particular ASTM Standard Practices E917, E964, E1057, E1121, and
E1185.
NISTIR-327321 Energy Price Indices and Discount Factors for Life-Cycle Cost Analysis
– April 2010, May 2005. 81 Pages.
This
is the April 2010 edition of energy price indices and discount factors for
performing life-cycle cost analyses of
energy and water conservation and renewable energy projects in federal
facilities. It will be effective from
April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. This
publication supports the federal life-cycle costing methodology described in
10CFR436A and Circular A-94 by updating the energy price projections and
discount factors that are described, explained, and illustrated in NIST
Handbook 135 (HB 135, Life-Cycle Costing
Manual for the Federal Energy Management Program).
NUREG-74/014 (WASH-1400) Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of
Accident Risks in
This report is often referred to as WASH-1400 or the Rasmussen
Report [Professor Norman Rasmussen] which used probabilistic risk assessments
in the form of fault trees to demonstrate the risk of death to individuals was
very small and at an acceptable level compared to risk of other types of
accidents as shown in Table 6-3 reproduced below which shows:
TABLE
6-3 INDIVIDUAL RISK OF EARLY FATALITY
BY VARIOUS CAUSES
(U.S. Population Average 1969)
__________________________________________________________________
Approximate
Individual
Risk
Total Number Early
Fatality
Accident
Type for
1969 Probability/yr(a)
____________________________________________________________________
Motor Vehicle 55,791 3 x 10-4
Falls 17,827 9
x 10-5
Fires and Hot
Substance 7,451 4
x 10-5
Drowning 6,181 3
x 10-5
Poison 4,516 2
x 10-5
Firearms 2,309 1
x 10-5
Machinery
(1968) 2,054 1
x 10-5
Water
Transport 1,743 9
x 10-6
Air Travel 1,778 9 x 10-6
Falling
Objects 1,271 6
x 10-6
Electrocution 1,148 6
x 10-6
Railway 884 4 x 10-6
Lightning 160 5 x 10-7
Tornadoes 118(b) 4 x 10-7
Hurricanes 90(c) 4 x 10-7
All Others 8,695 4 x 10-5
All
Accidents (from Table 6-1) 115,000 6 x 10-4
Nuclear
Accidents (100 reactors) - 2 x 10-10 (d)
(a)
Based on
total
(b)
(1953-1971
avg.)
(c)
(1901-1972
avg.)
(d)
Based on
a population at risk of 15 x 106.
NUREG-75/014 was superseded by NUREG-1150 described
below for Severe Accident Risks.
Appendix
III & IV describe failure data (Appendix III) and common mode
failures with bounding techniques and special techniques (Appendix IV). It contains 170 pages and the file size is
8.5 Meg.
Appendix
V provides quantitative results of accident sequences. It contains 142 pages and the file size is
6.1 Meg.
Appendix
VI shows calculation of reactor accident consequences. It contains 500 pages and the file size is
23.7 Meg.
Appendix
VII through X describes release of radioactivity in reactor accidents
(Appendix VII). Physical processes in reactor meltdown accidents (Appendix
VIII), safety design rationale for nuclear power plants (Appendix IX), and
design adequacy (Appendix X). It
contains 682 pages and the file size is 32.9 Meg.
NUREG-0492 Fault Tree Handbook,
January 1981. 209 Pages.
This
handbook has been developed not only to serve as text for the System Safety and
Reliability Course, but also to make available to others a set of otherwise
undocumented material on fault tree construction and evaluation. The publication of this handbook is in
accordance with the recommendations of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report
(NUREG/CR-0400) in which it was stated that the fault/event tree methodology
both can and should be used more widely by the NRC. It is hoped that this document will help to
codify and systematize the fault tree approach to system analysis.
The
principal concern of this book is the fault tree technique, which is a
systematic method for acquiring information about a system. The information so gained can be used in
making decisions, and therefore, before we even define system analysis, we will
undertake a brief examination of the decision making [decision making]
process. Decision making is a very
complex process, and we will highlight only certain aspects which help to pat a
system analysis in proper context.
NUREG-0585 Three
Mile Island Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report. 55 Pages
The principal
conclusion of the Task Force is that, although the accident at Three Mile
Island stemmed from many sources, the most important lessons learned fall in a
general area we have chosen to call operational safety. This general area includes the topics of
human factors engineering, qualification, and training of operations personnel;
integration of the human-element in the design, operation, and regulation of
system safety; and quality assurance of operations. Specifically, the primary deficiency in reactor
safety technology identified by the accident was the inadequate attention that
had been paid by all levels and all segments of the technology to the human
element and its fundamental role in both the prevention of accidents and the
response to accidents. Thus, our policy
recommendations and our specific ideas for stimulating and accomplishing change
concentrate heavily on operations reliability and the associated design and
licensing review measures that support or augment operations reliability. But an important qualifier must be added to this
conclusion. That is, if the basic
responsibility for public safety is to remain in the private sector, in the
hands of the individual licensees for commercial nuclear power plants, then
significant change in the attention to operations reliability must take place
in the licensed industry. Operations is a "hands-on" concept and high
operations reliability can only be achieved in practice by those responsible
for "hands-on" functions.
NUREG-700 Human-System Interface
Design Review Guidelines. 659 Pages
The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE)
aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan
(NUREG-0800). Detailed design review procedures are provided in the HFE Program
Review Model (NUREG-0711). As part of the review process, the interfaces
between plant personnel and plant's systems and components are evaluated for
conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design ReviewGuidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 2), provides the
guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address
the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces
(HSIs). Since these guidelines only
address the HFE aspects of design and not other
related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural
design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of
actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a
design specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are
organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I
contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: displays, user-interface
interaction and management, and controls. These elements are used as building
blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the
guidelines for reviewing six such systems: alarm system, group-view display
system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, computerized
operator support system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines
for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for
the review of HSI support, i.e., maintainability of digital systems.
NUREG-0711 Human
Factors Engineering Program Review Model,
February 2004, 124 Pages
This document is
used by the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the human
factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for construction permits,
operating licenses, standard design certifications, combined operating
licenses, and for license amendments. The purpose of these reviews is to verify
that accepted HFE practices and guidelines are incorporated into the
applicant’s HFE program. The review methodology provides a basis for performing
reviews that address the twelve elements of an HFE program: HFE Program
Management, Operating Experience Review; Functional Requirements Analysis and
Function Allocation, Task Analysis, Staffing, Human Reliability Analysis,
Human-System Interface Design, Procedure Development, Training Program
Development, Human Factors Verification and Validation, Design Implementation,
and Human Performance Monitoring. Each review element is divided into four
sections: Background, Objective, Applicant Submittals, and Review
Criteria. References to sources of
additional information are also provided for each element.
Human
reliability analysis (HRA) is an integral activity of a complete probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA). A PRA is submitted in accordance with current NRC
requirements, if applicable. Human reliability analysis (HRA) seeks to evaluate
the potential for, and mechanisms of, human error that may affect plant safety.
Thus, it is an essential element in achieving the HFE design goal of providing
a design that will minimize personnel errors, allow their detection, and
provide recovery capability.
NUREG-1093 Reliability and Risk Analysis Methods
Research Plan, October 1984, 93 Pages.
This
document presents a plan for reliability and risk analysis methods research to
be performed mainly by the Reactor Risk Branch (RRB), Division of Risk Analysis
and Operations (DRAO), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. It includes those activities of other DRAO
branches which are very closely related to those of the RRB. Related or interfacing programs of other
division, offices and organizations are merely indicated.
The
primary use of this document is envisioned as an NRC working document, covering
about a 3-year period, to foster better coordination in reliability and risk
analysis methods development between the offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research
and Nuclear Reactor Regulation. It will
also serve as an information source for contractors and others to more clearly
understand the objectives, needs, programmatic activities and interfaces together
with the overall logical structure of the program.
NUREG-1150
Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power
Plants
This 1991 report from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission improves
on the probabilistic risk assessment of the Walsh-1400 report summarized in
NUREG-75 which is available in PDF format above. Report NUREG-1150 is less pessimistic, i.e.,
less concervative than NUREG-75/014 from the
1974/1975 period. NUREG-1150 shows the
current generation of nuclear plants for production of electricity exceeds the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s requirements for safety goals.
The
report is available in three volumes:
Volume 1 describes the Final Summary
Report. It has three parts:
Part
1 provides the background and objectives of the assessment and
summarizes methods used for risk studies.
It contains 59 pages and the file size is 3.6 Meg.
Part 2
provides a summary of results obtained for each of the five plants
studied. It contains 124 pages and the
file size is 6.2 Meg.
Part 3
provides perspectives on the results and discusses the role of this work in the
larger contest of the NRC. It contains
105 pages and the file size is 6.5 Meg.
Volume 2 describes Appendices A, B, and C of the Final Report
Appendix A
describes the risk methods used. It
contains 73 pages and the file size is 4.4 Meg.
Appendix B
shows examples of the risk calculations.
It contains 78 pages and the file size is 5.1 Meg.
Appendix C
describes issues important to quantification of risks. It contains 162 pages and the file size is
9.5 Meg.
Volume 3 describes Appendices D and E
of the Final Report
Appendix
D & E contains comments received about the report and staff
responses. Appendix D refers to the
first draft on February 1987, and Appendix E refers to the second version of
the report on June 1989. It contains 90
pages and the file size is 6.4 Meg.
NUREG-1420 Special Committee Review of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s Severe Accident Risks Report (NUREG-1150), August 1990. 93 Pages
In
April 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES) published a draft report “Severe Accident Risks: An
Assessment for Fiver U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” NUREG-1150. This report updated, extended and improved
upon the information presented in the 1974 “Reactor Safety Study,”
WASH-1400. Because the information in
NUREG-1150 will play a significant role in implementing the NRC’s Severe
Accident Policy, its quality and credibility are of critical importance. Accordingly, the Commission requested that
the RES conduct a peer review of NUREG-1150 to ensure that the methods, safety
insights and conclusions presented are appropriate and adequately reflect the
current state of knowledge with respect to reactor safety.
To
this end, RES formed a special committee in June of 1989 under the provisions
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The Committee, composed of a group of recognized national and
international experts in nuclear reactor safety, was charged with preparing a
report reflecting their review of NUREG-1150 with respect to the adequacy of
the methods, data, analysis and conclusions it set forth. The report which precedes reflects the
results of this peer review.
NUREG-1526 Lessons Learned from Early Implementation of The Maintenance Rule at Nine Nuclear Power Plants, June 1995, 48 Pages
This report
summarizes the lessons learned from the nine pilot site visits that were
performed to review early implementation of the maintenance rule using the
draft NRC Maintenance Inspection Procedure. Licensees followed NUMARC 93-01,
"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants." In general,
the licensees were thorough in determining which structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) were within the scope of the maintenance rule at each
site. The use of an expert panel was an
appropriate and practical method of determining which SSCs are risk
significant. When setting goals, all
licensees considered safety but many
licensees did not consider operating experience throughout the industry. Although required to do so, licensees were
not monitoring at the system or train level the performance or condition for
some systems used in standby service but not significant to risk. Most licensees had not established adequate
monitoring of structures under the rule.
Licensees established reasonable plans for doing periodic evaluations,
balancing unavailability and reliability, and assessing the effect of taking
equipment out of service for maintenance.
However, these plans were not evaluated because they had not been fully
implemented at the time of the site visits.
NUREG-1624
Technical Basis and Implementation Guidelines for A Technique for Human Event
Analysis (ATHEANA). April 2000,
NUREG-1624-cover-ch5,
115 pages
NUREG-1624-Section-6-through-11,
177 pages
NUREG-1624-Appendices,
277 pages
This report describes the most recent
version of a second-generation human reliability analysis (HRA) method called "A Technique for Human Event
Analysis," (ATHEANA), NUREG-1624, Rev. 1. ATHEANA is the result of
development efforts sponsored by the Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch in the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)'s Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research. ATHEANA was developed to address limitations identified in current
HRA approaches by providing a structured search process for human failure
events and unsafe acts, providing detailed search processes for error-forcing
context, addressing errors of commission and dependencies, more realistically
representing the human-system interactions that have played important roles in
accident response, and integrating advances in psychology with engineering,
human factors, and PRA disciplines. The report is divided into two parts. Part
I introduces the concepts upon which ATHEANA is built and describes the
motivation for following this approach. Part 2 provides the practical guidance
for carrying out the method. Appendix A provides retrospective ATHEANA based
analyses of significant operating events. Appendices B-E provide sample ATHEANA
prospective analyses (HRAs) for four specific human performance issues [for
these reactors: Three Mile Island 2, Crystal River Unit 3, North Anna 2, Salem
Unit 1, and Wolf Creek, Davis-Besse].
NUREG-1792 Good
Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), April 2005, 110 Pages
The
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is establishing “good practices” for
performing human reliability analyses (HRAs)
and reviewing HRAs to assess the quality of those analyses. The good practices were developed as part of
the NRC’s activities to address quality issues related to probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) and, as such, support the implementation of Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.200, “An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,” dated
February 2004.
The
HRA good practices documented in this report are of a generic nature; that is,
they are not
tied to any specific methods or tools
that could be employed to perform an HRA.
As such, the good practices support the implementation of RG 1.200 for
Level 1 and limited Level 2 internal event PRAs with the reactor at full
power. Their elements are directly
linked to RG 1.200, which reflects and endorses (with certain clarifications
and substitutions) the “Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear
Power Plant Applications” (RA-S-2002 and Addenda RA-Sa-2003) promulgated by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and “Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance” (NEI
00-02, Revision A3) promulgated by the Nuclear Energy Institute.
This
report is not intended to constitute a standard and, hence, it does not provide
de facto requirements; rather, this report is intended for use as a reference
guide. Consequently, the authors did not
write this report with the expectation that all good practices should always be
met. That is, the decisions regarding
which good practices are applicable — and the extent to which those practices
should be met — depends on the nature of the given regulatory application.
Therefore, it is important to
understand that certain practices may not be applicable for a given analysis,
or their applicability may be of limited scope.
NUREG-1842
Evaluation of Human Reliability Analysis Methods Against
Good Practice,
August 2006, 279 Pages
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has developed guidance for performing or evaluating human
reliability analyses (HRAs) to
support risk-informed regulatory decision-making and, in particular, the
implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.200, “An Approach for Determining the
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed
Activities,” dated February 2004. The
NRC’s detailed HRA guidance was developed in two phases. The first phase focused on developing “Good
Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis,” as documented in
NUREG-1792, dated April 2005. The second
phase, summarized in this report, evaluated the various HRA methods that are
commonly used in regulatory applications in the United States, with a
particular focus on the extent to which they provide guidance to satisfy the
good practices. Since the good practices
closely parallel the requirements of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard (RA-S-2002) promulgated
by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the HRA methods are
also evaluated against that standard by implication. Toward that end, this report includes
observations regarding the respective strengths and limitations of the HRA
methods, as well as summaries of the scope, underlying knowledge base, and
sources of quantification data associated with each method.
NUREG-1852
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in
Response to Fire,
October 2007, 101 Pages
This
report provides criteria and associated technical bases for evaluating the
feasibility and reliability of postfire operator
manual actions implemented in nuclear power plants. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) developed this report as a reference guide for agency staff
who evaluate the acceptability of manual actions, submitted by licensees as
exemption requests from the requirements of Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R,
“Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to
January 1, 1979,” to Title10, Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50),
as a means of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions during and
after fire events. The staff may use this information in the review of future postfire operator manual actions to determine if the
feasibility and reliability of the operator manual action were adequately
evaluated.
NUREG-1880
ATHEANA User’s Guide,
June 2007, 134 Pages
This
manuscript provides a user’s guide for the human reliability analysis (HRA)
method known as “A Technique for Human Event Analysis” (ATHEANA), which the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documented in NUREG-1624, Rev. 1,
dated May 2000. As the first publication of its kind, this user’s guide
describes both the quantitative and qualitative ATHEANA analysis approaches,
fully describing the revised quantification approach and presenting a simpler
description of the other ATHEANA elements needed to perform an HRA as part of a
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
Toward that end, this user’s guide strives to present the steps for
applying ATHEANA in a straightforward and succinct manner, so that HRA experts
can easily and effectively apply the technique. Consequently, although the
authors relied on NUREG-1624 as a primary resource for its development, the NRC
is publishing this user’s guide as a standalone document, such that it can be
used by analysts to apply the ATHEANA technique without the need to use NUREG-1624.
Also
see above for NUREG-1624 (in three parts), see below for NUREG/CR-6350, and Wikipedia
for more details.
NUREG-1921 EPRI/NRC-RES
Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines, November 2009, 322 Pages
During
the 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed methods for
fire risk analysis to support its utility members in the preparation of
responses to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, “Individual Plant Examination
- External Events” (IPEEE). This effort
produced a Fire Risk Assessment methodology for operations at power that was
used by the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) in support of the
IPEEE program and several NPPs overseas.
Although these methods were acceptable for accomplishing the objectives
of the IPEEE, EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized
that they required upgrades to support current requirements for risk-informed,
performance-based (RI/PB) applications.
In
2001, EPRI and the USNRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) embarked
on a cooperative project to improve the state-of-the-art in fire risk
assessment to support a new
risk-informed environment in fire
protection. This project produced a consensus document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI
1011989), entitled “Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities” which
addressed fire risk for at power operations. NUREG/CR-6850 developed high level
guidance on the process for identification and inclusion of human failure
events (HFEs) into the fire PRA (FPRA), and a methodology for assigning
quantitative screening values to these HFEs. It outlined the initial
considerations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and related fire effects
that may need to be addressed in developing best-estimate human error
probabilities (HEPs). However, NUREG/CR-6850 did not describe a methodology to
develop best-estimate HEPs given the PSFs and the fire-related effects.
In
2007, EPRI and RES embarked on another cooperative project to develop explicit
guidance for estimating HEPs for human failure events under fire generated
conditions, building upon existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods.
This document provides a methodology and guidance for conducting a fire HRA.
This process includes identification and definition of
post-fire human failure events,
qualitative analysis, quantification, recovery, dependency, and uncertainty.
This document provides three approaches to quantification: screening, scoping,
and
detailed HRA. Screening is based on
the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850, with some additional guidance for scenarios with
long time windows. Scoping is a new approach to quantification
developed specifically to support the
iterative nature of fire PRA quantification. Scoping is intended to provide
less conservative HEPs than screening, but requires fewer resources than a
detailed HRA analysis. For detailed
HRA quantification, guidance has been developed on how to apply existing
methods to assess post-fire fire HEPs.
NUREG/CR-1614
Approaches to Acceptable Risk: A Critical Guide, December 1980, 336 Pages
Acceptable-risk
decisions are an essential step in the management of technological hazards. In
many situations, they constitute the weak (or missing) link in the management
process. The absence of an adequate decision-making methodology often produce’s
indecision, inconsistency, and dissatisfaction. The result is neither good for
hazard management nor good for society.
This report offers
a critical analysis of the viability of various approaches as guides to
acceptable-risk decisions. It does so by:
(1) Defining
acceptable-risk decisions and examining some frequently proposed but
inappropriate, solutions.
(2) Characterizing
the essential features of acceptable-risk problems that make their resolution
so difficult. These are: uncertainty about how specific decision problems are
to be defined, difficulties in ascertaining crucial facts, the problematic
nature of the value issues that arise, the vagaries of human behavior that
render responses to hazards unpredictable, and inability to assess the adequacy
of decision-making processes and the degree to which their conclusions are to
be trusted.
(3) Creating a
taxonomy of decision-making methods, identified by how they attempt to address
the features of acceptable-risk problems listed below. The major categories
discussed here are:
- Professional judgment: allowing technical
experts to devise solutions;
- Bootstrapping: searching for historical
precedents that embody guides to future decisions; and
- Formal analysis: theory-based procedures
for modeling problems and calculating the best
decision.
(4) Specifying the
objectives that an approach should satisfy in order to guide social policy.
These are: comprehensiveness, logical soundness, practicality, openness to
evaluation, political acceptability, institutional compatibility, and
conduciveness to learning.
(5) Rating the
success of the approaches in meeting these objectives. Namely: How well does
each approach satisfy each objective?
How satisfactory are the approaches relative to one another? How might
one choose the most adequate approach for different decision problems?
The
following conclusions emerge from our analysis:
(1) Acceptable-risk
problems are decision problems, that is, they require a choice between
alternatives. That choice depends upon the alternatives, values, and beliefs
that are considered. As a result, there is no single all-purpose number that
expresses "acceptable risk" for a society.
(2) Values and
uncertainties are an integral part of every acceptable-risk problem. As a
result, there are no value-free processes for choosing between risky
alternatives. The search for an "objective method" is doomed to
failure and may blind the searchers to the value laden assumptions they are
making.
(3) None of the
approaches considered here offers an unfailing guide to selecting the most
acceptable alternative. Each gives special attention to some features of
acceptable-risk problems, while ignoring others. As a result, not only does
each approach fail to give a definitive answer, but it is predisposed to
representing particular interests and recommending particular solutions. Hence,
choice of a method is a political decision with a distinct message about who
should rule and what should matter.
(4) Acceptable-risk
debates are greatly clarified when the participants are committed to separating
issues of fact from issues of value. Yet, however sincere these attempts, a
clear-cut separation is often impossible. Beliefs about the facts of the matter
shape our values; in turn, those values shape the facts we search for and how
we interpret what we find.
(5) The controlling
factor in many acceptable-risk decisions is how the problem is defined (i.e.,
which options and consequences are considered, what kinds of uncertainty are
acknowledged, and how key terms are operationalized). As a result, definitional
disputes underlie some of the most rancorous political debates.
(6) Values, like
beliefs, are acquired through experience and contemplation. Acceptable-risk
problems raise many complex, novel, and subtle value issues, for which we may
not have well-articulated preferences. In such situations, the values we
express may be greatly influenced by transient factors, including
subtle.-aspects of how the question is posed.
(7) Even the most knowledgeable
experts may have an incomplete understanding of new and intricate hazards.
Indeed, some limits on breadth of perspective may be a concomitant of acquiring
a particular disciplinary or world outlook. In such cases, non-experts may
possess important supplementary information or viewpoints on hazards and their
consequences.
NUREG/CR-1916
A Risk Comparison, February 1981, 100 Pages
This
report presents data for the comparison of societal risk from natural and
man-made hazards. Only fatalities resulting from the hazards are used in the
comparison, with the data and the comparative analysis taken from current
literature. In comparing societal risks for most of the hazards, both expected
values and frequency vs. consequence curves are presented. For a subset of
hazards, notably the power generation technologies (nuclear, coal, oil, and
gas), which have not exhibited high consequence events (catastrophes), the
comparisons are based on estimated expected values only.
Individual
risk data are presented in two ways, a probability of death within a year and
the amount of life shortening of an average life span.
NUREG/CR-2258
Fire Risk Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants, September 1981, 193 Pages
A
methodology for evaluating the frequency of' severe consequences due to fires
in nuclear power plants is presented.
The methodology produces a log of accident scenarios and then assesses
the frequency of occurrence of each. Its
framework is given in six steps. In the first two steps, the accident scenarios
are identified qualitatively and the potential
of fires to cause
initiating events is investigated. The
last four steps are aimed at quantification.
The frequency of fires is obtained for different compartments in nuclear
power plants using Bayesian techniques. The results are compared with those of
classical methods and the variation of the frequencies with time is also
examined. The combined effects of fire
growth, detection, and suppression on component failure are modeled. The susceptibility of cables to fire and
their failure modes are discussed.
Finally, the limitations of the methodology and suggestions for further
research are given.
NUREG/CR-2350 Sensitivity Analysis Techniques: Self-Teaching Curriculum, June
1982, 146 Pages
This
is a tutorial on Latin Hypercube
Sampling. This document provided a
solid foothold in the computer modeling world for Latin Hypercube Sampling to
speed completion of computer simulations by a factor of roughly 10. The complete file is 47 Meg.
Other
background details are available from Ron Iman’s
website http://swtechcon.com/by_publication.shtml#CIS
particularly the 5-part series download from Communications in Statistics in 1980 and 1982 referring to “Small Sample Sensitivity Analysis Techniques
for Computer Models with an Application to Risk Assessment”, pages
1749-1842.
This
report contains discussions and exercises that illustrate the application of
the sensitivity analysis techniques developed at Sandia National Laboratories for
the Risk Methodology for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste Project. With this report the user may familiarize
himself with the application of the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) program and
the Stepwise Regression (STEP) program with the groundwater transport model
NWFT/DVM to do sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. The user may require the User’s Guides for
LHS (Sand 79-1473), STEP (SAND 79-1472), and NWFT/DVM (NUREG/CR-2081) to make
full use of this self-teaching curriculum.
This report is one of a series of self-teaching curricula prepared under
a technology transfer contract for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
NUREG/CR-3385
Measures of Risk Importance And Their Applications, May 1986, 116 Pages
The objectives of
this work are to evaluate the importance of the containment and the different
safety functions as assessed in probabilistic risk analyses. To accomplish this
objective, risk importance measures are defined to evaluate a feature's
importance in further reducing the risk and its importance in maintaining the
present risk level. One defined importance measure, called the feature's risk
reduction worth, is useful for prioritizing feature improvements which can most
reduce the risk. The other defined importance, called the feature's risk
achievement worth, is useful for prioritizing features which are most important
in reliability assurance and maintenance activities.
Any
type of feature can be evaluated for its risk reduction worth and its risk
achievement worth; safety functions, safety systems, components, surveillance
tests, human activities, mitigation functions, and containments can all be
quantified as to their worths. Evaluating the worth
in a structured manner from general safety function worths
to detailed component, test,
and human activity worths allows one to successively focus on the important
items. The worths also provide important information
for cost-benefit and value-impact analysis, as the report describes. The
limitations, assumptions and uncertainties of Probabilistic Risk Analysis
should be considered when making risk based decisions. Sensitivity analysis can
be used to identify the
importance of
assumptions and areas where more in-depth analysis is needed. Since much of the information contained in
the risk importance measures is relative, much of the analyses can be made
robust to risk analysis uncertainties.
The
defined risk worth measures are applied to the risk analyses performed in the
Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program (RSSMAP). Four plants
were analyzed in RSSMAP: Oconee, Grand Gulf, Calvert Cliffs, and Sequoyah, and
the risk worths are applied to each of the plant's
risk analysis. Safety functions, safety systems, containment, and certain components and human activities are specifically
evaluated for their worths.
NUREG/CR-5500-Vol-10
Reliability Study: Combustion Engineering Reactor Protection System, 1984-1998, November 2001, 464 Pages
This report documents an analysis of the
safety-related performance of the reactor protection system (RPS) at U.S.
Combustion Engineering commercial reactors during the period 1984 through
1998. The analysis is based on the four
variations of Combustion Engineering reactor protection system designs. RPS-operational data were collected for all
U.S. Combustion Engineering commercial reactors from the Nuclear Plant
Reliability Data System and Licensee Event Reports. A risk-based analysis was performed on the
data to estimate the observed unavailability of the RPS, based on fault tree
models of the systems. An engineering
analysis of trends and patterns was also performed on the data to provide
additional insights into RPS performance. RPS unavailability results obtained
from the data were compared with existing unavailability estimates from
Individual Plant Examinations and other reports.
NUREG/CR-5500-Vol-11
Reliability Study: Babcock & Wilcox Reactor Protection System, 1984-1998,
November 2001, 341 Pages
This
report documents an analysis of the safety-related performance of the reactor
protection system (RPS) at U.S. Babcock & Wilcox commercial reactors during
the period 1984 through 1998. The
analysis is based on the Oconee and Davis-Besse plant
designs. RPS operational data were collected for all U.S. Babcock & Wilcox
commercial reactors from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System and Licensee
Event Reports. A risk-based analysis was
performed on the data to estimate the observed unavailability of the RPS, based
on fault tree models of the systems. An
engineering analysis of trends and patterns was also performed on the data to
provide additional insights into RPS performance. RPS unavailability results obtained from the
data
were compared with
existing unavailability estimates from Individual Plant Examinations and other
reports.
NUREG/CR-6101
Software Reliability and Safety in Nuclear Reactor Protection Systems, June 1993, 150
Pages
Planning
the development, use and regulation of computer systems in nuclear reactor
protection systems in such a way as to enhance reliability and safety is a
complex issue. This report is one of a
series of reports from the Computer Safety and Reliability Group, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, that investigates different aspects of computer
software in reactor protection systems. There are two central themes in the
report. First, software considerations
cannot be fully understood in isolation from computer hardware and application
considerations. Second, the process of
engineering reliability and safety into a computer system requires activities
to be carried out throughout the software life cycle. The report discusses the
many activities that can be carried out during the software life cycle to
improve the safety and reliability of the resulting product. The viewpoint is
primarily that of the assessor, or auditor.
NUREG/CR-6350
A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA), May 1996, 114 Pages
Probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) has become an important tool in the nuclear power industry,
both for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the operating utilities.
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a critical element of PRA; however,
limitations in the analysis of human actions in PRAs have long been recognized
as a constraint when using PRA. A
multidisciplinary HRA framework has been developed with the objective of
providing a structured approach for analyzing operating experience and
understanding nuclear plant safety, human error, and the underlying factors
that affect them. The concepts of the framework have matured into a rudimentary
working HRA method. A trial application of the method has demonstrated that it
is possible to identify potentially significant human failure events from
actual operating experience which are not generally included in current PRAs,
as well as to identify associated performance shaping factors and plant
conditions that have an observable impact on the frequency of core damage. A general process was developed, albeit in
preliminary form, that addresses the iterative steps of defining human failure
events and estimating their probabilities using search schemes. Additionally, a
knowledgebase was developed which describes the links between performance
shaping factors and resulting unsafe actions.
NUREG/CR-6753 Review
of Findings for Human Contribution to Risk in Operating Events,
August 2001, 107 Pages.
This report presents the
findings of a study of the contributions of human performance to risk in
operating events at commercial nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program and the Human Performance Events
Database (HPED) were used to identify safety significant events in which human
performance was a major contributor to risk. Conditional core damage
probabilities (CCDPs) were calculated for these events using Systems Analysis
Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE) software and
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models.
Forty-eight events described in licensee event reports and augmented inspection team reports were reviewed . Human performance did not play a role in 11 of the events, so they were excluded from the sample. The remaining 37 events were qualitatively analyzed. Twenty-three of these 37 events were also analyzed using SPAR models and methods. Fourteen events were excluded from the SPAR analyses because they involved operating modes or conditions outside the scope of the SPAR models.
The results showed that human performance contributed significantly to analyzed events. Two hundred and seventy human errors were identified in the events reviewed and multiple human errors were involved in every event. Latent errors (i.e., errors committed prior to the event whose effects are not discovered until an event occurs) were present four times more often than were active errors (i.e., those occurring during event response). The latent errors included failures to correct known problems and errors committed during design, maintenance, and operations activities. The results of this study indicate that multiple errors in events contribute to the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) basic events present in SPAR models and that the underlying models of dependency in HRA may warrant further attention.
NUREG/CR-6791
Eddy Current Reliability Results from the Steam Generator Mock-up Analysis
Round-Robin, October 2009, 135 Pages
This report
presents the results of a nondestructive evaluation round–robin designed to
independently assess the reliability of steam generator (SG) tube inspection. A
steam generator mock–up at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) was used for this
study.
The goal of the round–robin was to
assess the current state of in–service eddy–current inspection reliability for
SG tubing, determine the probability of detection (POD) as a function of flaw
size or severity, and assess the capability for sizing of flaws.
Eleven teams participated in
analyzing bobbin and rotating coil mock–up data collected by qualified industry
personnel. The mock–up contains hundreds of cracks and simulations of artifacts
such as corrosion deposits and tube support plates. This configuration mimics
more closely than most laboratory situations the difficulty of detection and
characterization of cracks experienced in an operating steam generator.
An expert task group from industry, ANL, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the signals from the laboratory–grown cracks used in the mock–up to ensure that they provide reasonable simulations of those obtained in the field. The number of tubes inspected and the number of teams participating in the round–robin are intended to provide better statistical data on the POD and characterization accuracy than is currently available from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) qualification programs.
NUREG/CR-6823 Handbook of Parameter Estimation for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, September 2003, Pages.
Cover to Abbreviations,
23 Pages, 1.24 MB Chapter 7, 26 Pages, 1.94 MB
Chapters 1 - 2,
25 Pages, 1.89 MB Chapters 8 – 9,
31 Pages, 2.15 MB
Chapters 3 – 5,
31 Pages, 2.46 MB Appendices A – B, 41 Pages, 3.70 MB
Chapter 6, 84 Pages, 6.4 MB Appendices C – D, 33 Pages, 1.85 MB
Probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) is a mature technology that can provide a quantitative
assessment of the risk from accidents in nuclear power plants. It involves the
development of models that delineate the response of systems and operators to
accident initiating events. Additional models are generated to identify the
component failure modes required to cause the accident mitigating systems to
fail. Each component failure mode is represented as an individual “basic event”
in the systems models. Estimates of risk are obtained by propagating the
uncertainty distributions for each of the parameters through the PRA models.
The data analysis portion of a nuclear power plant PRA provides estimates of the parameters used to determine the frequencies and probabilities of the various events modeled in a PRA. This handbook provides guidance on sources of information and methods for estimating the parameters used in PRA models and for quantifying the uncertainties in the estimates. This includes determination of both plant-specific and generic estimates for initiating event frequencies, component failure rates and unavailabilities, and equipment non-recovery probabilities.
NUREG/CR-6791 Eddy Current Reliability Results from the Steam Generator Mock-up Analysis Round-Robin, October 2009, 135 Pages
This report presents the results of a nondestructive evaluation round–robin designed to independently assess the reliability of steam generator (SG) tube inspection. A steam generator mock–up at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) was used for this study. The goal of the round–robin was to assess the current state of in–service eddy–current inspection reliability for SG tubing, determine the probability of detection (POD) as a function of flaw size or severity, and assess the capability for sizing of flaws. Eleven teams participated in analyzing bobbin and rotating coil mock–up data collected by qualified industry personnel. The mock–up contains hundreds of cracks and simulations of artifacts such as corrosion deposits and tube support plates. This configuration mimics more closely than most laboratory situations the difficulty of detection and characterization of cracks experienced in an operating steam generator. An expert task group from industry, ANL, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the signals from the laboratory–grown cracks used in the mock–up to ensure that they provide reasonable simulations of those obtained in the field. The number of tubes inspected and the number of teams participating in the round–robin are intended to provide better statistical data on the POD and characterization accuracy than is currently available from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) qualification programs.
TM 5-698-1 Reliability/Availability of Electrical & Mechanical Systems For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Facilities, 154 March 2003. 101 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide facility manages with the information and procedures necessary to baseline the reliability and availability of their facilities, identify “weak links”, and to implement cost-effective means of improving reliability and availability.
The information in this manual reflects both the move to incorporate commercial practices and the lessons learned over many ears of acquiring weapon systems “by the book”. It specifically focuses on the availability of electrical and mechanical systems for command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facilities and the role reliability plays in determining availability. The manual, in the spirit of the new policies regarding acquisition, describes the objectives of a sound strategy and the tools available to meet these objectives.
TM 5-698-2 Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 6 October 2006. 96 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide facility managers with the information and procedures necessary to develop and update a preventive maintenance (PM) program for their facilities that is based on the reliability characteristics of equipment and components and cost. Such a PM program will help to achieve the highest possible level of facility availability at the minimum cost.
The information in this manual reflects the commercial practices and lessons learned over many years of developing cost-effective preventive maintenance programs for a wide variety of systems and equipment. It specifically focuses on developing PM programs for electrical and mechanical systems used in facilities based on the reliability characteristics of those systems and economic considerations, while ensuring that safety is not compromised. The process for developing such a PM program is called reliability-Centered Maintenance, or RCM. Two appendices develop key topics more deeply: appendix B, statistical distribution; and appendix C, availability.
TM 5-698-3 Reliability Primer For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 10 July 2003. 51 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to provide a basic introduction to and overview of the subject of reliability. It is particularly written for personnel involved with the acquisition and support of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment.
The information in this manual reflects the theoretical and practical aspects of the reliability discipline. It includes information from commercial practices and lessons learned over many years of developing and implementing reliability programs for a wide variety of systems and equipment. Although some theory is presented, it is purposely limited and kept as simple as possible.
TM 5-698-4 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) For Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Facilities, 29 September 2006. 75 pages
The purpose of this US Army technical manual is to guide facility mangers through the Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) process, directing them how to apply this type of analysis to a command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) facility. . It is particularly written for personnel involved with the acquisition and support of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. These facilities incorporate several redundant systems used to achieve extremely high availability that requires specialized tools, which are described in this manual, to conduct an accurate analysis.
The information in this manual will provide the facility manager the necessary tools needed to conduct a realistic approach to establish a relative ranking of equipments’ effects on the overall system. The methods used in this manual have been developed using existing concepts from various areas. These methods include an easy to use evaluation method to address redundancy’s affect on failure rates and probability of occurrence. Because a C4ISR facility utilizes numerous redundant systems this method is very useful for conducting a FMECA of a C4ISR facility. Examples will be provided to illustrate how this can be accomplished by quantitative (with data) or qualitative means (without data). Although heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are used as examples, the FMECA process can be applied to any electrical or mechanical system.
TM 5-698-5 Survey Of Reliability And Availability Information For Power Distribution, Power Generation, And Heating, Ventilating &